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Abstract 
It is generally acknowledged that the new millennium is likely to witness a broad based 
tendency towards being knowledge driven. One manifestation seems particularly important, 
viz. the realisation that the proactive management of the important organisational resource of 
intellectual capital (Ie) increasingly influences corporate performance. In order for companies 
to remain competitive in future, it appears essential that an appropriate understanding of the 
concept of intellectual capital management (IeM) be developed. In view of these 
observations, there is a need for a critical analysis of extant conceptual approaches and tools 
to IeM. The objective of the present study was to contribute to an improved understanding of 
the concept of IeM. To achieve this objective it was considered fundamental to first establish 
conceptual clarity concerning the resource to be managed through IeM, viz. Ie. In a second 
step, an important task for the achievement of the objective was a critical analysis of extant 
IeM approaches and tools, to investigate their rationale, origin, and, purpose, as well as to 
establish advantages and disadvantages inherent in their operationalisation. 
Scrutiny of the literature revealed that conceptual vagueness and obscurity surround the term 
Ie, and that no clear consensus has yet been established concerning its anatomy. In spite of 
the divergent views on the definition and the generic properties of Ie a preliminary definition 
of Ie could be established by way of a comparative analysis. It was further demonstrated that 
the anatomy of intellectual capital can be synthesised into a categorisation scheme involving 
three distinct building blocks, viz. internal capital, human capital and external capital. 
Three IeM approaches and tools were eclectically chosen and critically analysed: i) Sveiby's 
"Intangible Asset Monitor," ii) Kaplan and Norton's "Balanced Scorecard," and iii) 
Edvinnson's "Skandia Ie Navigator." These were selected because they were considered to 
encapsulate pioneering efforts and thus represent the status quo on IeM. Analysis suggested 
that the three models differ in scope and purpose, i.e. different approaches exist as to whether 
intellectual capital should be managed in isolation or in conjunction with financial capital, and 
as to whether they should be used for internal measurement purposes or external reporting. 
Moreover, extant IeM approaches and tools appear to be static in that they account primarily 
for stocks of intellectual capital, rather than for flows between the individual Ie categories. 
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The salient conclusion of the study was that extant ICM tools are primarily concerned with 
the measurement of intangible corporate assets and not with their management per se. 
Based on the conclusions of the study a number of recommendations were forwarded, both in 
terms of a better understanding of the concept of ICM as well as suggestions for the 
advancement of business applications and theory. The propositions made range from a 
validation of the three components of IC discerned in the study to a development of specific 
management directives for ICM. 
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Auszug 
Angesichts der Tatsache, dass seit einigen lahren in Forschungsinstituten zu Fragestellungen 
des Wissensmanagements gearbeitet wird und immer mehr namhafte Firmen in diesem Gebiet 
Projekte starten, kann das Management von Wissen als die groesste Herausforderung fuer das 
neue Millennium postuliert werden. Besonders wichtig fuer Unternehmungen scheint zu sein, 
das Management der strategischen Resource Intellektuellen Kapitals als zentralen Hebel fuer 
die Sicherung der Wettbewerbsfaehigkeit zu erkennen und verstehen. Urn ein Verstaendnis 
des Management dieser Resource zu erleichtern, scheint eine kritische Analyse aktueller 
konzeptioneller Ansaetze und Modelle notwendig. Das Ziel der vorliegenden Studie war es, 
zu einem verbesserten Verstaendnis des Konzeptes "Intellectual Capital Management" (ICM) 
beizutragen. Die Vorgehensweise war wie folgt: Ais wichtiger erster Schritt zaehlt die 
Herstellung konzeptioneller Klarheit ueber die Resource Intellektuelles Kapital, die durch 
Ansaetze und Modelle gemanaged werden kann. Drei solcher Ansaetze und Modelle wurden 
im zweiten Schritt im Bezug auf Vor- und Nachteile ihrer Operationalisierbarkeit 
systematisch analysiert. 
Sorgfaeltige Literatuerstudien haben ergeben, dass noch immer konzeptionelle Unklarheit 
bezueglich des Begriffs Intellektuelles Kapital vorherrscht und dass bisher noch kein klarer 
Konsens zur Struktur von Intellektuelfem Kapital etabliert wurde. Trotz dieser definitorischen 
Uneinigkeiten und unterschiedlichen Meinungen zu Struktur und Bausteinen, konnte als 
Ergebnis einer komparativen Analyse eine Definition von Intellektuellem Kapital festgehalten 
werden. Es wurde gezeigt, dass Intellektuelles Kapital in ein Kategorisierungsschema 
synthetisiert werden kann, welches die drei Bausteine Internes Kapital, Externes Kapital und 
Kunden Kapital umfasst. 
Drei ICM Ansaetze und Modelle wurden ekletisch ausgewaehlt und anschliessend kritisch 
analysiert: i) Sveibys "Intangible --Asset Monitor," ii) Kaplan und Nortons "Balanced 
Scorecard," sowie iii) Edvinnsons "Skandia Ie Navigator." Die Wahl fiel auf diese drei 
Modelle, im Wesentlichen weil der inherente Pioniergeist in der Literatur anerkannt ist und 
ihre Analyse somit einen guten Einblick in den status quo des ICM Forschungsgebietes 
gewaehrt. Ais Ergebnis der Analyse bleibt festzuhalten, dass die Modelle sich in Umfang und 
Zielsetzung unterscheiden. Unterschiede konnten insbesondere festgeste11t werden 
hinsichtlich drei Fragen: SolI Intellektuelles Kapital in Isolation oder in Verbindung mit 
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Finanzkapital gemanaged werden? Soli en ICM Modelle fuer interne Wissensbewertung oder 
externe Bilanzbewertung dienen? ZeicJmen sich die Modelle durch eine statische 
Bestandaufnahme von unsichtbaren Vermoegenswerten aus oder durch die Systematisierung 
dynamischer Fluesse zwischen den einzelnen Bausteinen lntelletkuellen Kapitals? Die 
\vichtigste Schlussfolgerung, die gezogen \vurde, sagt aus dass aktuelle lCM Ansaetze und 
Modelle sich im Wesentlichen mit der Bewer/ung unantastbarer Firmengueter und nicht mit 
dem eigentlichen A1anagemenf solcher Gueter befasst. 
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Part I: Conceptual Frame 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
It is generally acknowledged that the new millennium is likely to witness a broad-based, 
knowledge-driven tendency in business and society (see, e.g. Quinn, 1992; Stehr, 1994; 
Toffler, 1990). This could result in a modification of the competitive conditions in which 
business enterprises are currently operating (see, e.g. Porter, 1997, 1998). If companies are 
not to lose their competitive position in this changing environment, a complete re-orientation 
in strategic thinking and management practice is required. More specifically, explicit attention 
will have to be accorded to the newly emerging phenomenon of "Intellectual Capital" (IC), 
and to the managerial implications thereof (see, e.g. Sveiby, 1997; Edvinsson and Malone, 
1997; Stewart, 1998; Brooking, 1996). The most pertinent environmental trends and 
discontinuities, as well as their managerial implications for business enterprises, for~ the 
background to this study and are briefly sketched below. 
1.1.1 Environmental trends and discontinuities, and the increasing importance of 
intellectual capital 
An increasing awareness of the role played by knowledge and IC in the international 
economy, as well as society in general, can be observed in the current literature. 
Countless expressions exist for the contemporary and developing economIC and social 
environment in which business enterprises will have to compete in future. Authors in 
academia and business practice alike, describe an emerging "dangerous society, age, or era" 
(Sveiby, 1997). Expressions utilised range from "Global Information Society" (The European 
- ~ ~ --
Commission, 1994), "Third Wave Economy" (Toffler, 1980; Zey, 1997), "Information 
Economy" (Carnoy, Castells, Cohen, and Cardoso, 1993), "Information Age" (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996), "Post Industrial Society" (Bell, 1974) and "Knowledge Society" (Masuda, 
1980; Nasbitt, 1982; Stehr, 1994) to "Knowledge Economy" (OECD, 1996; Stewart, 1998). 
In the "knowledge era" (Savage, 1996), which is characterised by "future shock" (Toffler, 
1970), "unreason" (Handy, 1990), and "smart machines" (Zuboff, 1988), "jumping the curve" 
seems to be the advisable behaviour in a business environment (Imparato and Harari, 1994) 
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where new rules for competition are increasingly driven by IC (Roos, 1998; Bontis, 
Dragonetti, Jacobsen, and Roos, 1999). The potential impact of knowledge on a wide variety 
of industries seems of such magnitude that some observers refer to it as the "Knowledge 
Revolution" (Stewart, 1998; Badaracco, 1991). 
Possibly as a result of these environmental trends and discontinuities "wealth creation is now 
[becoming] a mental event" (Edvinnson and Malone, 1997). This opinion is also endorsed by 
Savage who indicates that with the transition from one historical era to the next, a shift in the 
source of wealth creation is incidental. Savage argues that a dominant source of wealth 
creation seems attributable to each era, i.e. land to the agricultural era, labour to the early 
industrial era, and financial capital to the fading late industrial era (Savage, 1997). 
Concomitant with the dawning of the knowledge era, a new form of capital seems to emerge 
as dominant source of wealth creation, viz. intellectual capital (Quinn, 1992; Roos, 1996; 
Quinn, Anderson, and Finkelstein, 1996; Stewart, 1998). This organisational resource IS 
enjoying increasing attention from numerous scholars and practitioners. The momentum 
behind the proliferation of interest in IC may be attributable to the fact that IC represents an 
increasingly large component of a company's overall market value. 
In many instances IC even supersedes corporate book values and is hence commonly referred 
to as the "value gap" between market and book value (see e.g. Brooking, 1996; Von Krogh 
and Roos, 1996; Jordan and Jones, 1997; Sveiby, 1997). It is thus not surprising that among 
these observers, a consensus has transpired as to the significance of Ie. It is widely agreed 
that the gap between market and book value is becoming too wide to be ignored by managers 
(Edvinnson, 1998; Roos, Roos, Edvinnson, and Dragonetti, 1998; Stewart, 1998; Sullivan, 
1998). 
Interestingly, while it is widely acknowledged that IC is important, no consolidation has as 
yet evolved concerning the anatomy and definition of this phenomenon. Different definitions 
of IC (Edvinnson and Sullivan, 1998; Stewart, 1998; Roos and Roos, 1997) as well as 
approaches to the categorisation thereof (Saint-Onge, 1996; Edvinnson, 1997; Sveiby, 1997; 
Sullivan, 1998) are offered in the current management literature. Although similarities 
between these approaches are identifiable, definitions of IC often seem elusive. Conceptual 
vagueness and obscurity still appear to surround the anatomy of IC. 
2 
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1.1.2 Managerial implications: an emerging need for managing intellectual capital 
The increasing relevance of IC seems to have provided the impetus for a growing interest in 
appropriate approaches and mechanisms that may be employed to manage this important 
resource. Inquiries have therefore been pursued into the rapid diffusion of knowledge 
companies (Drucker, 1988, 1992; Senge, 1990; Sveiby and Lloyd, 1987; Rheingold, 1993), 
the increasing impact of knowledge on organisational design and structure (Mintzberg, 1983; 
Brunsson, 1985; Grenier and Metes, 1992; Czamiawska-Joerges, 1993; Johansen and Swigart, 
1994), the shift from traditional towards knowledge enriched production skills (Lloyd, 1988; 
Pascale, 1990; Toffler, 1990; Peters, 1992; Wheatley, 1995; Darling, 1996), and the rise of the 
knowledge worker (Schoen, 1983; Leinberger and Tucker, 1991; Coupland, 1991; Drucker, 
1993, 1999a, 1999b). All these factors work together in different ways to create new 
organisational and managerial theory, approaches, tools, and measures relating to intellectual 
capital management (ICM). 
At the heart of this shared interest seems to reside the conviction that adequate managerial 
attention should be given to the critical resource of IC. A natural conclusion, parallel to the 
recognition of IC's increasing relevance to corporate market value, would be the 
acknowledgement of the need to proactively manage it. Neglecting the management of IC, is 
likely to have severe implications for business organisations. As Roos, Roos, Edvinnson, and 
Dragonetti predict, "in the modem business world, the business imperative is to manage 
intellectual capital or die" (Roos, Roos, Edvinnson, and Dragonetti, 1998). 
The above-mentioned authors generally agree that ICM is vital for companies wishing to stay 
competitive in future. No consensus, however, seems to have been reached as to what such 
management of IC actually entails or should entail. This divergence in views can be seen as a 
major factor impeding an improved understanding of the concept. The potential merits of the 
present study should be· viewed against- the background sketched above. The study intends 
investigating and clarifying the conceptual approaches and tools to IC, as well as its 
management. 
;J 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
The aforementioned environmental trends and discontinuities (in particular the concomitant 
increase in importance of Ie), seem to call for a substantial rethinking by business enterprises 
of their currently employed management approaches. It would be beneficial for managers to 
realise that holistic thinking will have to be increasingly employed in order to navigate 
companies successfully into the complexity of the knowledge era. A sound grasp of 
appropriate approaches and tools, which adequately address the dynamics imposed by Ie on 
organisational actions, is incumbent. It would appear that without such knowledge, attention 
could not be adequately given to Ie and its management. Without devoting managerial 
attention to this critical corporate success factor, a company is likely to ignore a considerable 
source of value creation. It may face a competitive disadvantage relative to companies that 
tend to Ie in an appropriate fashion. 
Obscurity and diverging VIews, however, appear to prevail as to how managers should 
manage corporate Ie. In particular, the question of whether Ie should be managed separately 
or in conjunction with traditional financial assets, seems as yet largely unanswered. 
Furthermore, the purpose of ICM seems unclear in the literature. Last but not least, it should 
also be appreciated that an appropriate understanding of IeM approaches and tools seems to 
be additionally complicated by the fact that discordant perceptions of the anatomy of IC 
prevail. In other words, the question of how to manage Ie seems to be compounded by the 
question of what to manage. 
The implications of the above indicate the following: 
(a) It would be important for an investigation into IeM to establish conceptual clarity 
concerning the definition and anatomy (constituent parts) of the phenomenon to be 
managed, viz. Ie. This is considered fundamental in view of the fact that a discussion 
of extant IeM approaches presupposes that clarity prevails as to what exactly ICM 
means. While scholarly attention has been given to definitional aspects of this new 
"buzzword" (Petrash, 1994, 1996; Edvinnson, 1997; Sullivan, 1998) and approaches 
to categorise it (Saint-Onge, 1996; Edvinnson, 1997; Sveiby, 1997; Sullivan, 1998), 
divergent views seem to be prevalent in the literature concerning its anatomy. An 
4 
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.. important first step to providing an improved understanding of IeM, would therefore 
be to establish clarity concerning the definition and anatomy ofIe. 
(b) With the rising importance of Ie seems to have come the recognition of the need to 
manage this form of corporate capital. Predicated on the belief that IeM enhances the 
competitive positions of organisations, a variety of theories has been advanced to 
manage Ie. Interestingly these theories seem to take different stances as to whether 
the management of Ie should be pursued in isolation or in conjunction with financial 
capital. Some authors focus exclusively on Ie (Sveiby, 1997; Stewart, 1998), whereas 
other authors link IeM to the management of financial resources, thereby adopting a 
more holistic and integrated outlook on management (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; 
Edvinnson and Malone, 1997). In view of the different opinions it seems relevant to 
j investigate the appropriateness of the individual approaches to IeM. 
(c) As the relevance of Ie to corporate success has increasingly been acknowledged, a 
natural subsequent step by academics and business practitioners has been to devote 
adequate attention to the management of this critical resource. Although the need to 
manage Ie through formalised frameworks is generally agreed upon (see, e.g. 
Brooking, 1997; Roos and Roos, 1997; Bontis, Dragonetti, Jakobsen, and Roos, 
1999), it appears that no consensus has yet emerged concerning the overall objective 
for IeM. Thus different interpretations of the overall purpose of IeM are evident in 
the literature, e.g. measuring for the purpose of external benchmarking (Edvinsson 
and Malone, 1997; Edvinsson, 1997; Hiebeler, 1996; 1997), or measuring for internal 
purposes (see, e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a; Sveiby and Risling, 1986), and 
sometimes for both (Sveiby, 1997, 1998a; 1998e). In other instances, managing in 
general is seen as the key assignment of IeM (Stewart, 1998; Sullivan, 1998; Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996a, 1996b). It should be appreciated that these different viewpoints 
concerning the purpose of IeM, and the resulting divergence in specific management 
directives, can be interpreted as a major impediment to an understanding of the 
concept. 
5 
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1.3 Objective of the thesis 
The overall objective of the thesis is to contribute to an improved understanding of the 
concept of ICM by way of conceptually clarifying IC, and providing a critical analysis of 
extant ICM approaches and tools. 
1.4 Scope of the analysis 
In order to provide a comprehensive insight into the concept of ICM it is essential to analyse a 
broad spectrum of available international literature. ICM is considered to be a newly 
emerging topic of growing interest to researchers (Stewart, 1998; Brooking, 1996, 1997; 
Roos, 1998). Scholars and business practitioners alike increasingly accept its significance to 
corporate success. In view of this requirement, the literature consulted for this study 
comprises academic as well as practical sources. A sound balance was sought between the 
practical relevance of the investigation and academic entrenchment. 
It has to be noted, however, that the majority of the available literature is of North American 
and European origin. This is a rather untypical phenomenon in the business management 
realm which seems typically characterised by an purely USA bias. While it is obvious that the 
bilateral bias may on the one hand represent a limitation of the study, it could also be 
interpreted as further enhancing the study's validity. The North American literature is in fact 
complemented and validated by European sources. One might argue that the European flavour 
puts a potential "Americanism" into perspective and vice versa. Hence, it is considered 
appropriate to delimit the scope of the present study to the available literature of USAf 
European origin. This approach, however, has implications when inferences drawn from the 
present study are applied to newly industrialised countries. The approach thus possibly limits 
the conclusions and recommendations of the present study to a Western setting. 
Within in the delimited scope of USA and European literature, three approaches and tools, 
critically analysed in part III of the study, have been chosen. After scrutiny of the literature, 
the choice was specifically made, using an eclectic approach. Based upon the author's 
understanding the three approaches and tools (viz. Balanced Scorecard, Intangible Asset 
Monitor and Skandia IC Navigator) encapsulate pioneering efforts and current streams of 
thought on rCM. It is believed that scrutiny of the selected approaches sheds more light on 
rCM and thereby contributes to an enhanced understanding of the concept. 
6 
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It should also be appreciated that the present study acknowledges the existence of constructs 
that seem to be related to, or overlapping with, the phenomenon under investigation, e.g. 
knowledge management (see, e.g. Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Allee, 1997; von Krogh and 
Roos, 1995; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). It would however go beyond the scope of the study 
to offer a detailed delimitation ofICM and knowledge management. A brief attempt is offered 
by Sveiby who contends that knowledge management and ICM can best be interpreted as 
"two branches of the same tree" (Sveiby, 1998c: 1). Wiig (1997) as well as Roos, Roos, 
Edvinnson and Dragonetti (1998) elaborate on Sveiby's contention and provide more detailed 
frameworks for illustrating the relatedness and differences between both concepts. The 
present study shares the views of these authors and concentrates on ICM exclusively. 
Ultimately, from the comments made earlier, it should be apparent that ICM appertains to all 
sectors of the economy (i.e. public, private, and non-profit). In fact, several authors (e.g. 
Edvinnson and Malone, 1997) stress its applicability to public and non-profit environments. 
This study, however, concentrates on the applicability ofICM to business enterprises and will 
not be concerned with investigating its applicability to other sectors of the economy. 
1.5 Methodology employed 
The basis for the present thesis is deductive in nature and predominantly rests on secondary 
sources of information, North-American and European, academic and popular, and published 
as well as unpublished books, articles, research reports, official documents, company annual 
reports, web sites, and other relevant documents that have been collected through library 
research and internet research. To enhance the validity of the results and, conclusions, 
unstructured preliminary opinions from international experts in the intellectual capital 
management field have been sought bY,rneans of personal communication or the use of 
electronic mail. 
In order directly address the objective of the study, the research is explicitly designed in a 
logical sequence that connects the collected material to the study's initial research questions 
and, ultimately to its conclusions and recommendations (Yin, 1994). To this end a qualitative 
research approach has been applied in which the data processing aims to organise and 
categorise the collected material in such manner that meaningful analyses and evaluation can 
follow. At strategic points throughout the study "summative evaluation statements" (McNiff, 
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Lomax, and Whitehead, 1996) have been made to demonstrate how the individual chapters 
and sections, individually and combined, contribute to an improved understanding of the 
concept oflCM. Illustrative case studies have been included when considered appropriate. 
The method of investigation exhibits heuristic elements, i.e. past experience was used to solve 
conceptual and technical problems. The research approach is phenomenological in the spirit 
of Mumford (1984) who holds that a phenomenological study cannot claim to have a proof of 
its findings. There is only a reliance on its method and the hope that other people besides its 
author will regard its descriptions as true and accurate. It is therefore not the aim of this thesis 
to claim ultimate truth by alleging that the findings are of relevance to all business 
organisations, nor are the results meant to be valid in all circumstances. The aim is rather to 
present preliminary findings, which may at best contribute to an overall understanding of the 
concept of I CM and serve as a basis for further investigations on the topic. 
It should additionally be emphasised that the study has been conducted in the spirit of Reason 
and Rowan who propose a post-positivist paradigm of "objectively subjective" inquiry as an 
antithesis of traditional positivist research methods (Reason and Rowan, 1981). The authors 
suggest that their paradigm constitutes a synthesis of "naIve inquiry and orthodox research" 
(Reason and Rowan, 1981: xiii). Hence, this paradigm would in principle be applicable to the 
present study due to its combinatory approach of scientific method and subjective reasoning. 
1.6 Structure of the presentation 
This study is presented in three parts and seven chapters. 
1.6.1 Part I: Conceptual frame 
Part I comprises chapters 1-3, and presents a general introduction to, and conceptual frame of 
reference for, the concept of ICM by providing an improved understanding of the resource to 
be managed, viz. Ie. 
Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the thesis and includes a general background section in 
which relevant environmental trends and discontinuities and their managerial implications are 
briefly outlined. After the statement of the problem which motivated this thesis, the objective 
8 
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of the study follows. The scope within which the analysis was made, is subsequently 
delineated. Thereafter the methodology utilised is briefly sketched with reference to the 
individual epistemological (theory of knowledge) and methodological assumptions which 
have been adopted for the purpose of the present thesis. Finally the structure of the thesis is 
presented in order to demonstrate the flow of argumentation. 
Chapter 2 reports the findings of a review of the literature on Ie. Particular emphasis was 
placed on an analysis of definitions and properties of, as well as approaches to, the 
categorisation of IC. A variety of scholarly and practical research efforts eminent in the 
management research realm, were investigated to establish inherent commonalities and 
differences. The ultimate objective of this exercise was to synthesise current thought on the 
anatomy of IC and to provide a preliminary definition of IC, i.e. to establish clarity 
concerning the resource to be managed through ICM. 
Chapter 3 serves as an essential background and basis to the development of an)mproved 
understanding of ICM. It is laid out in case study format and indicates the potential 
managerial dangers of neglecting IC as an important source of corporate value creation. The 
insights gained throughout the discussion emphasise the potential of management approaches 
that accord explicit attention to corporate IC. Before such ICM approaches and tools are 
critically analysed, however, the need for these models would have to be established. The 
purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the need for ICM by way of illustration of the 
generic importance of IC in a wide spectrum of industries. 
In summary, the purpose of part I is to provide the conceptual frame for the following part of 
the discussion. This is done by, firstly, conveying an introductory picture of the field of study 
to be covered; secondly, by providing a definition of and approach to anatomise IC; and 
thirdly, by demonstrating the need to manage IC. Thus, part I establishes conceptual clarity of 
IC, the resource to be managed through ICM, with the ultimate objective of contributing to an 
improved understanding of ICM. Such improved understanding represents the platform for an 
examination of approaches and tools that are designed for the management of this 
organisational resource, which follows in part II. 
·9 
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1.6.2 Part II: Critical analysis of extant intellectual capital management approaches 
and tools 
Part II consists of the three constituent chapters 4-6. The analyses in part II are built on the 
insights gained throughout part I. Based on these insights, the analyses in part II can proceed 
to investigate approaches and tools that attempt to manage Ie. 
Chapter 4 contains an analysis of Sveiby's Intellectual Asset Monitor - a tool with a specific 
focus on the management of IC. Chapter 5 deals with Kaplan and Norton's Balanced 
Scorecard - a holistic performance measurement tool. Chapter 6 presents Edvinsson's Skandia 
Navigator - an ICM approach and tool, drawing from both foregoing approaches. A thorough 
understanding of these approaches and tools will be developed in order to improve an 
understanding of the concept of ICM as currently portrayed in the literature. The objective of 
part II is to uncover implicit assumptions, individual premises, and operational environments 
where each tool is designed to be deployed. Particular emphasis will be given to the inherent 
limitations of these ICM approaches and tools, by way of critical examination of their 
sophistication in managing IC in a wider context of corporate management. 
The objective of part II suggests that, for expository purposes, the individual chapters be 
structured analogously. Hence, throughout chapters 4-6 the origins of the individual 
approaches and tools are firstly elucidated. With the origin appreciated, the rationale and 
purpose of the approaches and tools can better be understood. Based on these insights, 
analysis proceeds to critically examine the relative level of sophistication of each ICM tool in 
catering for the concept oflC as was investigated in part I. 
In summary, the purpose of part II is to provide a good grasp of extant ICM approaches and 
tools. It is believed that together with part I, part II contributes to an improved understanding 
oflCM. 
1.6.3 Part III: Concluding observations and recommendations 
Part III consists of chapter 7. Its purpose is to convey an overall encompassing view of the 
study. To this end the main findings of the study are summarised, and the most pertinent 
conclusions and recommendations for an improved understanding of the concept of ICM are 
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given. In addition to this recommendations concerning the promotion of business applications 
and the advancement of theory development are made and prioritised. 
1.7 Summary 
Chapter 1 provides the background against which the study was conducted. The problem 
which motivated the objective, is outlined. Thereafter the scope and methodology of the study 
are discerned. Subsequently the structure of the thesis is presented in terms of parts and 
chapters. 
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Chapter 2: 
2.1 Introduction 
A preliminary definition and an anatomy of 
intellectual capital 
A great number of scholars and practitioners have recently proclaimed that the real value of 
many companies resides not in brick and mortar, or financial capital, but in their IC (see, e.g. 
Roos and Roos, 1997; Sullivan, 1998; Stewart, 1998). Considerable conceptual confusion, 
however, appears to exist concerning this resource to be managed through ICM. Close 
scrutiny of the literature suggests for example that the buzzword IC is used for a variety of 
phenomena, including company knowledge (Stewart, 1998), invisible assets (Itami, 1987), 
intangible assets (Sveiby, 1997), or corporate culture (Johnson, 1994; Lank, 1997; Jordan and 
Jones, 1997; Hall, 1998). Furthermore, no clear consensus seems to have emerged as to how 
IC can best be defined, and discordant perceptions of the anatomy ofIC can be observed (see, 
e.g. Sveiby, 1997; Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Sullivan, 1998; Saint -Onge, 1996). The 
divergence in view as how to define and anatomise Ie could impair an appropriate 
understanding of ICM. It would appear, in fact, that the level of sophistication of ICM 
approaches and tools is convoluted by discordant perceptions of the anatomy of Ie. In other 
words, the question of how to manage IC is likely to be compounded by the question of what 
to manage. As some observers have perceptfully suggested, "the way you conceive of 
knowledge influences the way you manage it" (Roos and von Krogh, 1996b: 334). Thus, an 
important conclusion drawn from an extensive analysis of the current status of research on 
ICM, is that developing a preliminary definition ofIC as well, as a clear understanding of the 
anatomy of the phenomenon to be managed, is critical. 
The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to the conceptual clarification of IC through a 
comparative analysis and synthesis of extant conceptualisations of the resource that leM 
seeks to manage. This is done with the ultimate aim of clarifying the concept of ICM as such. 
To this end, the chapter is presented in four main sections: Firstly, a review and analysis of 
properties and definitions of IC are presented, which will be concluded with a preliminary 
definition of IC. The second section is concerned with an analysis of extant approaches and 
models to categorise Ie. Building on these insights, the third section provides a comparative 
analysis of these approaches in order to reveal inherent commonalities and differences that 
offer a synthesised view ofIe. 
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2.2 Definitions and properties of intellectual capital 
Although IC seems to be a hotly debated topic and the need to manage it has clearly been 
established throughout current literature, some observers accept and justify the prevalent 
confusion by describing IC as an ineffable phenomenon (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997), or 
suggesting that synthesis may be premature (Spender and Grant, 1996). This study shall take a 
different stance. 
It would appear that a clarification of IC is a fundamental starting point for a discussion on 
ICM. The conceptual confusion surrounding the new buzzword IC can best be illustrated by 
reference to pertinent examples portraying the· terminological disagreement among scholars 
and practitioners. While the term IC itself is frequently used in the literature (see, e.g. Stewart, 
1998; Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Brooking, 1996; ICM Group, 1999; 
IntellectualCapital.org, 1998; Hudson, 1993; Bontis, Dragonetti, Jacobsen, and Roos, 1999), 
other expressions are also in circulation, some of which are applied synonymously, while 
others refer to subordinate concepts of IC. Yet others comprise similar concepts with slightly 
different meanings. To name but a few, Klein and Prusak (1994) use the term "intellectual 
material," whereas Sveiby (1997) speaks of "intangible assets" and Allee· (1999) of 
"intangible enterprise assets". Expressions such as "intellectual assets" (Sullivan, 1998; 
Edvinsson and Sullivan, 1996), "knowledge capital" (Porter, 1997), "core capability" 
(Leonard-Barton, 1995), and the term "knowledge" in general (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; 
Prusak, 1999; Petrash, 1996) are also frequently referred to. 
2.2.1 Intellectual capital- the dictionary definition as a starting point 
In view of the endeavour to clear up some of the conceptual confusion surrounding the term, a 
good place to start would be an internationally recognised dictionary. To begin with the first 
part.ofthe term, Hornby's (1989: 652) "Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary" provides the 
following description of the word "intellectual": "(1) of the intellect; (2) interested or able to 
deal with things of the mind (e.g. arts, ideas for their own sake rather than practical matters);" 
"Intellect" in turn, is depicted as "power of the mind to reason and acquire knowledge 
(contrasted with feeling or instinct)." 
An interpretation of these definitions leads to the inference that the concept of I C is not about 
capitalising intuitive hunches, i.e. instinctive wisdom or feelings based on emotional 
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inspiration. Rather, it deals with articulable, reasonable, knowledgeable and substantial fruits 
of the mind, i.e. with corporate knowledge. It claims intangible and tangible dimensions, 
which do not mutually exclude, but actually complement each other. 
FUliher consultation of the dictionary reveals that the second part of the term Ie, the word 
"capital" has, inter alia, the following meaning attributed to it (Hornby, 1989: 167): "wealth 
or property that may be used to produce more wealth." In addition to the first part of the term, 
which alludes to a duality of tangible and intangible aspects, the second part of the term Ie is 
inherently about value creation. It is useful to bear the dictionary definition in mind when 
reviewing some of the more complex definitions in the current literature on the topic. 
2.2.2 The term intellectual capital in the research literature 
The first use of the term Ie is attributed to the noted economist John Kenneth Galbraith, who 
in 1969 wrote in a letter to economist Michael Kalecki: 
"I wonder if you realise how much those of us in the world around have owed to the 
intellectual capital you have provided over these past decades" (cited in Sveiby, 1998c). 
According to Galbraith, Ie incorporates a degree of intellectual action implying that it is 
likely to be a dynamic, rather than a static form of capital such as financial capital (Edvinsson 
and Sullivan, 1996: 358). A key element in Galbraith's analysis is the conception of Ie as 
characterised by two properties, viz. it (1) creates value and (2) constitutes a corporate asset. 
It seems that more recent conceptions of properties pertaining to Ie do not significantly differ 
from the two given by its first proponent. Thus, the potential contribution ofIe as a corporate 
asset to organisational value creation is well established in the literature. Stewart (1994), for 
instance, in an article entitled "Your company's most valuable asset: intellectual capital" 
views Ie as "something you cannot touch but still makes you rich." The interpretation of this 
author seems to echo Galbraith's two properties, even if implicitly. "Becoming rich" might be 
interpreted as an informal paraphrase for the concept of value creation. In the title of the 
article he refers to "most valuable assets", which are further specified as intangible. Wiig 
endorses Galbraith and Stewart's opinion by regarding Ie as "wide value of intellectual 
assets" (Wiig, 1997: 399). Similarly, for a variety of authors, Ie has to be profitable, and a 
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number of scholars proclaims that IC is knowledge that can be converted into profits (Prusak, 
1999; Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Sullivan, 1998). As far as Galbraith's second property of 
IC as a corporate asset is concerned, Stewart (1998) agrees with before mentioned authors and 
conceives of IC as knowledge. In his book, "Intellectual capital: the new wealth of 
organisations" Galbraith's first property, value creation, is equated to wealth and it is stated 
that IC is "organised knowledge that can be used to create wealth" (Stewart, 1998: x). In other 
words, IC contributes to achieve and sustain corporate competitive advantage. Petrash (1996), 
the Director of Intellectual Asset and Capital Management for the Dow Chemical Company, 
approves this view by defining IC as knowledge with potential for value. 
To this perspective could also be added the view of the stock market which increasingly 
acknowledges IC, while typically invisible on corporate balance sheets, as an indicator of an 
organisation's future earning capability (Edvinsson and Sullivan, 1996; Edvinsson, 1997). In 
other words, it seems IC will be creating value in future by invisibly enhancing a company's 
market value. Similarly, Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) commissioner Wallman 
(in Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 3) views IC as "assets currently valued at zero on the 
balance sheet." Edvinsson (1997: 367) elaborates on the idea of IC's future earning potential 
by saying that it enhances a company's market value. He proposes viewing IC as the value 
gap between a company's market value and book value. He further argues that the market 
value often exceeds the respective book value immensely and that the gap between the two 
can be seen as a fundamental source of organisational value creation. 
Another debate evolves around the issue whether the asset in question IS tangible or 
intangible. Unlike Stewart (1994, 1998) or Brooking and Motta (1996) who share the 
contention that IC consists of intangible assets, Klein and Prusak (1994) refer to intellectual 
material that has been formalised, captured, and leveraged, i.e. they refer to intangible assets 
that have been_ transferred into tangible ones. One of the most best-known approaches to 
categorising knowledge is to adopt Polanyi' s (1958, 1966) explicit/tacit taxonomy (see, e.g. 
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece, 1998; Spender, 1996; Grant, 1996; Winter, 1987; Hedlund, 
1994). Doing so attributes tangible as well as intangible dimensions to corporate knowledge 
and thereby to IC. Revisiting the literary definition of "intellectual" would reinforce the dual 
nature of IC assets and would seem to reveal that tangibility/intangibility need not be viewed 
as a dichotomy, but as complementary. 
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2.2.3 Towards a definition of intellectual capital 
Recalling the foregoing definitions ofIe, it appears that most scholars and businessmen agree 
upon the two properties of Ie as originally identified by Galbraith in that Ie constitutes 
firstly, a value-creating entity, and secondly, a corporate asset. Moreover, a general consensus 
seems to have emerged concerning the first property. In most definitions the word "value is 
explicitly stated, in a few instances it is specifically emphasised and paraphrased with 
"wealth" (Stewart, 1998), "profit" (Sullivan, 1998), or "value gap between market value and 
book value" (Edvinsson, 1997). But the original meaning seems unchanged. 
Analysing Galbraith's second property in more detail, however, reveals that unclarities and 
different views abide which might be the cause for the conceptual confusion outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter. While research consolidates around the view of Ie as corporate 
asset, controversial opinions as to which corporate assets fall under the heading Ie seem to 
cause this confusion. Likewise, revisiting the literary definition of "capital," discloses that the 
sum of tangible and intangible assets work together to produce wealth or property in order to 
sustain competitive advantage. This is in line with Galbraith's suggestion that Ie creates 
value. Nevertheless, the corporate assets that constitute Ie remain a contentious issue. To use 
the dictionary analogy, it is unclear what the term "intellectual" connotes in a business 
context. 
On the evidence of the above-analysed definitions and properties of Ie as prevalent in the 
current management literature, the following preliminary definition of Ie can, for the purpose 
of the present study, be suggested: 
Intellectual Capital 
• is an important source of value creation, and thus 
• contributes to sustainable competitive advantage; 
• constitutes the value gap between book value and market value, which typically 
• is invisible in the corporate balance sheet; 
• has the potential to enhance a company's future earning capability; 
• consists of tangible and intangible intellectual assets. 
16 
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In summary, based on the analysis of extant definitions and properties of IC, a preliminary 
definition of the phenomenon ofIC has been given. The attempt to provide an insight into the 
concept of IC, utilising Galbraith's two properties as a template, revealed that IC is generally 
perceived as a source of value creation, whereas the discussion of which assets actually 
constitute IC, did not lead to clarity. 
A general consensus seems to have been reached regarding the different constituent 
components of IC, whereas no consolidation seems yet to have emerged as to what range of 
assets, whether tangible or intangible, coalesces into IC. As a result, various divergent 
building blocks of IC are prevalent in the current management literature, which seem to make 
the anatomy of the concept elusive. In order to contribute to the conceptual clarification ofIC, 
the subsequent section provides an overview of extant approaches to, and models of, its 
anatomy. 
2.3 Major anatomical models of intellectual capital 
Reviewing and summarising all approaches to anatomise IC as evident from the literature, 
would be a futile effort with little value. Therefore, in an attempt to balance the complexity of 
the subject with a comprehensible mode of presentation, the analysis is limited to four 
prominent models. These represent, based upon the author's understanding, the most eminent 
approaches in the field and have been developed by recognised practitioners and academics 
(Saint-Onge, 1996; Sveiby, 1997; Edvinsson, 1997; Sullivan, 1998). The approaches to be 
discussed are well established and extensively listed by other authors, which can be 
interpreted as further enhancing the validity of these models. 
2.3.1 Saint-Onge's model 
. Hubert Saint-Onge is the former Vice President: Leadership Organisation and Leadership 
Development, for the Ontario based Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) and now 
holds the position of Vice President: People, Knowledge and Strategies at Mutual Life of 
Canada. Saint-Onge's approach to IC is therefore obviously inspired by a practical application 
perspective. According to him, the CIBC had devoted many years to the understanding of this 
complex phenomenon. The roles of both tangible and intangible aspects of knowledge in the 
various categories of IC had been investigated, along with different ways of encouraging 
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value creation ll1 these elements (Saint-Onge, 1996). This endeavour culminated ll1 the 
identification of three key categories oflC, viz.: 
• Human capital - the capabilities of the individuals required to provide solutions to 
customers. 
• Customer capital - the depths (penetration), width (coverage), attaclm1ent 
(loyalty), and profitability of customers. 
• Structural capital - the capabilities of the organisation to meet market needs. 
To visualise the three listed categories, Saint-Onge proposes the integrated layout illustrated 
in figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Hubert Saint-Onge's model of intellectual capital 
Source: Westberg and Sullivan, 1998: 71. 
Saint-Onges's approach to the anatomy of IC assigns special importance to the translation of 
intangible IC dimensions into tangible forms of knowledge, so that knowledge can be shared 
and continually renewed (Allee, 1997: 37). This emphasis is visualised by the intersections of 
the three circles, each representing a form of corporate capital. Saint-Onge explains the 
interrelation and the importance of the alignment of all three circles as follows: 
"If the structural and human capital are not minimally aligned, it is the customer who loses. 
Customer capital are the clients or customers that pay us for what we do and produce - they 
are our lifeline to the future" (Saint-Onge, in Hall, 1998: 44). 
The section where human, structural and customer capital merge into one another is 
characterised by its "dynamic internal cohesiveness" (Westenberg and Sullivan, 1998: 71) 
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which is deemed to enhance the company's future performance, l.e. it is this section that 
ultimately creates profitable value for the company. 
2.3.2 Sveiby's model 
Karl Erik Sveiby is chief executive officer of the consulting company "Sveiby Knowledge 
Management" and former Executive Chairman and co-owner of Ekonomi+Teknik Forlag, one 
of Scandinavia's largest publishing companies in the trade press and business press sector. 
Currently he is also research fellow at Queensland University of Technology in Australia, 
where he investigates IC related issues (Sveiby, 1999). His outlook on IC is thus characterised 
by a combination of practical and academic interests. Similarly to Saint-Onge, the range of 
building blocks forming IC, as conceived by Sveiby, comprises three components, and the 
taxonomy presented is also threefold. An illustration of these three kinds of intangible assets 
is provided in figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2: Sveiby's taxonomy of intellectual capital 
Internal Structure People's Competence 
Source: Sveiby, 1998c: 2. 
According to Sveiby (1997: 10-11), the individual components are defined as follows: 
• Employee competence: It involves the capacity to act in a wide variety of 
situations to create both tangible and intangible assets. Individual competence 
cannot be owned by anyone or anything except the person who possesses it. 
• Internal structure: It includes patents, concepts, models, and computer and 
administrative systems. The internal structure is created by the employees and is 
generally owned by the organisation. 
• External structure: It refers to relationships with customers and suppliers, brand 
names, trademarks, and the company's reputation or image. Some of these assets 
can be considered legal property, but investing in external structure is not regarded 
possible with the same degree of confidence as investments in internal structure. 
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Employees, according to Sveiby (1997: 8) "are the only true agents in business." All 
corporate assets and structures, whether tangible or intangible are interpreted as the result of 
human action. It is argued that people working in a business enterprise direct their efforts 
primarily in two areas: first , outwardly when engaging with customers; and second, inwardly 
when maintaining and building the company. When employees engage with the market, they 
are likely to create e.g. relationships with customers or suppliers , as well as an image, partly 
owned by the company, in the marketplace. This is what Sveiby refers to as external structure. 
An internal structure, however, is created when efforts are directed inward. Both structures 
are regarded as knowledge structures and form two categories of IC, or to use Sveiby's term 
of preference, "intangible assets." The third component is constituted by the corporate 
workforce and labelled "employee competence." Thus, an important preliminary observation 
to be made from Sveiby ' s anatomy of IC is the predominant importance he accords corporate 
employees. This must be kept in mind with regard to Sveiby's ICM model , the "Intangible 
Asset Monitor," which will be critically discussed in chapter 4. 
2.3 .3 The Skandia model 
Skandia, an internationally operating and Swedish insurance company, is commonly referred 
to as a pioneer in implementing IC theory. An IC function has been established, headed by 
Leif Edvinsson, who was appointed the first Director of Intellectual Capital. He is widely 
acknowledged as one of the world's leading experts in the field. Against these facts, the 
Skandia approach is clearly inspired by a practical orientation, similar to that of Saint-Onge. 
As has been argued previously, Edvinsson considers IC primarily as the hidden values 
constituting the gap between market value and book value (Edvinsson, 1997). Hence the 
equation 
Market val ue Book value + IC. 
In 1992 when Skandia started stock-taking of the hidden IC values, a list consisting of more 
than fifty valuable items such as trade marks, concessions, customer databases, IT systems, or 
key persons was designed. Since the list was perceived as too long and unmanageable its 
items had to be grouped into fewer, but decisive categories. In a first attempt, Skandia 
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established two major categories, the human dimension and the structural dimension, which 
led to a simplified definition ofIe: 
Ie = Human capital + Structural capital 
Those dimensions that are "left behind when the staff has gone home," according to 
Edvinsson, are referred to as structural capital. Ideally, "human capital is translated into some 
kind of structural capital so that the company is able to add something beyond the staff each 
year" (Edvinsson, 1997: 368). Thus, each year more structure and thereby Ie is emerging. In 
accordance with Sveiby (1997), Edvinsson emphasises the fact that human capital crumot be 
owned, it can only be rented. On the other hand structural capital can, from a shareholder' s 
point of view, be owned and traded. Exhibiting several dimensions the model may 
accordingly be subdivided into several constituent parts. These parts, or "building blocks," are 
visualised in figure 2.3, which illustrates Skandia's Ie model and also integrates the above 
equations. 
Figure 2.3: Skandia' s intellectual capital model 
Human 
Capital 
Customer 
Capital 
Source: Adapted from Edvinsson, 1997: 369. 
As evident from figure 2.3 , the Skandia Ie model is built on a successive reduction approach 
that commences with the market value, from which the financial capital (i.e. a company' s 
book value) is deducted. What is left as balancing item is intellectual capital with its two 
components, human and structural capital. If human capital is deducted from intellectual 
capital, structural capital remains as balancing item. According to Edvinsson, the component 
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left behind when the employees leave the company, viz. structural capital , can be further split 
into customer capital and organisational capital (Edvinsson, 1997). 
Edvinsson' s approach to categorising Ie, being threefold (as illustrated by the shaded boxes 
in figure 2.3, i.e. those categories that are atomic in the sense that they are not subdivided 
further) is structurally similar to Saint-Onge ' s and Sveiby 's approaches. Subsequently, 
however, Edvinsson provides a more detailed perspective and further divides organisational 
capital into two additional building blocks. Within organisational capital the value of process 
capital could be deducted, resulting in innovation capital as balancing item. Figure 2.4 
illustrates how the Skandia approach complements the two previous models . 
Figure 2.4: Skandia's intellectual capital categorisation 
Capital 
Market 
Value 
Source: Edvinsson, 1997: 369. 
An interpretation of the individual components of Skandia' s Ie model is offered by Wiig 
(1997: 401): 
• Human capital refers to the employees' competencies and capabilities. If an 
organisation for example educates its staff, it increases its human capital. Human capital 
is usually viewed as a smaller component than the structural capital. 
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• Structural capital is the result of intellectual capital and is reflected in data, knowledge 
bases or documents. As argued before, it is depicted as "what is left after the staff has 
gone home." 
• Customer capital is represented in the value of the company's relationship with its 
customers. 
• Organisational capital consists of embedded knowledge assets in the areas of processes 
and innovation. 
• Process capital refers to the company's value creating processes such as the 
organisational structure, management practices, systems and procedures, infrastructure, 
computer systems etc. 
• Innovation capital comprises both explicit knowledge and intellectual assets, which are 
difficult to identify, e.g. positive culture. 
• Intellectual property is an expression for documented and captured knowledge such as 
innovations, operational practices, patents, technology, educational programmes, 
corporate knowledge bases, designs, specification of products and services. 
• Intangible assets represents the value of intangible assets, e.g. positive culture, 
community, or image. 
2.3.4 Sullivan's model 
The fourth model that remains to be analysed has been developed by Sullivan, a founding 
partner of the ICM Group, a consulting company focusing their activities on value extraction 
from Ie. Similarly to Edvinsson, Sullivan's approach seems to be inspired by a practical 
mindset. Sullivan's approach to visualise IC is graphically represented in figure 2.5. 
Figure 2.5: Sullivan's model of intellectual capital 
Human 
Resources 
Source: Sullivan, 1998:5. 
Intellectual 
Assets 
Intellectual 
Property 
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It is Sullivan's (1998: 5) contention that IC consists of three components as indicated below: 
• Human Resources: These are seen as the firm's "employee intellect." Human 
resources provide the know-how and institutional memory around topics of 
importance to the company. This corporate asset includes the collective 
experiences, skills, and general know-how of all the firm's employees. 
• Intellectual Assets: Intellectual assets are the codified, tangible, or physical 
descriptions of specific knowledge to which the company can assert an ownership 
right and readily trade in disembodied form. Any piece of knowledge that becomes 
defined, usually in written form or uploading it into a computer, qualifies as an 
intellectual asset and can be protected. Intellectual assets represent the source of 
ilmovations which firms commercialise. 
• Intellectual Property: Intellectual property is an intellectual asset which can be 
legally protected. Examples include patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, 
and semiconductor masters. 
2.4 Comparative analysis of anatomical models of intellectual capital 
2.4.1 Saint-Onge and Sveiby 
When comparing Sveiby's with Saint-Onge' s categorisation of IC, it is conspICUOUS that, 
notwithstanding the divergent terminology used, both authors essentially agree on the three 
building blocks of Ie. Saint-Onge's human capital largely corresponds to Sveiby's employee 
competence, as does customer capital to external structure, and structural capital to internal 
structure. It is difficult to detect major differences since Sveiby, unlike Saint-Onge, provides a 
more detailed definition of each building block. It nevertheless seems obvious that Saint-
Onge has a narrower outlook on customer capital as compared to Sveiby. The latter conceives 
of external structure in a more broad-gauged fashion, and in addition to customers further 
building blocks, viz. supplier, brand name, trademark, and company image are incorporated. 
Whereas Saint-Onge exclusively ascribes external value to customer relations, Sveiby 
provides a more holistic picture when valuing external intangible assets. This divergence may 
be attributed to the differences in professional backgrounds of the two authors. Saint-Onge 
developed his taxonomy for a bank with a firmly established reputation and brand name, 
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hence possibly the exclusion of certain intellectual assets in the approach presented. Sveiby, 
in turn, in his newly established consultancy firm, evidently ascribes additional value to 
intellectual assets besides customer relations. Brand-building, for instance, might significantly 
influence the competitiveness of a firm and is consequently devoted separate attention in 
Sveiby' s categorisation ofIC. 
In summary, despite the different backgrounds of Saint-Onge and Sveiby, the respective 
anatomical models as offered by the above authors seem to reveal essentially the same 
approach to categorising IC. In both models three building blocks are identified, with one 
focusing on the organisation itself, one on the people working within, and the last one on the 
environment a company is operating in. 
2.4.2 Saint-Onge, Sveiby, and Skandia 
As figure 2.4 illustrates, it is possible to identify intellectual properties such as patents or 
trademarks within the component of innovation capital which leaves intangible assets as 
balancing item (Edvinsson, 1997). This is the point where considerable terminological 
divergences appear to persist between Edvinsson and Sveiby. Both use the term intellectual 
assets to denote two different ends of the same spectrum. Sveiby (1997) refers to intellectual 
assets as a super-ordinate concept of the three building blocks instead of using the term IC, 
whereas Edvinsson (1997) views intellectual assets as the last balancing item on the agenda, 
on the same level as intellectual property and as subordinate to innovation capital (see figure 
2.4). 
The Skandia model is also depicted in Edvinsson and Malone (1997: 52) with the 
fundamental difference that innovation capital is not further subdivided into the two 
components of intellectual property and intangible assets. This notion would then render the 
aforementioned terminological divergences of Sveiby and Edvinsson obsolete. Edvinsson and 
Malone, in the course of their book seem to renounce completely the use of the term 
intangible assets, whereas Sveiby continues to explicitly use it synonymously to the term Ie. 
Taking Edvinsson and Malone ' s abandoning of the term intellectual assets into consideration 
it might be concluded that Edvinsson and Sveiby' s terminological disagreement concerning 
this term could be seen as settled. 
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Nevertheless, there still persist differences between Saint-Onge and Sveiby's classifications of 
Ie into three equally weighted parts, as compared to the Skandia value scheme. The reasons 
for this are twofold. Firstly, as figure 2.4 suggests, Edvinsson and Malone (1997) do not 
perceive human capital, customer capital, and organisational capital as being placed on the 
same hierarchical level. According to them, Ie in their approach is divided into human capital 
and structural capital , with the latter being subdivided into customer capital and organisational 
capital. Hence, the term structural capital incorporates both an inward dimension (i.e. 
organisational capital) as well as an outward dimension (i.e. customer capital) . This approach 
to Ie categorisation interferes with Saint-Onge and Sveiby 's more emancipatory perception of 
three Ie categories on the same hierarchical level. Secondly, Edvinsson and Malone's 
terminology differs in particular from the one provided by Saint-Onge who refers to internal 
corporate capabilities with the term structural capital. To the confusion of the reader, 
Edvinsson and Malone, although their way of interpreting structural capital significantly 
differs from the one applied by Saint-Onge, cite this author to reinforce and illustrate their 
explanation of structural capital: 
"According to Hubert Saint-Onge the relationship between human and structural capital is a 
'double-arrow dynamic .' In Saint-Onge's words, 'Human capital is what builds structural 
capital, but the better your structural capital, the better your human capital is like ly to 
be"(£dvinsson and Malone, 1997: 35). 
One might reason that this conveys the impression of Edvinsson and Malone being 
inconsistent in their argumentation. This impression is reconciled one page later in their book, 
where, in a paragraph under the heading "customer capital", the authors explicitly state that 
"the original Skandia model places the valuation of customer relationships under structural 
capital. Sut it is interesting to note that in a recently developed Ie model , refined by Saint-
Onge at elSe, customer capital is broken out as a separate category, equivalent to structural 
and human capital. [t is an interesting idea, suggesting both that the relationship of a company 
to its customers is distinct from that of its dealings with employees and strategic partners, and 
that this relationship is of absolutely central importance to the company 's worth. Time will tell 
whether this distinction is intrinsically valid or merely a means to promote the company to 
investors and to motivate employees and other stakeholders (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 
36). " 
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It is further interesting to note that Saint-Onge and Edvinsson seem to acknowledge the 
importance of relationships other than with customers although these do not find explicit 
recognition in their respective categorisation schemes. In this respect Saint-Onge and 
Edvinsson seem to adopt Sveiby's wider view regarding the outward dimension of Ie. This, 
in addition to the fact that Saint-Onge's model is derived from the Skandia approach and that 
the authors of the different models mutually acknowledge their -in some instances- slightly 
distinct opinions, might lead to the conclusion that the commonalities" inherent in all three 
models exceed the differences. On the evidence of these facts, common ground seems to 
appear. An attempt to articulate this common ground, i.e. to synthesise the three foregoing 
models could thus be presented as follows: Saint-Onge, Sveiby, and Edvinsson seem to agree 
that Ie can be categorised into three major dimensions, the human, external, and internal 
dimension. Firstly, the human dimension focuses on individual capabilities, secondly, the 
internal dimension represents the embodiment of the human dimension. Thirdly, the external 
dimension involves relationships with non-internal-organisational stakeholders. 
2.4.3 Saint-Onge, Sveiby, Edvinsson, and Sullivan 
Sullivan (1998: 6), similar to the authors reviewed previously, also speaks of structural 
capital, but defines it rather unconventionally. Opposed to Ie, he views structural capital 
constituting the "hard assets" of a company. Hence, structural capital in his sense comprises 
all the assets visible in the balance sheet. This notion is confusing when recalling that 
structural capital, as has been established throughout this chapter, is commonly conceived of 
as building block of Ie. This in turn would entail that structural capital is part of the "hidden 
values" (Edvinsson, 1997) which are invisible in the balance sheet (Sveiby, 1997; Edvinsson 
and Malone, 1997). Therefore, for the purpose of the present study and for the sake of 
conceptual clarity the term structural capital as proposed by Sveiby and Edvinsson is used, 
thu~ ~ismissing StIl!iv:an's interpretati.on .. 
A closer look at Sullivan's (1998) approach to categorise Ie reveals that a 
tangibility/intangibility dichotomy of corporate intellectual assets constitutes the basis for 
categorisation. The human resource category represents the intangible dimension whereas 
intellectual assets refer to the tangible counterpart with intellectual property as a sub-form. 
Although Sullivan essentially endorses the view of the previous observers by emphasising 
that intangibles can and should be converted into tangibles, his outlook appears relatively 
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wide and imprecise. Sullivan basically stops defining IC at the point which Edvinsson uses as 
point of departure for his categorisation process, i.e. the level where IC is divided into human 
and structural capital (see figure 2.4). Thus, one might equate Sullivan's intellectual assets 
with Edvinsson's structural capital, with the terminological congruence of the human 
dimension in both approaches speaking for itself. 
To summarise, Sullivan's perception of IC is obviously in line with the conception Saint-
Onge, Sveiby, and Edvinsson agree upon. Concerning Sullivan's categorisation approach it 
remains to be said that there are also no significant differences to the other approaches except 
for the fact that the one provided by Sullivan would appear to be more superficial and broad 
in its outlook. 
2.5 An attempt at synthesising extant categorisation patterns 
Above, current definitions and categorisation patterns of IC have been reviewed and 
comparatively analysed in order to establish prevalent commonalities and differences. The 
analysis revealed that most authors assent to Galbraith's early suggestion of two basic IC 
properties, viz. IC firstly creates value and secondly constitutes a corporate asset. Apart from 
that, it is believed that IC determines the value gap between a company's book value and its 
value in the market place. IC typically is invisible in conventional corporate balance sheets 
and can be interpreted as an indicator for future earning capabilities of an organisation. 
Moreover, IC seems to have tangible and intangible dimensions and can be categorised into 
several building blocks. The foregoing discussion of these building blocks has shown that 
while the authors reviewed are not terminologically congruent, conceptual commonalities 
seem to make the approaches amenable to synthesis. Table 2.1 attempts to summarise and 
provide a comparative overview of the findings, by placing the categorisation terminology as 
applied by Saint-Onge, Sveiby, Edvinsson and Sullivan in perspective. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of four major approaches to categorise intellectual capital 
Ir:S~~E~if~:;;L" i:;" SVEIBY lit""~4~f;"':t'Uti<~fjv;f%t~tl C<!" ~ Z~'""WSZ ~ ~ • ,:,:" ~,.·:~DV,NssoNi.li~l.a~ ; J! @ 4'~'$l fi$ a __ 4!.~ 
Human Capital People's Competence Human Capital Human Resources 
Structural Capital Intellectual Assets 
Structural Capital Internal Structure (internal & external) 
Customer Organi-
Capital sational 
Customer Capital External Structure Iintellectual PropertYl Capital 
'" 
From table 2.1 would follow that the four previously analysed authors generally agree on a 
threefold classification of Ie. At first glance however, it would appear that Sullivan only 
identifies two categories, viz. human resources referring to the intangible dimension, and 
intellectual assets comprising the tangible dimension of Ie. This obvious conjecture might be 
rejected by the notion that Sullivan's intellectual asset dimension implicitly comprises an 
internal as well as an external aspect related to tangible assets (IeM Group, 1999). Sullivan's 
definition of intellectual assets claims that "any piece of knowledge which becomes defined, 
usually by writing it doWfl or putting it into a computer qualifies as an intellectual asset." 
Arguing that employees on the one hand enter e.g. customer or supplier data into the 
computer and on the other hand calculate e.g. process oriented performance figures, validates 
the statement that Sullivan implicitly agrees on a subdivision of intangible assets into an 
external and internal dimension. Hence, there is evidence for the notion that Ie is commonly 
divided into three main building blocks. 
An effort to summarise and synthesise the discussed approaches to categorise Ie might be 
presented as follows: Ie can be seen as consisting of three different categories, which might 
be further divided into several sub-categories. The three main categories generally deal with 
human capabilities, and involve internal as well as external aspects of the business 
organisation. Therefore, and in an attempt to balance the complexity of the subject with a 
comprehensible mode of presentation, it is proposed to label these building blocks 
respectively as human capital (i.e. the skills, capabilities and competencies of the corporate 
workforce), internal capital (i.e. "what is left when the employees go home"), and external 
capital (i.e. customer-, social-, supplier-, competitor-, and other stakeholder relationships, the 
reputation of a company, as well as the brand equity). This terminology is believed to 
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authentically reflect their meaning and content as used by the anatomical models analysed. An 
attempt to visualise Ie and its three subcategories finds graphic representation in figure 2.6. 
Figure 2.6: A triad model of intellectual capital categorisation 
INTELLECTUAL 
CAPITAL 
I 
I I I 
HUMAN INTERNAL EXTERNAL 
CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAC 
As the previous section attempted to show, through synthesis of current Ie approaches and 
models, three key building blocks of this resource have crystallised. Thus it can be argued that 
Ie essentially embraces three constituent components. Although this pragmatic view on the 
complexity of knowledge in organisations represents an exciting perspective for managers, 
the merits of a consolidation at the present stage of research development are clearly 
debatable. The consolidation, while appealing in its conceptual pragmatism, may, inter alia, 
be overly simplistic, thus calling for a critique of the proposed triad model. 
2.6 A critique of the proposed triad model 
It should be realised that any conceptualisation of Ie is a highly consequential step to the 
extent that it is used as a platform for building IeM approaches and tools. The suggested 
three-dimensionality of Ie may not capture authentically all subordinate dimensions of this 
resource. For example, external capital embraces a range of subordinate concepts, such as 
brand image, corporate identity, customer relations, networking with strategic alliances, 
corporate social responsibility etc., many of which may be overlooked through the broad 
anatomical conceptualisation above. 
To the extent that this conjecture materialises, IeM approaches and tools that use the three 
key building blocks as a platform for further investigations may be impaired by the potential 
negligence of its subcategories, which in turn may have fundamental implications for the 
management of Ie. Potential hazards possibly arising from an inadequate treatment of Ie by 
the suggested model may be indicative of an alternative, more comprehensive approach to 
form salient building blocks. Such an approach would have the potential merit of a more 
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authentic representation of the complexity of the resource under investigation. An analysis in 
this manner would, however, dramatically increase the complexity of its illustrative format. A 
balance has therefore been sought in this analysis between sacrifice in content on the one hand 
and a comprehensible mode of presentation on the other. 
The merits of the generalist approach pursued as it is pursued here would leave individual 
companies ample room for tailoring the advocated three-dimensionality to their particular 
needs and requirements. It is conceivable, for instance, that business enterprises operating in 
service industries might set foci within their external capital structure differently to those in 
manufacturing industries. In many ways, it would appear that the suggested approach to the 
anatomy of IC achieves a balance of illustrative format and the complexity of the 
phenomenon under investigation. Depending on the operative environment where the 
approach is to be deployed, it may thus be useful to subdivide the three extrapolated building 
blocks as appropriate. 
2.7 Summary 
In view of the increasing importance of IC, a key question seems to be what the structure and 
categories of this resource look like, what its building blocks are - in brief, how it can be 
defined and anatomised. Analysis of the literature, however, revealed that no clear consensus 
concerning the definition and anatomy of this resource has emerged as yet. The divergence in 
views concerning the concept of IC clearly impairs a proper understanding of ICM. 
Appropriate conceptualisations of IC can be seen as a fundamental platform from which 
further investigations concerning the management of this resource, can be pursued. The 
objective of this chapter was to review and synthesise extant perceptions of IC with the 
ultimate aim of contributing to an enhanced understanding of the concept of ICM. Thus, the 
basic insights offered in the course of this chapter are intended to serve as the platform on 
which the analyses. in-the following pages are .built. 
The analysis in this chapter showed that while terminological and conceptual divergences 
concerning the definition and anatomy of IC abound in the literature, it seems possible to 
forward a preliminary definition of IC and to draw the salient aspects together using a 
threefold categorisation scheme. 
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Upon analysis of the prevailing definitions and categorisations ofle, a preliminary definition 
ofIe was suggested and three basic building blocks ofle were identified, viz.:.human capital, 
internal capital and external capital. 
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Chapter 3: The need to _manage intellectual capital 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter serves as an essential background and basis to the development of an improved 
understanding of ICM. It is laid out in case-study format and indicates the potential 
managerial dangers of neglecting IC as an important source of corporate value creation. The 
potential managerial dangers can be highlighted without involving ICM models. The practical 
case presented, illuminates the need to manage the concept of IC as it emerged from chapter 
2, thereby emphasising the importance of such models. 
In the analysis of the case study, it will be demonstrated that an underestimation of the 
significant impact of IC on corporate performance, mainly emanates from a financial focus, 
characteristic of traditional approaches to management. These insights could serve to 
emphasise the potential of management approaches that accord more explicit attention to the 
need to manage corporate Ie. 
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate the need for ICM models by way of 
emphasising the generic importance of IC in a wide spectrum of industries. For this purpose, 
the analysis firstly examines a case study involving the advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi. 
This will highlight the potential managerial dangers entailed by a negligence of IC. Analysis 
will then proceed to demonstrate the relevance of IC to industrial settings other than the 
service variety in general and the advertising business in particular. 
3.2 The need to manage intellectual capital- the case of Saatchi & Saatchi * 
For a few months in 1988 Saatchi & Saatchi was the largest advertising agency in the world. 
y et, becalls_~l1lanagers solely f<?cused 0n._financia~ c,:!pital, instead of balancing it with the key 
resource of the company, viz. IC, the agency lost its strong competitive position. A review 
and analysis of this transition are the concern of this section. Before an analysis can be made 
of this particular case, a word of qualification would be necessary. 
* This case is based on Sveiby and Lloyd, 1987; Sveiby, 1997; Stewart, 1997; Roos, Roos, Edvinsson, 
and Dragonetti, 1998; 
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It might be argued that that the inferences drawn from the advertising agency could be of 
limited pertinence to other branches of industry (e.g. manufacturing industries). As will be 
demonstrated shortly. IC seems to represent a rising component of the market value of 
compal1les in diverse industries. It should therefore be appreciated that in view of the 
increasing importance IC assumes across industries, the present case would usefully 
demonstrate the impact of Ie on corporate competitive success, irrespective of industry 
boundaries. This contention seems to be shared by a number of scholars in the field (see, e.g. 
Sveiby and Lloyd, 1987; Sveiby, 1997; Stewart, 1997; Roos, Roos, Edvinsson, and 
Dragonetti, 1998) where the Saatchi & Saatchi case is used to illustrate the potential 
managerial dangers of neglecting Ie. Analysis will proceed in two basic steps. Firstly, a 
review of the decline of the agency is presented. This is followed by an interpretation of this 
decline using the conceptual lens of IC, and drawing on the insights developed in the course 
of chapter 2. 
3.2.1 The decline of the Saatchi & Saatchi company 
An illustration of the decline of the Saatchi & Saatchi agency would need to start in the year 
in which the agency was founded. In 1970 the brothers Maurice and Charles Saatchi had 
founded the advertising agency which they started in a rented office in Soho. Within the six 
ensuing years, the brothers established an image of extraordinary creativeness. The creative 
agency attracted a number of very skilful advertising professionals and succeeded in 
developing a portfolio of high-profile customers, which added to its prestige. During this 
period the Saatchi brothers seemed to have managed their IC well, and the early 1970s was a 
period characterised by significant growth for. The Saatchi brothers' success led to the 
agency's initial public offering on the London Stock exchange in 1976. This was considered a 
revolutionary achievement, since the Saatchi company was the first advertising business that, 
through going public, overcame the prevalent perception of the advertising industry being 
"arty," without substance and no underlying physical assets. 
The floatation represented a capital platform for building an aggressIve acquisition-lead 
development strategy. Focusing on this aim the brothers succeeded, inter alia, by means of 
persuasive eloquence to convince investors in London and on the Wall Street to value the 
company as they would "more substantial" manufacturing industries. As a result, reliable 
34 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
profitability and good acquisition-lead growth potential was ascribed to the business. This, 
increased its appeal on the stock exchange. 
During the ten years of uninterrupted success that followed the floatation other agencies were 
acquired at a rate of three per year. In this period, it seems, the founders were able to balance 
both IC and financial capital. They managed to inspire and preserve a creative spirit, which 
appears to be essential to successful advertising. This in turn, motivated and encouraged their 
employees. They also delivered profits, growth, and dividends to their shareholders. As a 
result, affiliated members of the firm viewed the growing collection of agencies as stimulating 
their creativity. Investors regarded the dynamic group of companies under the Saatchi & 
Saatchi umbrella, as credit-worthy as companies traditionally relying on physical assets. 
In April 1986, through a secondary issue of stock, 400 million pounds were paid by the city of 
London for a 47% share of the company. A month later the money was invested in the 
purchase of the New York agency, Ted Bates. The Ted Bates acquisition turned the Saatchi & 
Saatchi company into the world's largest advertising group, with billings of 7 billion dollars. 
This acquisition however would also constitute the turning point in the company's success 
story, because in that same year the group's first-ever profit decline was recorded. Moreover, 
a leakage of creative talent had begun to materialise. It became difficult to preserve the 
creative spirit, which was the cause for more key employees to resign. 
The Saatchi brothers underestimated, even disregarded, these wanling signals and continued 
to expand their empire. In 1987 they announced their new strategic aspirations to diversify 
into several other service industries. The goal was to become a "global one-stop shop of 
business services including marketing, financial services, and management consulting in 
addition to advertising" (Sveiby, 1997: 15). Later that year the brothers made known their 
intention to buy the Midland Bank, one of the United Kingdom's biggest retail banks. The 
financial community, already concerned by the Ted Bates acquisition, reacted even more 
sensitively to this announcement. As a result, the company's image on the stock market 
declined. 
At the end of 1988, the group's market value amounted to 636 million pounds, but still 
compared favourably to its book value of 108 million pounds. Its IC was then valued almost 
six times higher than its financial capital. Saatchi & Saatchi's Ie. Due to several reasons 
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however the company's IC progressively depreciated. Firstly, the company's reputation as a 
top creative performer within the profession began to dissolve. It became harder to attract and 
retain talented employees and to sustain a base of profitable customers. Secondly, as a 
consequence of this, frustration spread among the executives. In turn, the frustration seems to 
have led to a decrease in share prices. A year later, by 1989, the Saatchi group was 111 a 
financial crisis. By 1993 it was only yielding 20 million pounds a year. 
In December 1994, as a response to the considerable profit decline, institutional investors 
forced the board of directors to dismiss Maurice Saatchi. Protesting Saatchi' s resignation, 
several other executives also left the company, which was then renamed "Cordiant." In an 
aggressive move Saatchi, together with these executives, and his brother Charles, established 
a new agency called "Maurice and Charles Saatchi." As a result, Cordiant lost business to the 
value of 40 million pounds (6% of its total billings). The majority of this business, including 
customers such as Mars, British Airways, and Dixons went to the brothers' new agency 
"Maurice and Charles Saatchi." Although Maurice Saatchi's dismissal was invisible on 
Cordiant's balance sheets, it materialised in a plummeting share price. While the share were 
previously traded at 8 5/8 on the New York Stock Exchange they immediately fell to 4. 
Cordiant's market value decreased to two percent of its peak market capitalisation attained in 
1988. 
3.2.2 Analysis of the Saatchi & Saatchi case using an intellectual capital perspective 
The decline of the house of Saatchi & Saatchi can be interpreted as illustrating the perils 
involved in underestimating the value of corporate IC. It appears as if initially the Saatchi 
brothers had taken a holistic outlook on their corporate assets. They had managed to maintain 
a sound balance between their tangible and intangible assets. In the period between 1970 and 
1976 the brothers seemed to successfully manage the three constituents of IC as outlined in 
chapter 2, viz. human, internal, and external capital. They invested in their human capital by 
employing a number of very skilled advertising professionals. As regards their internal 
capital, the brothers appeared to create a spirit of creativity within their company, thereby 
motivating employees to be hardworking and loyal. The creative image and the high-profile 
customers enhanced the value of Saatchi & Saatchi' s external capital. 
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In 1976, it was their profit track record, which can usefully b~ interpreted as emanating from 
the company's IC, that persuaded the London business community to view the advertising 
agency with the same gravity as any other manufacturing business. Although Saatchi & 
Saatchi's key assets were intangible and invisible in its corporate balance sheet, the business 
community agreed to convert parts of their intellectual assets into cash in their initial public 
offering. 
The initial public offering seems to suggest that the Saatchi brothers successfully extracted 
value from its IC. The capital resulting from a high share rating was however not used to 
further enhance the company's current stock of IC in order to ultimately support its key 
business, advertising. Instead, after 1976, the financial capital was used to pursue an 
aggressive acquisition strategy. More specifically, until that time Saatchi & Saatchi's profit 
growth had been generated by advertising, with satisfied customers returning with new 
commissions to the company (i.e. it emanated from Saatchi & Saatchi's external capital). 
After 1976 most of the growth came from acquisitions. In fact, the Saatchi brothers seemed to 
have defied their creative core business and their external capital the moment the agency 
network was used as a vehicle for buying non-advertising businesses. 
The Saatchi case demonstrates the risks of ignoring, and failing to understand, the value and 
importance of IC. Saatchi & Saatchi's IC assets might be compared to a bank account that 
slowly but steadily depleted after the company's floatation (Sveiby, 1997; Sveiby and Lloyd, 
1987). The firm's human capital, consisting of corporate skills, creativity, and talent was 
devalued when employees left. Consequently the internal spirit of creativity, the strong 
corporate culture, and particularly the structure of the organisation, lost its coherence, i.e. the 
internal capital depleted. Finally, the external capital depreciated in value when the creative 
reputation faded and prestigious customers defected. 
The question arising here seems to be whether Saatchi & Saatchi could have succeeded. The 
speculative answer would be yes - if the brothers had recognised that the value gap between 
their company's market value and book value equated the value of its IC. Accordingly, if they 
had seen their competitive momentum lying in their IC and had proactively captured, 
measured and leveraged it, their agency might still have existed today. 
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The Saatchi & Saatchi case seems to reveal that the brothers viewed financial capital rather 
than IC, as their agency's momentum. They thus neglected to adequately manage the three 
key categories of IC. In this light, it is important to appreciate that such negligence might 
have an adverse effect on corporate competitive success. Further, it should be noted that IC 
with its intangible building blocks, can radically affect corporate performance. It might be 
instrumental in yielding and depleting tangible profits. Hence, a misplaced view of the true 
momentum underlying business performance, might have detrimental effects on corporate 
performance. This is a vital observation in view of the objective of the study. 
3.3 The need to manage intellectual capital across a spectrum of industries 
The Saatchi & Saatchi case was designed to convey an illustrative picture of what the 
potential results are of neglecting efforts to understand IC as resource endowment and its 
effects on corporate performance. Although the Saatchi company is an exponent of the service 
industry, it should be recognised that the inferences drawn could also be germane to industries 
other than the service-variety. This speculation would need to be substantiated, and the 
present section is concerned with demonstrating the pertinence of IC to a broad spectrum of 
industries. 
3.3.1 Market value versus book value across industries 
In the literature, it is generally contended that corporate success or failure would ultimately be 
reflected by the stock-market valuation of a company's market capitalisation. Thus the logical 
conclusion, that an appropriate indicator of IC's pertinence to success, could be the share it 
has in a firm's total market value. This view is prevalent among a large body of scholars (see, 
e.g. Stewart, 1998; Edvinsson, 1997; Edvinsson and Sullivan, 1996; Roos, 1996, 1998). As 
outlined in chapter 2, Edvinsson refers to IC as the "hidden values," constituting the gap 
between market and book value (Edvinsson, 1997). In a similar vein, Stewart echoes this 
contention by labeling IC as a company's "hidden gold," thereby implying IC's capability to 
materialise into tangible value (Stewart, 1998). Roos shares with Edvinsson and Stewart the 
view that the most valuable part of many companies is reflected in its IC, which has overtaken 
tangible assets such as real estate and inventories (Roos, 1996; Roos, personal 
communication, March 23, 1999). 
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These realisations are reflected in table 3.1. The figures are drawn from the top-five 
companies of the United States of America ranked according to market value. 
Table 3.1: Market value and book value 
.. ~ " Market Value (in Book Value (In Company Ie 
, .. billions of dollars) billions of dollars) 
~ , 1 ( ; ~l 
General Electrics 169 31 138 (82%) 
Coca-Cola 148 6 142 (96%) 
Exxon 125 43 82 (66%) 
Microsoft 119 7 112 (94%) 
Intel 113 17 96 (85%) 
Source: adapted from Roos, Roos, Edvmsson, and DragonettI, 1998: 2. 
It should be appreciated that the above companies span a variety of industries. Although the 
number is limited to five only, it is contended that the selected firms can be seen as epitomes 
of several industries. They represent a sound basis from which generalisation can be made. 
All examples clearly show that the market value of all five organisations is many times their 
book value, i.e. the value of the respective physical capital. In all instances, Ie ' s value 
represents a total share of market value higher than 50%. 
While none of the above companies operates in the service industry, parallels to Saatchi & 
Saatchi can be drawn. In 1988 Saatchi & Saatchi was valued at 636 million pounds at the 
stock exchange, compared to its book value of 108 million pounds as documented on 
corporate balance sheets. The difference between these two figures, i.e. Saatchi & Saatchi ' s 
Ie, amounted to 528 million pounds, thereby assuming 83% of its total market capitalisation. 
It is worth noting that General Electrics, representing a traditional manufacturing company, 
reveals almost the same percentage, viz. 82% when it comes to the ratio of Ie to total market 
capitalisation. This example seems to substantiate that Ie also appertains to industries other 
than service. Moreover, it must be realised that the Ie value of all five companies depicted in 
table 3.1 amounts to more than half of each firms ' total market value. The suggestion can 
therefore be made that it would be paramount for corporate success to attribute managerial 
attention to this critical resource. 
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Table 3.2: Market value and replacement costs 
, ": ! ~ < " Market Value (in Replacement IC Company 
billions of dollars) Costs (in billions 
of dol/ars) 
General Electrics 169 77 92 (54%) 
Coca-Cola 148 15 133 (90%) 
Exxon 125 107 18 (14%) 
Microsoft 119 18 101 (85%) 
Intel 113 43 70 (62%) 
Sources: adapted from Roos, Roos, Edvmsson, and Dragonettl, 1998: 3. 
Close scrutiny of table 3.2 indicates that it differs from table 3.1 only with respect to the 
substitution of the book values of the five firms with their respective replacement costs. 
Resulting from this substitution, the IC value of all firms in table 3.2 has shrunk, in some 
instances considerably. Except for the case of Exxon, IC maintains its total share of market 
value higher than 50%. As the figures impart, the ratio between a company's market value 
and the cost of replacing its physical assets is considerable in most industries. This is not 
restricted to service industries only. Studying the data of General Electrics, a company with a 
high degree of physical infrastructure, it becomes evident that its IC assets are also valued 
higher than its traditional material assets. The data of knowledge companies like Intel, and 
Microsoft, but also of Coca Cola seem to substantiate this statement. This would suggest that 
what applies to the business service sector, is in similarly pertinent to traditional physical 
asset-intensive industries, albeit in varying degrees. 
3.4 Summary 
The objective of this chapter was to demonstrate the need for ICM models by way of 
illustration of the generic importance of IC to a wide spectrum of industries. Ultimately this 
would contribute to an enhanced understanding of the concept ofICM. For this purpose a case 
study, involving the advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi was analysed. Analysis showed that 
a concentration on financials at the expense of ignoring IC, seriously frustrated corporate 
performance at Saatchi & Saatchi. It was demonstrated that an IC perspective allows for 
insights, which illustrate the importance of the three components of IC, as they emerged from 
chapter 2. 
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Part II: A critical analysis of major extant intellectual 
capital management approaches and tools 
Chapter 4: The Intangible Asset Monitor 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2 it was indicated that the anatomy of Ie involves three generic building blocks, 
viz. internal capital, external capital, and human capital. It was also suggested that IeM 
models would need to consider all three building blocks of Ie. Based on the insights gained 
throughout part I, the analysis can now proceed to investigate the three most popular extant 
IeM approaches and tools that are designed to cater for Ie. The choice of the respective 
approaches and tools is eclectic and has specifically been made after scrutiny of the literature. 
Based upon the author's understanding, these models encapsulate trailblazing research efforts, 
and balance European with American streams of thought. They thus provide a representative 
picture of the status quo of IeM research. It is contended that a thorough understanding of 
these three IeM approaches and tools, of their origins, rationales, and purposes is critical for 
an improved understanding of the concept of IeM as it is currently portrayed in the literature. 
The analysis will endeavour to uncover implicit assumptions, individual premises, and 
operational environments for each tool. Particular emphasis will be given to the inherent 
limitations of the IeM approaches and tools by way of critical examination of their 
sophistication in administering Ie in a wider context of corporate management. The above 
areas of investigation form the framework of the analysis in part II of the present thesis. 
For expository purposes, the analysis is divided into three chapters, with each chapter being 
concerned with a critical analysis of one prominent approach to IeM. The present chapter will 
attempt to critically analyse the "Intangible Asset Monitor," an IeM approach and tool that 
was developed by Sveiby to manage and measure intangible resources (Sveiby, 1989, 1997; 
Sveiby and Risling, 1986; Sveiby and Lloyd, 1987). The Intangible Asset Monitor has been 
chosen because it can be interpreted as the first European IeM approach and tool that accords 
explicit attention to the three building blocks of Ie as identified in chapter 2. The present 
chapter will firstly attempt to elucidate the origins of Sveiby's tool. With an understanding of 
the origin, the rationale and purpose of the Intangible Asset Monitor can better be appreciated. 
Based on the gained insights, an analysis will be made of the approach and tool itself. The 
investigation is structured using three broad steps. Firstly, the approach to the management 
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and measurement of IC as presented by Sveiby is discussed. Secondly, an analysis will be 
given .if the Intangible Asset Monitor caters for the three building blocks of IC as conceived 
of Sveiby. Finally, the level of sophistication of the Intangible Asset Monitor is critically 
analysed within a wider framework of managerial tasks. Throughout the analysis in this 
chapter reference will be made to a business case, in order to enhance the theoretical 
discussion with practical insights. 
4.2 Origin, rationale, and purpose of the Intangible Asset Monitor 
The origin, rationale, and purpose of Sveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor can be portrayed 
against the background of related approaches in Scandinavia. They seem to be inherently 
linked to Sveiby's publishing company "Affarsvalden." The origins of Sveiby's [CM 
approach and tool are first illustrated. Thereafter, the rationale and purpose are explored. 
4.2.1 Orig,in 
The origins for Sveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor are best understood against the background 
of IC related research initiatives in Scandinavia. From the mid-1980s on, academic as well as 
practical researcll, had been undertaken aiming at managing knowledge organisations and 
measuring intangible assets. Sweden particularly appears to be the "cradle" of European 
research e1Torts on rCM. A number of proactive Swedish service companies, such as Skandia, 
WM-data, Celemi, and KREAB, to mention but a few, seem to form the so-called "Swedish 
Community of Practice" (Sveiby, 1996). This Swedish community follows two different 
routes to [CM. One is "Human Resource Costing and Accounting," with Johanson (1996) as 
its main proponent. Johanson was instrumental in establishing the Swedish "Key Ratio 
Institute", a databank of Human Resource indicators and measures currently subscribed toby 
130 Swedish companies (Sveiby, 1996). 
The second, and for the purpose of this study more interesting route, "might for lack of [a] 
better label be called the 'Konrad' track" (Sveiby, 1996: I). It consists of managers who 
primarily engage in monitoring and publicly presenting the .intangible assets of the respective 
companies by use of non-financial indicators (Sveiby, 1996: I). In 1988 the Konrad Group 
published its findings in a report edited by Sveiby {"The New Annual Report"). l3ased on 
Sveiby and Risling's (1986) 'The know-how company," the report suggested a theoretical 
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framework for publicly reporting intangible assets. The terms "structural capital" and 
"human/individual capital" were firstly used in "The New Annual Report" (Sveiby, 1989). 
From the above follows that Konrad's initial aim was to offer a conceptual framework to be 
used by companies for improving their public reporting, i.e. emphasis was put on an external 
dimension. Some companies, however, also started using the measure, as proposed by the 
Konrad Group for internal management and performance measurement purposes (e.g. WM-
data, KREAB) , thereby transcending the external dimension. Hence, and this is noteworthy, 
the Intangible Asset Monitor seems to originate from the desire to establish a non-financial 
measurement system in order to serve two purposes, viz. firstly, to report to external 
stakeholders; and secondly, to report to internal management executives. This should be kept 
in mind when examining the rationale and purpose of Sveiby's ICM tool. 
4.2.2 Rationale 
The rationale for Sveiby's Intangible Asset monitor has been to cater for the competitive 
realities surrounding his company "Affarsvalden." In 1979 Sveiby resigned his position at 
Unilever to buy with a group of nine friends the publishing company "Affarsvalden". The 
company's focus was on editorial content, while the visible production process, i.e. printing 
was outsourced. Confronted with an organisation characterised by the absence of a physical 
production process and traditional assets, as well as by a strong competitive situation, the 
group realised that conventional managerial tools were ill-versed to accommodate the 
operating environment of the company. The company's operating environment was 
determined by a substantial stock of invisible and knowledge-based assets that included some 
of Sweden's best financial analysts, a prominent brand and a well-established network in the 
business community, i.e. it was determined by a high stock of IC (see, e.g. Sveiby, 1997; 
1999). This predominant importance of IC seems to have inspired Sveiby to formulate his 
well-known "knowledge perspective" of the firm. 
4.2.2. 1 The know/edge perspective and the "know-how company" 
Intrigued by the phenomenon of intangible assets and the managerial implications this 
phenomenon entails, Sveiby proposed the first theory of the know-how company in 1986 
(Sveiby and Risling, 1986). The theory forms the theoretical background of the Intangible 
Asset Monitor. The underlying rationale is to dismiss what the author calls the "traditional 
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industrial paradigm" (Sveiby, 1997: 26) in favour of a "knowledge paradigm." The principal 
characteristics of both paradigms, as Sveiby sees them, are summarised and contrasted in 
table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: The principles of the knowledge paradigm as opposed to the industrial paradigm 
Source: Sveiby, 1997: 27. 
Two aspects deserve attention in table 4.1. Firstly, an important question to be contemplated 
is the applicability of the knowledge paradigm to different industries. It would appear that the 
relevance, or irrelevance, of Sveiby's knowledge paradigm to firms in particular industries 
would ultimately affect the relevance of the Intangible Asset Monitor, which is conceived in 
this paradigm. Sveiby is, however, not very specific concerning which industries compete 
within the knowledge paradigm. On the one hand, the author explicitly acknowledges that the 
46 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
business service sector appertains to the knowledge perspective (e.g. Sveiby, 1997: 28), and 
that all know-how companies are service companies (Sveiby and Lloyd, 1987: 18). On the 
other hand, it is also argued and demonstrated that, for instance, pharmaceutical companies 
(e.g. Astra and Glaxo) generally hold higher proportions of IC to market value than service 
industries (e.g.Wal-Mart, Mc'Donald's). The same seems to apply to high-tech companies 
(e.g. Microsoft, Intel, Gentech), media companies (e.g. Springer, Reuters), waste management 
(Rentokil) and many branded consumer product companies (e.g. Coca-Cola, Hugo Boss, 
Arnotts) (see, e.g. Sveiby, 1997: 6-8, 1998d: 1). Sveiby argues that even physical asset 
intensive industries compete according to the rules of the knowledge paradigm. The authors 
holds that steel companies can be seen as epitomes of traditional, tangible asset intensive 
industries of the industrial era. Nucor, a company, which has revolutionised the steel industry 
with millimil technology and a management approach focusing on competencies of individual 
employees, is given as an example (Sveiby, 1997: 6-7). These observations seem to indicate 
that Sveiby, in line with many scholars in the field, implicitly assumes a wide pertinence oflC 
to a broad spectrum of industries. 
It should be appreciated that closer scrutiny of Sveiby's work reveals that the Intangible Asset 
Monitor would represent a tool specifically designed for know-how companies. Know-how 
companies typically compete in service industries, in which individual employees are the 
main drivers for performance and IC is thus the crucial resource (see, e.g. Sveiby, 1989, 1997; 
Sveiby and Risling, 1986; Sveiby and Lloyd, 1987). This explanation seems intuitively 
plausible, if one recalls from the origin of Sveiby's ICM tool, that it is inherently linked to 
"Amirsvalden," a service company. For "know-how" companies an invisible balance sheet is 
constructed. 
4.2.2.2 The invisible balance sheet 
Predicated on the belief that "invisible" assets, or IC, represent a considerable share of a 
know-how company's market value and that traditional balance sheets do not adequately 
account for it, Sveiby proposes an "invisible" balance sheet (figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1: The invisible balance sheet 
Assets Finance 
Cash: Visible 
Current Short-term dept 
Assets 
Equipment Long-term dept 
Goodwill Visible Equity 
External Shareholders Invisible 
structure Inv,isible Equity (Under the 
Internal Surface) 
structure 
Individual Obligation 
competence 
I 
Assets Finance 
Source: adapted from Sveiby, 1997: II; 1998a: 2. 
Sveiby proclaims that "under the surface" of the traditional "visible" balance sheet resides an 
"invisible" balance sheet itemising the three categories of Ie as intangible assets. These 
intangible assets are deemed to have substantial implications for financing a knowledge 
organisation. In line with visible assets financed with visible capital, invisible assets are 
typically financed with invisible capital, viz. a company's Ie (Sveiby, 1997, 1998a). 
To summarise the rationale ofSveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor, two areas deserve attention. 
Firstly, the author discovered that know-how companies compete in the knowledge paradigm 
according to different rules than their counterparts in the industrial paradigm. The most 
important aspect differentiating competitive success seems to be the predominant importance 
of intangible assets that characterises know-how companies. Secondly, this relative 
importance of Ie suggests the potential of an invisible balance sheet to measure the 
constituents of this important organisational resource. It should be emphasised again that the 
domain of "know-how companies" is seen as restricted to service industries. This would 
suggest that the Intangible Asset Monitor as a tool is primarily designed for service industries. 
This should be borne in mind when investigating the purpose of Sveiby's tool. 
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4.2.3 Purpose 
The purpose of the Intangible Asset Monitor seems predicated on the assumption above, 
which suggests that concomitant with the rising importance of non-financial capital in know-
how companies, the need emerges for new measurement systems based on non-financial 
measures emerges. Financial indicators, such as return on equity or return on assets, it is 
argued, do not shed sufficient light on intangible assets and are thus inappropriate for 
managing and measuring IC. Sveiby reasons that 
"it is tempting to try to design a measurement-system equivalent to double-entry bookkeeping 
with money as the common denominator. It is an established framework with definitions and 
standards and therefore common sense. But this is precisely the reason why we should break 
with it. Ifwe measure the new with the tools of the old, we won't be able to perceive the new" 
(Sveiby, 1997: 155, emphasis added). 
From the quotation above would follow that Sveiby, in order to perceive the "new," designed 
the Intangible Asset Monitor as a framework specifically for measuring intangible assets. It is 
should furthermore be re-emphasised that this system for measuring I C is designed to serve 
two ends, i.e. the Intangible Asset Monitor may serve as an internal measurement system, and 
as a format to publicly report corporate results. 
In summary, the analysis of origin, rationale and purpose of Sveiby's Intangible Asset 
Monitor, revealed that this ICM tool is specifically designed for "know-how" companies, 
where IC seems to exceed financial capital stocks. As a result, greater explicit managerial 
recognition would need to be given to the measurement of these intellectual assets. Ideally, 
argues Sveiby, ICM tools as a means for such measurement would accommodate two generic 
objectives, viz. they could, firstly, be used as an internal measurement system, and secondly, 
for external reporting purposes. Sveiby's approach to the development of an ICM tool, based 
on these assumptions and objectives, is the focus of the subsequent section. 
4.3 Approach and tool 
Sveiby's approach in designing a measurement system for IC can be interpreted as entailing 
three generic steps. Developing a good grasp of these three steps is essential for an 
understanding of the logic and potential of Sveiby's approach to ICM. The first step involves 
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the identification of bases for measuring each of the three building blocks of Ie as Sveiby 
sees them (chapter 2 describes Sveiby's approach to the anatomy of IC). The second step then 
delineates appropriate measures for each of the identified bases. In a third step, the identified 
bases, with the corollary measures, are grouped under the three building blocks of IC, viz. 
external structure, internal structure and competence of employees. Figure 4.2 illustrates the 
resulting tool, the Intangible Asset Monitor. 
Figure: 4.2: The Intangible Asset Monitor 
Indicators of 
Growth/Renewal 
Indicators of Efficiency 
Indicators of Stability 
Source: Sveiby, 1997: 165. 
Indicators of 
Growth/Renewal 
Indicators of Efficiency 
Indicators of Stability 
Indicators of 
Growth/Renewal 
Indicators of Efficiency 
Indicators of Stability 
The sequence of steps in Sveiby's approach suggests structuring the analysis in this section in 
the following way: firstly, the process of determining bases for measurement is discussed; 
secondly, the process of delineating appropriate measures for these bases is briefly analysed. 
With these insights, the Intellectllal Asset Monitor as such is examined. This examination 
involves a discussion of the approach in dealing with each building block of IC, as well as a 
critical analysis of the Intangible Asset Monitor itself. To illustrate the theoretical analysis 
with practical insights, reference is made to Celemi, a Swedish company, which "develops 
and sells training tools" (Sveiby, 1997: 191). 
4.3.1 Determining the bases of measurement 
Determining bases for measurement can be seen as the first step in developing an intangible 
Asset Monitor. Sveiby suggests the adoption of three bases, viz. efficiency, stability, as well 
as growth and renewal. The problem with Sveiby's treatment of these bases appears to be the 
author's imprecise treatment concerning their generation, structure, and systemisation. This 
impreciseness is rather unfortunate, since these bases seem to serve as fundamental building 
blocks of the Intangible Asset Monitor. The author's comments on these building blocks 
generally do not seem to be very illuminating. The only explanation provided suggests that 
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the three bases for measurement "are growth and renewal - in other words, change -
efficiency, and stability" (Sveiby, 1997: 164). Despite the general dearth of information 
Sveiby emphasises that "effectiveness is seldom measured" (Sveiby, 1997: 155) and 
underlines the relative importance of efficiency-related indicators versus effectiveness-related 
indicators (see, Sveiby, 1997: 154). This seems noteworthy in view of the following chapter, 
where an expanded organisational performance measurement tool (the Balanced Scorecard) 
will be discussed. In the Balanced Scorecard, both efficiency and effectiveness are explicitly 
considered in designing measures. 
4.3.2 Selecting measures 
After the identification of the three bases for measuring intangible assets, Sveiby suggests the 
selection of concrete measures for these bases as a next step. The selection should be in line 
with the above-discussed primary purpose of measurement, i.e. whether a company aims at 
external presentation or establishment of an internal management and measurement system. 
Within this broad framework, however, the selection of these measures is not at all formalised 
in the Intangible Asset Monitor. While the author gives numerous suggestions, some of which 
will be reviewed in the discussion of the Intangible Asset Monitor, these are not prescriptive. 
In fact, Sveiby emphasises that each individual company should view the proposed measures 
only as a guideline. Within the broad framework of figure 4.2, a wide spectrum of measures 
may be identified. This has critical implications for the envisaged dual purpose of Sveiby's 
ICM tool, as is shown in the analysis towards the end of the chapter. 
With the general approach discussed, the way in which the tool itself accommodates measures 
for each of the three building blocks of IC can be investigated. For illustrative purposes a list 
of indicators, as offered by Sveiby, is presented at the end of each building block. Towards 
the end of the chapter the integration of these measures, in the format of the Intangible Asset 
Monitor, is demonstrated using Celemi's Intangible Asset Monitor. The present section 
neither attempts to critically discuss each measure per se, nor the underlying formulae. It is 
rather intended to provide a brief sketch of Sveiby's approach to the delineation of these 
measures and the implications of this approach for a better understanding of ICM. The first 
building block to be analysed is the external structure. 
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4.3.3 External structure 
Notwithstanding the fact that, according to Sveiby, the external structure includes per 
definitionem relationships with suppliers, brandnames, and trademarks, this author seems to 
restrict his analysis of the external structure to customers. It is emphasised, in various 
instances throughout the analyses, that customer relations are the most decisive factor in 
determining the external structure. This should be remembered when assessing the 
sophistication of Sveiby's model in dealing with the external structure as a building block of 
IC. Predicated on the belief that customers are the most important variable influencing 
corporate IC stocks, Sveiby proposes to classify customers according to their relative 
contributions to corporate intangible assets. 
4.3.3.1 Classifying customers 
The classification of customers according to their relative contributions to intangible value 
creation processes of "know-how companies," represents the first step in measuring the 
external structure. The logic behind the introduction of this categorisation scheme seems to be 
that not all customers are equally profitable. Potential sources of such profit are revenues 
contributed by customers in forms other than money, i.e. intangible revenues. Sveiby (1997: 
liS, 1995b) discerns three kinds of intangible revenues, viz. firstly, those that improve the 
learning competencies and ideas of the employees (e.g. through training programmes). 
Secondly, those that enhance the external structure (e.g. through referrals to new customers or 
establishments of prestige). Thirdly, those that enhance the internal structure (e.g. through 
leveraging R&D projects or projects that support knowledge transfer). 
The above-mentioned approach to categorise customers seems intuitively appealing. This is 
particularly so, if one bears in mind that not all customers are equally profitable and useful to 
further develop the competence of the employees, enhance the corporate image, or generate 
new assignments. This impression can be substantiated by observing the practical 
operationalisation of this approach. For example, Celemi adopted Sveiby's customer 
classification scheme because of its potential to enhance the three types of intangible assets 
through intangible revenues. Just as visible revenues improve the tangible equity, Celemi 
ascribes the impact on invisible revenues to the improvement of et1iciency and the value of 
intangible assets. By canvassing customers according to their respective provision of invisible 
revenues, rather than in terms of their monetary contributions, Celemi is able to actively 
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enhance its stock of IC. Celemi distinguishes between image-enhancing customers, 
organisation-enhancing customers, and competence-enhancing customers. 
Image-enhancing customers improve Celemi' s external structure by means of references and 
testimonials. In this way, they assist Celemi in finding new customers and simultaneously 
reduce its marketing costs. Organisation-enhancing customers improve Celemi' s internal 
structure by demanding state-of-the art solutions which are new and thus contribute to 
Celemi's R&D. Competence-enhancing customers improve the level of Celemi's 
competencies by challenging its employees with new and demanding projects, enabling the 
employees to learn (Sveiby, 1997). The classification of customers according to their relative 
contributions forms the basis for the delineation of measures for the external structure. 
4.3.3.2 Measuring the external intellectual capital structure 
It should be kept in mind that, according to Sveiby, the most important aspect of corporate 
external structure resides in customer relations. Hence the exclusive focus of this author on 
customer relations for the purpose of measuring external structure. Table 4.2 has been drawn 
from the most salient measures and presents Sveiby's analysis in an abridged format. In line 
with Sveiby's general approach, these measures are grouped under the identified bases for 
measurement, viz. growth/renewal, efficiency, and stability. 
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Table 4.2: Measures for the external intellectual capital structure 
It is contended that' a company depends on a few 'large customers its position and 
structure is weak. Therefore Sveiby suggests to measure the percentage of billings 
attribl1table to the five biggest customers or the number of customers accounting for fifty 
are to 
new ones and thus this indicator also teUs 
Source: Sveiby, 1997: 182-184. 
At the risk of repetition it should agam be emphasised that Sveiby's mam concern II1 the 
external structure seems to be corporate customers. His approach to measure this building 
block of Ie, seems intuitively appealing and rather sophisticated. It should be appreciated, 
however, that Sveiby's explicit focus on customers could lead to a negligence of other 
important areas of organisational influence, which could radically impact Ie. As evident from 
chapter 2, the areas of corporate competitors, as well as the wider social and political 
environment would particularly deserve attention. This aspect will receive further attention 
towards the end of this chapter. After investigating Sveiby's approach in addressing the 
external structure, the two remaining building blocks of Ie, viz. internal structure, and 
employee competence can be analysed. 
4.3.4 Internal structure and employee competence 
In analysing the two remaining building blocks of Ie, internal structure, and employee 
competence, it should be realised that these are inherently linked in Sveiby's approach. It is 
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important to appreciate the approach of this author in delineating the internal structure and 
employee competence building blocks. This approach involves the classification of employees 
in two generic categories, of which one is interpreted as internal structure, and the other one 
as employee competence. The analysis in this section is structured in three steps. Firstly, this 
two-fold classification scheme for employees in the Intangible Asset Monitor is illuminated. 
Secondly, the measures for each of the two identified categories are outlined. 
4.3.4.1 Classifying employees 
According to Sveiby, there are two major types of employees within an organisation's 
personnel who should be classified for the purpose of measuring IC. Sveiby's classification 
approach involves distinguishing between a company's "support staff' and "professionals." 
With regard to the former, Sveiby explains that a company's support staff does not directly 
generate revenues. Members of the support staff rather contribute indirectly by assisting the 
primary revenue generators, viz. the professionals. Employees in this category would be 
predominantly concerned with general management, administration, accounting, personnel, or 
reception tasks. Also included should be employees carrying out activities like routine 
maintenance of computer systems and databases, unless their work refers to a specific 
customer or group of customers. The tasks of the former would focus on administrative issues 
and are believed to add to the internal structure of an organisation. Hence, it is proposed to 
measure the support staff under the "internal" category ofIC (Sveiby, 1997). 
Professionals, in tum, are considered the prImary revenue generators of the knowledge 
organisation. This employee category, in Sveiby's analysis, is directly involved in generating 
revenues for the company. For example, such employees would be engaged in planning, 
processing or presenting solutions to customer problems, and would be directly involved in 
client work. As a result, the measures for the external structure are constructed around the 
time professionals spend maintaining, building and deVeloping client relations. Sveiby further 
suggests that the category "competence of people" (also "competence of employees" or 
"professional competence") exclusively refers to the competence of professionals. Measures 
should, for instance, target at degree of responsibility or area of expertise. 
To summarise, Sveiby's approach to the measurement of internal structure and employee 
competence as two building blocks ofIe, seems primarily concerned with the classification of 
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employees in two generic categories, viz. "professionals," and "support staff." The former is 
interpreted as the IC building block, competence of employees, whereas the latter represents 
the internal structure. Companies wishing to introduce the Intangible Asset Monitor in their 
firms are advised to first categorise employees accordingly. In a subsequent step, Sveiby 
suggests that appropriate measures for each of the resulting building blocks need to be 
identified. 
4.3.4.2 Measuring the internal intellectual capital structure 
To recall from the above, measuring the internal structure refers exclusively to measuring the 
activities of the support staff. Table 4.3 attempts to summarise the most pertinent measures, 
which Sveiby propounds in the course of his analysis. 
Table 4.3: Measures for the internal intellectual capital structure 
as percentages or are 
J provide valuable insights into the development of the internal structure, Measures such 
"~~l~(~ij~,t'~~: i ' as number of computer per emp'loyees can also 'be used as control figures. Sveiby Ii: argues that in many industries these investments indicate the progress towards 
i the i 
i e.g. new new methods I I ,or new 
software can be seen as important variable potentially contributing to the growth of the 
internal structure. 
com 
two years i i 
" group is typically considered to be less efficient than others and a high rookie ratio thus, 
hints at an unstable internal situation, Sveiby advises to view the rookie ratio and the 
ratio as I rather than I 
Source: Sveiby, 1997: 175-177. 
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4.3.4.3 Measuring professional competence 
Measuring professional competence, which can be interpreted as Sveiby's terminology for 
human capital (see chapter 2, table 2.1) is considered paramount, because professionals are 
believed to be a primary source of value creation in service companies. Table 4.4 summarises 
the most important aspects of Sveiby's suggestions for measuring professional competence. It 
should be remembered that human capital in Sveiby's sense, refers exclusively to the 
competence of professionals (Sveiby: 1997). 
Table 4.4: Measures for professional competence 
GROWTH/RENEWAL ~';';, \" , >,' 'l,;, ,; .,r; ~'«1\ ;:"':', :' \ ' 
Number of years The total number of years in the profession is a measure of the skill and experience 
in the profession of a company's professional body, whereas professional experience per employee is 
a measure of the average skill and experience per employee, 
Level of The educational level of professionals affects the assessment of their competence 
education and hence a knowledge company's ability to future success, 
Training and As knowledge companies typically invest heavily in competence development, 
education costs training costs should be accounted for in monetary as well as time aspects. 
Grading Sveiby contends that educational level describes competence imprecisely and 
suggests awarding grades to their employees. To this end, a five-point or three-point 
scale may be used in order to be able to trace how competence develops in various 
fields, and how it changes over time. 
Turnover The quotient of competence of professionals who have joined the company divided 
by the competence of those who have left it shows how personnel turnover affects 
the company's competence. 
Competence- Valuable information can be gained by measuring the proportion of customer 
enhancing assignments that contribute to competence development of professionals. 
customers 
'EFFICENCY <c' • ;·;"i'<', .,<:"<-; Y; :.:.:: .. , 
Proportion of The number of professionals divided by the total number of employees is considered 
professionals in useful in benchmarking the company against competitors. 
the company 
The leverage The underlying question of this measure is how important a company's in-house 
effect professionals are to its ability to generate revenue. 
Value added per Value added per professional can be regarded as purest measure of the 
professional professionals' capability to generate economic value. As it has been mentioned 
above, Sveiby emphasises that value added can generally be seen the best measure 
for yield. Factors influencing this measure, it is argued, are the state of the market, 
the efficiency of a company's management, and the amount of value added paid out 
directly to employees as salaries and benefits. 
STABILITY :tic ><: e'iH '. ,(.;;: ;/; ",,;' ,; ;:, 'f!">' {:;~ )';f w 
Seniority Sveiby views the number of years professionals are employed in the same company 
as indicator for stability. 
Professional This rate is calculated as the numbers of employees leaving a company divided by 
turnover rate the number of new employees. A low turnover suggests a stable but static corporate 
situation, while high turnover rates hint at dissatisfied employees. 
Average age Against the fact that older employees tend to be more stable than younger as they 
are unlikely to leave the company, average age is believed to be a good indicator for 
stability. Like turnover and seniority, it is also a measure of dynamics because a high 
average age can be interpreted as a sign for stability on the one hand, and as 
indicator for inflexibility on the other hand. 
Relative pay This measure is usually expressed in index form and has high information value 
position because it measures cost levels relative to competitors. 
Source: Sveiby, 1997: 168-174. void 
57 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
To summanse, the starting point for Sveiby's approach to the measurement of the two 
building blocks of IC, internal' structure (i.e. internal capital) and employee competence (i.e. 
human capital), is the corporate workforce. This is in line with an established consensus in the 
field, would be the corporate workforce (see, e.g. Drucker, 1999a, 1999b; Roos and Roos, 
1997; von Krogh and Roos, 1995). The individual employees are classified according to their 
respective input to revenue generation of the firm. Those that are directly involved in 
generating revenues, are referred to as "professionals." Employees who indirectly generate 
revenues, are called support staff." An important point to consider seems to be that Sveiby, in 
measuring employee competence, exclusively considers "professionals." In measuring 
internal structure, the author focuses on employees who fall under the "support staff' 
category. Thus, it should be appreciated that in the analysis of this author, the measurement of 
the two generic building blocks that have been identified in chapter 2 (viz. "internal capital" 
and "human capital") essentially revolves around the measurement of employees. A practical 
example will serve to illustrate Sveiby's approach to ICM. 
4.3.5 Celemi's Intangible Asset Monitor 
In order to demonstrate the way in which Sveiby's theory is translated into practice, a 
practical example is now given. The present section illustrates the Intangible Asset Monitor of 
Celemi (figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: Celemi's Intangible Asset Monitor 1994-1995 
Our'People '" 'Our C'ustomers Our Organisation 
(External Structure) (Internal Structure) (Competence) 
Growth/Renewal Growth/Renewal ro enewa G wth/R 
44% IT investments percent value Avg. professional Revenue growth 
Image-enhancing added (15) 11% experience (7), years 7.8 -25% 
customers (2) 40% Organisation-enhancing Competence-en hancing 
customers (2) 44% customers (2) 43% 
Product R&D percent Total competence, experts 
value added (4,7), years 298 
18% 43% 
Total investment in org. Average education 
percent value added 3% level (3) 2,3 0% 
Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency 
Changes in sales per Change proportion of Value added per expert 
customer (12) 4% admin. staff (1,8) 4% (4, 15), TSEK 867 13% 
Sales per admin. staff Value added per employee 
growth (6, 11) -20% (6, 15), TSEK 665 -13 
Stability Stability Stability 
Repeat orders (9) 66% Admin. staff Expert turnover (4, 14) 10% 
Five largest customers turnover (1, 14) 0% Expert seniority (4, 13) 
percent (5) 41% Admin. staff seniority years 2,3 79% 
years (1,13) 3 Median age all employees 
Rookie ratio (10) 64% years, 34.0 -12% 
Notes: 
r-Aaministrative staff: All employees other than experts 
2. Customers: Categorised under three headings. The indicator is percent share of revenues. 
3. Education level: Employees at year-end with primary education (calculated as 1), secondary 
education (2), and tertiary (3). 
4, Experts: Employees working directly with customers in projects, Top managers are regarded as 
experts because they work actively with customers. 
5. Five largest customers: Share of revenues from five largest customers, 
6. Number of staff: Two definitions are used-average number employed during year for efficiency 
indictors; year-end numbers for growth/renewal and stability indicators. 
7. Professional competence: Number of years in current profession, 
8. Proportion of administrative staff: Number of administrative staff divided by number of total staff at 
year-end. 
9. Repeat orders: Customers also existing in 1994 (those corresponding to two-thirds of revenues) , 
10. Rookie ratio: Number of employees with less than two years seniority . 
11. Sales per administrative staff: Total revenues divided by average number of administrative staff, 
12, Sales per customer: Total revenues divided by average number of customers, 
13, Seniority: Number of years as Celemi employee, 
14. Staff turnover: Number of leavers divided by number of staff at beginning of year. 
15. Value added: The value produced by Celemi's employees after payment to all outside vendors. 
Source: Sveiby, 1997: 195. 
The percentages in figure 4.3 are meant to indicate the changes in absolute value of the 
respective indicators from 1994 to 1995. The implications of Celemi' s Intangible Asset 
Monitor would point to the following: the external structure appears to be stable and has a 
large potential to generate intangible revenues in future. It can thus be interpreted as the most 
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valuable category of Celemi's IC. Concerning the internal structure, Celemi's organisation 
does not seem stable, yet has considerable potential for efficiency improvement and volume 
growth. Regarding the competence of its employees it would seem that new employees are in 
average well educated. Hence, it might be speculated that the rapid growth in competence 
could profoundly change and revitalise the company (Sveiby, 1997, 1998e). 
For the purpose of this study, a brief pause should be made here to appreciate an important 
aspect. Svciby's approach, as illustrated by the Celemi example, appears to account for 
changes in the absolute value of individual IC indicators. (In the example above, from one 
year to the next.) Sveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor, however, does not seem well versed 
when elucidating where these changes come from, given that the "IC balance sheet total" 
remains unchanged. Yet, it would be interesting to understand the origin of such changes. For 
example, it would be interesting to see how human capital is translated into internal capital, 
because that would cnable corporate leaders to monitor "what is left when the employee goes 
home." Such changes of individual IC categories, given that the total sum of IC remains 
unchanged, have been referred to as "flows" of IC (see, e.g. Roos and Roos, 1997; Roos, 
Roos, Edvinsson, and Dragonetti, 1998; and in particular Bontis, 1999). Although Sveiby 
emphasises the importance of measuring flows and trends (Sveiby, 1997: 156, 164), it seems 
as if his understanding of flows is limited to changes in absolute values, i.e. the development 
of certain indicators from one year to the next is measured as in the Celemi example. This 
aspect will be further elaborated in chapter 6. 
With the approach and tool illustrated, the analysis can now proceed with a critique of the 
most salient aspects ofSveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor. 
4.4 A critique of the Intangible Asset Monitor 
Before criticising the Intangible Asset Monitor,it should be acknowledged that Sveiby's 
approach and tool should be credited as a pioneering research effort in developing a 
preliminary view on ICM. Sveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor can be criticised on various 
accounts. In view of the objective of the study, the most pressing areas for critical analyses 
would include, but may not be restricted to, firstly, the explicit focus of Sveiby on service 
industries; secondly, the approach utilised to categorise employees; thirdly, the feasibility of 
the dual purpose of Sveiby's tool would need to be examined; and finally, and perhaps most 
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importantly, an evaluation of whether the Intangible Asset Monitor can primarily be regarded 
as a measurement or a management tool. 
4.4.1 The explicit focus on service companies 
In the section describing the origins, rationale and purpose of Sveiby's ICM tool, attention has 
been drawn to the fact that the Intangible Asset Monitor has its roots in Sveiby's publishing 
company, AfHirsvalden, a company operating in the service industry. This would suggest that 
the ICM tool, as presented by Sveiby, could be understood as designed specifically for 
companies in the service sector. In fact, closer scrutiny of Sveiby's approach has revealed that 
the "know-how companies" this author uses to illustrate the pertinence of the Intangible Asset 
Monitor, can be seen as service companies. This can be substantiated by reference to an 
earlier book by Sveiby (Sveiby and Risling, 1986), where it is emphasised that all know-how 
companies are essentially service companies. 
The explicit focus on service companies in general and know-how companies in particular, 
could compromise the potential of the Intangible Asset Monitor for companies in other 
industries (e.g. manufacturing industries). While it is not the purpose here to contradict 
Sveiby in his contention that IC assumes greatest relevance to companies in service or 
knowledge intensive industries, it must be emphasised that the explicit focus that is given to 
these branches of industry could impact the usefulness of the Intangible Asset Monitor to 
other settings. For example, to the extent that different industries are characterised by 
dramatically different competitive pressures (see, e.g. Fahey and Randall, 1994), ICM tools 
emanating from a given industry could be of reduced relevance to other industries. Thus, it 
should be criticiesed that Sveiby, through not using a broader empirical research base 
covering other industries besides the knowledge and service variety, would a priory restrict 
the validity of his tool to knowledge and service industries. This seems to be an important 
observation in view of the author's approach to classify employees. 
4.4.2 A critique of Sveiby's approach to the classification of employees 
As the analysis in the present chapter has obviated, a fundamental step in Sveiby's approach 
to the delineation of mea,sures for the two IC building blocks, internal structure (i.e. internal 
capital), and employee competence (i.e. human capital) seems to be the classification of 
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employees. Thus, the classification of employees appears to assume a pivotal role in 
delineating internal capital and human capital in the Intangible Asset Monitor. Because of its 
importance and fundamental nature, the methodology of this step would need to be 
scrutinised. Sveiby's categorisation approach, while certainly useful and in line with an 
established consensus in the related literature, where it is proclaimed that a starting point of 
investigations into corporate Ie would always be the individual (see, e.g. Drucker, 1999a, 
1999b; von Krogh and Roos, 1995; von Krogh and Vicari, 1993; Zimmerli, personal 
communication, March 10, 1999), can be criticised on various accounts. Two of the more 
important aspects pertaining to the limitations possibly associated with this approach shall be 
illuminated in the present section. 
Firstly, it could be argued that Sveiby's view on the constituents of internal structure (i.e. 
internal capital) could be overemphasising employees, at the expense of other important 
components of internal capital. To recall chapter 2, internal capital would not (only) embrace 
employees. In fact, it has been found that internal capital would embrace the structures and 
systems that "are left when the employees go home." 
Secondly, one might argue that a neat categorisation of employees, as proposed by Sveiby is 
hardly possible. In an era characterised by lean organisational structures, and multiple roles 
for employees (Lissack and Roos, 1999; Buys, 1999) it is unlikely that tasks to be performed 
by support staff and professionals can neatly be assigned to the respective category. For 
example, a professional may schedule her agenda herself because no support staff member is 
assigned responsible for this activity. Such cases do not seem to represent exemptions in 
today's business world, and could thus blur the neat boundaries drawn 111 Sveiby's 
classification approach. Sveiby himself acknowledges this fallacy and refers to it as the 
"problem of the grey areas-where employees perform a variety of duties" (Sveiby, 1997: (66). 
According to him, this problem 
"can be solved by including only the part of their time that is spent working for clients as 
professionals, with the rest charged to the internal structure. Time is such an important 
variable in knowledge organisations that it must be recorded" (Sveiby, 1997: 166). 
This would suggest that Sveiby's approach (0 employee classification allows for enough 
flexibility in categorising employees in service and know-how companies, because the two 
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categories of employees can be used as general guidelines rather than as prescriptions. 
Celemi, for instance, categorises employees in "administrative staff' and "experts." 
Employees working directly with customers in projects are considered to be experts, while 
administrative staff comprises all employees other than experts (Sveiby, 1997). It should be 
emphasised however that the described approach, while certainly useful in service companies 
and know-how companies, where all employees can be seen as contributing to corporate IC 
development, may be less relevant to other corporate environments. For example, in 
manufacturing industries, a great number of the workforce on the shop floor often performs 
standardised tasks, perhaps with little or no contribution to corporate IC development. Under 
these circumstances, Sveiby's categorisation approach would not be adequate, because it a 
priori assumes that all employees of a company contribute to corporate IC development. 
For the purpose of this study, it might be enlightening to briefly consider an alternative 
approach that might be more applicable to corporate environments other besides the service 
industry. A particularly useful approach is presented by Stewart. This author proposes a two 
by two matrix with the dimensions "difficult/easy to replace" and "lOW/high value added" to 
categorise a company's workforce. Figure 4.4 illustrates that Stewart's approach differs from 
Sveiby's in significant ways. Stewart firstly identifies employees, which form part of the 
human capital (upper right grey shaded quadrant). These employees are typically difficult to 
replace and an important source of value creation in the company. Hence, their contribution to 
IC. According to Stewart, a company's human capital is embodied in the people whose talent 
and experience create the products and services being the reason customers come to it and not 
to a competitor (Stewart, 1998). 
Figure 4.4: Stewart's approach to categorise a company's workforce 
Difficult to replace, 
Low value added 
Easy to replace, 
low value added 
Easy to replace, 
high value added 
Source: adapted from Stewart, 1998: 90. 
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In a second step (figure 4.5) managerial directives are given as how to address the four 
established categories. It should be noted here that the only category Stewart suggests to 
capitalise on is human capital (grey shaded). 
Figure 4.5: Managerial directives for addressing the established categories 
Difficult to replace, 
Low value added 
INFORMATE 
low value added 
AUTOMATE ~ 
Source: adapted from Stewart, 1998: 91. 
In essence, Stewart's approach appears to be more applicable to many corporate environments 
than Sveiby's, because it would discriminate better between the individual contributions of 
employees to corporate Ie. Naturally not all employees in all industrial settings could be 
considered as human capital. This appears to be a valid speculation, and would be particularly 
pertinent to physical asset intensive industries, where a high percentage of low skilled 
workers might be easy to replace, without negatively impacting a company's IC situation. 
4.4.3 The feasibility of the dual purpose in Sveiby's tool 
As the analysis in this chapter has emphasised on various occasions, Sveiby is not prescriptive 
with regard to the indicators that are to be delineated for the purpose of measuring the three 
building blocks of Ie. Attention has been drawn to the fact that, within the broad framework 
of figure 4.2, a wide spectrum of measures can be identified. This approach to the delineation 
of measures is likely to have critical implications for the dual purpose of Sveiby's ICM tool, 
viz. to serve as a tool for internal measurement, as well as for external reporting. With regard 
to the utilisation of the Intangible Asset Monitor for internal measurement purposes, 
allowance for a wide spectrum of possible indicators should be welcomed to the extent that it 
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allows individual companies to tailor the Intangible Asset Monitor to their individual and 
company and/or industry-specific needs. 
Therein, however, seems to reside the rub. The envisaged dual purpose behind the Intangible 
Asset Monitor would suggest the fallacies of a non-standardised approach to selecting such 
measures. The wide spectrum of possible measures to be identified could ultimately lead to 
the generation of company-specific IeM measurement systems. While this might be an asset 
for internal management purposes, it would clearly represent a liability for external reporting 
purposes, where comparability would be paramount. If Sveiby's tool was to be used for 
external purposes, it would be vital to ensure that individual companies calculate their 
respective Ie in a standardised manner, in order to ensure comparability. Indeed, such 
comparability would form the very rationale behind the generation of IeM systems for 
external reporting. A "laissez faire" approach, as presented by Sveiby would radically 
compromise the potential of IeM systems for external purposes, e.g. reporting, and 
benchmarking. Traditional, financially oriented performance measures already seem to be 
plagued by the heterogeneity of accounting standards across countries, thus negatively 
impacting comparability. In order to ensure that, in the Ie realm, "apples are not confused 
with pears," a more standardised approach would be more promising. This must be 
remembered when analysing the question of whether the Intellectual Asset Monitor can be 
primarily seen as a measurement system, or as a management system. 
4.4.4 Measuring versus managing intellectual capital 
Throughout the analysis in this chapter, is has been referred to the Intangible Asset Monitor 
primarily as an Ie measurement tool, that can allegedly be used for internal as well as external 
purposes. This seems to be in line with the title of Sveiby's tool, where "monitoring" can be 
interpreted as inherently concerned with "measuring." This contention can be substantiated 
with the following remark by the author himself. 
"The measuring system that I propose does not present a full and comprehensive picture of a 
company's intangible assets; such a system is not possible. That is why the all comprehensive 
approaches have failed so far. Rather, the purpose here is to be practical, to 'open a few 
windows' so that managers can at least begin measuring their firms" (Sveiby, 1997: 150, 
emphases added). 
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The citation above seems to suggest that Sveiby himself perceives the Intangible Asset 
Monitor as a tool that is designed specifically for measuring, rather than managing I C. This 
would be an important observation, in view of the fact that the Intangible Asset Monitor is 
commonly regarded as an IC management, rather than an IC measurement tool. It should be 
realised, however. that such terminological and conceptual incongruencies seem to be 
frequent accompaniments of emerging research areas (Despres and Chauvel, 1999) where 
substantial effort typically needs to be devoted to the definition of clear terminological 
boundaries, and the development of a conceptual apparatus (von Krogh and Roos, 1 996b). 
Another manifestation of such conceptual obscurity would be a recent article with the title 
'The knowledge toolbox: a review of the tools available to measure and manage intangible 
resources" (Bontis, Dragonetti, Jacobsen, and Roos, 1999). One of the authors of this paper, 
when asked why the two terms were used interchangeably, explained that "we do not use 
them really interchangeably, but the only point in measuring is to ease and facilitate 
management" (Dragonetti, personal communication July 22, 1999). It should nevertheless be 
kept in mind that Sveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor can be seen as an ICM tool that would be 
preoccupied with measuring Ie, and that concrete recommendations concerning the actual 
management of this important corporate resource are generally absent. This must be 
appreciated in order not to overestimate the potential of this tool. 
4.5 Summary 
In the present chapter, Sveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor, a pioneering conceptual model that 
has been designed specifically to measure IC for the purpose of internal and external reporting 
was discussed and critically analysed. Analysis revealed that the origin, rationale and purpose 
of this tool are inherently linked to a company in the service industry (the publishing 
company "Affarsvalden"). This nexus seems to have imparted a fairly strong emphasis on 
service industry oriented foci inherent in Sveiby's approach and tool. 
In summarising the main insights that could be gained throughout the analysis it should be 
emphasised that Sveiby should be credited for his pioneering efforts in creating a view and 
terminology on intangible assets that makes a meaningful discussion about their measurement 
and management possible. Despite this appreciation, three important aspects need to be 
criticised in order to develop and sustain an enhanced understanding of the concept of ICM, 
of which Sveiby's approach and tool forms an integral part. 
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• Firstly, it ought to be realised that Sveiby's IeM system is designed specifically for 
service companies in general and know-how companies in particular in mind. In view 
of the emphasis placed on the service sector, the applicability of Sveiby's tool to 
compames in other, e.g. manufacturing industries, should not be accepted at face 
value. 
• Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, the Intangible Asset Monitor, while 
often devoted the IeM tag, would be a tool that seems inherently concerned with 
measuring, rather than managing intangible assets. This should be remembered, in 
order not to overestimate the potential of Sveiby's IeM system. The above-mentioned 
two main points would mean that probably because of the pioneering nature of the 
Intangible Asset Monitor, its potential as an Ie management tool for a wider spectrum 
of industries would clearly be limited. 
• Thirdly, it should not be overlooked that the starting point for Sveiby's approach in 
delineating measures for the Ie building blocks internal structure (i.e. internal capital), 
and employee competence (i.e. human capital) would in both cases be the corporate 
workforce. The (in)appropriateness of this approach becomes obvious if one recalls 
the analyses from chapter 2. To the extent that both internal capital and human capital 
would be inherently preoccupied with employees, important structures and systems 
that would form part of internal capital (i.e., what is left when the employees go home) 
could eschew managerial attention. In a similar vein, Sveiby's exclusive focus on 
customers in the external structure (i.e. external capital) could lead to a neglect of 
other important constituents of external capital, such as competitors, relationships with 
the wider social and political environment, etc . 
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Chapter 5: The Balanced Scorecard 
5.1 Introduction 
The present chapter attempts to critically discuss Kaplan and Norton's Balanced Scorecard, 
which has originally been designed as a holistic corporate performance measurement system 
and can for the purpose of the present study usefully be interpreted as an ICM approach and 
tool. The Balanced Scorecard has specificaUy been selected because, in contrast to Sveiby's 
Intangible Asset Monitor, it emanates from the North America business management research 
realm and would complement the European perspective that traditionally characterises the 
magnitude ofICM research. 
In line with many scholars and practitioners in the management realm (see, e.g. Drucker, 
1995; Graham, 1998; Johanson, 1996; Skynne and Amidon, 1998), Kaplan and Norton 
proclaim that traditional, i.e. financially oriented, performance measurement systems may 
have been appropriate for the industrial era. In the new corporate operating environment, 
which the authors label "information age," however, a singular focus on financial measures is 
seen as inadequate in view of their tendency to lead to suboptimisation. The reason for this 
seems to be that the complexity of the information age would be ill-reflected in purely 
financial indicators and that managing an organisation today thus requires an expanded view 
on performance measurement (see, e.g. Lissack and Roos, 1999). Within this line of thought, 
Kaplan and Norton take the stance that in order to guard the organisation against possible 
inadequacies of traditional performance measurement systems, an appropriate alternative 
ought to embrace financial as well as non-financial aspects in an integrated framework 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a). 
In view of the objective of the study, to contribute to an enhanced understanding oflCM, it is 
contended that valuable insights for ICM theory can be gained from an in-depth analysis of 
the Balanced Scorecard. In order to further illuminate the concept of ICM, the analysis in the 
present chapter is conducted in three steps: firstly, the origin, rationale and purpose of the 
Balanced Scorecard are illustrated; secondly, a critical discussion of its operationalisation 
approach and concomitant tool; is provided; thirdly a critique of the most salient aspects of 
the Balanced Scorecard is made. 
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5.2 Origin, rationale and purpose of the Balanced Scorecard 
As with Sveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor, the origin, rationale, and purpose of the Balanced 
Scorecard seem to form an integral building block of an enhanced understanding of the 
concept itself, and should be examined in some depth. In this section, the origins of the 
Balanced Scorecard shall be outlined. With this understanding, the rationale, which motivated 
Kaplan and Norton's approach is analysed. Based on these insights, the purpose behind this 
tool will be discussed. 
5.2.1 Origin 
The origins of the Balanced Scorecard can be traced back to research in the United States on 
intangible asset measurement in the late 1980s. A study under the leadership of David Norton, 
then CEO of Nolan Norton with Robert Kaplan as academic consultant has been undertaken 
by the research arm of the KPMG, the Nolan Norton Institute. It is noteworthy that this study, 
in contrast to Sveiby's singular focus on know-how and service companies, involved a wide 
spectrum of industries, e.g. service industries, consumer, and physical asset intensive 
industries. The study was triggered by the participants' belief that a sole reliance on financial 
performance measures may convey an inadequate and misleading picture of corporate 
success. Moreover, it was argued that a purely financial focus might lead to suboptimisaiton 
in many areas. These findings apparently led to the realisation that traditional performance 
measurement methods, involving only financial perspectives were becoming obsolete (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996). 
In the course of the project, case studies of innovative performance measurement approaches 
have been discussed, among others, the "Analog Devices" case. This case has illustrated 
Analog's use of a so-called "Corporate Scorecard" incorporating customer delivery times, 
quality and cycle times of manufacturing processes and effectiveness of new product 
developments in addition to traditional financial measures. During the group discussions the 
proposition emerged to expand Analog Device's scorecard and to categorise its measures 
using four building blocks, viz. the "financial," "customer," "internal," and "innovation and 
learning perspective." The resulting expanded scorecard was labeled "Balanced Scorecard" in 
view of its quest to provide, inter alia, a balance between financial and non-financial measures 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996: viii). 
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Analog Device's expanded, or "balanced" scorecard has subsequently been adopted by 
participating companies in a variety of industries. These companies have established 
experimental sites in which prototype Balanced Scorecards were built and reported back the 
perceived strengths, weaknesses, acceptance, and barriers to the study group. In December 
1990., at the conclusion of the study involving a multitude of businesses from diverse 
industries, the feasibility and benefits resulting from implementing such a balanced 
measurement system have been documented. Kaplan and Norton eventually summarised the 
findings of this study in their groundbreaking article "The Balanced Scorecard - Measures 
that Drive Performance" (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). 
5.2.2 Rationale 
Three critical building blocks seem to form the rationale underlying the Balanced Scorecard, 
viz., firstly, an expanded logic of corporate performance measurement; secondly, strategic 
positioning of the company using a Porterian approach; and thirdly, the implications from a 
shift from competing in the industrial age to competing in the information age. 
5.2.2.1 An expanded logic 
As was emphasised before, the first building block of the rationale, which seems to have 
motivated the Balanced Scorecard involves an expanded logic on corporate performance 
measures. The assumption that in an increasingly complex information era existing financial 
performance measurement approaches and tools can be suboptimal, seems to have inspired 
Kaplan and Norton to conduct a study in which financial indicators are complemented by 
non-financial indicators. In analysing the Balanced Scorecard, it must thus be appreciated that 
its underlying rationale does not originally stem from Ie theory and practice. 
5.2.2.2 Strategic positioning 
The second building block of Kaplan and Norton's rationale seems to be the strategic 
positioning of the company using Porterian approaches. In line with Porter's (1980., 1985, 
1998) theory of competitive advantage, the authors' main conceptual lens in approaching 
strategy appears to be determined by an outward focus on the competitive environment of 
organisations. According to the two scholars, a fundamental first step in pursuing corporate 
strategy would be to position the company in adequate market and customer segments 
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(Kaplan and Norton, 1996). It should be appreciated that at various instances in their analysis, 
Kaplan and Norton explicitly emphasise that the suggested approach draws on Porterian 
theories of the 1980s, probably because the authors "have seen this approach work well with 
dozens of organisations" (Kaplan and Norton, 1996: 37). 
Consistent with Porter's suggestions, Kaplan and Norton consider it to be paramount that as a 
first step appropriate market and customer segments the business unit intends to serve are 
chosen. In a second step, internal business processes, which companies must excel at in order 
to provide value to its customers in the targeted markets would need to be identified. The 
identification is systematised using a template that involves internal, customer, and financial 
perspectives (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). 
5.2.2.3 Competing in the information age 
The third building block is fundamental to the Balanced Scorecard and seems to form the 
platform on which Kaplan and Norton build their argumentation. The authors emphasise that 
"companies are in the midst of a revolutionary transformation. Industrial age competition is 
shifting to information age competition" (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 2). According to Kaplan 
and Norton, the emergence of the information era renders many of the assumptions and 
beliefs inherent to industrial age thinking obsolete. Corporate competitive dominance, it is 
held, can no longer be sustained by the deployment of new technology into physical assets 
and by the management of financial assets and liabilities. The driving forces behind 
competitive success in the information age seem far more complex and would require new 
capabilities. Kaplan and Norton provide a comprehensive analysis of the principles and 
driving forces characterising the information age as opposed to those prevalent in the 
industrial age. In order to offer an abridged version of this analysis, and ultimately to shed 
more light on the rationale underlying Kaplan and Norton's approach, table 5.1 has been 
drawn. 
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Table 5.1: The principles of the information age as opposed to those of the industrial age 
Item Industrial age Information age 
" 
Major enabler Sophisticated financial control Information technology 
systems 
Employees White and blue collar workers Knowledge workers 
Product life cycles Relatively long Continue to shrink 
Determinants of long term Economies of scale and scope Continuous improvement in 
success processes and product 
capabilities 
Geographj~al scope of Restricted by domestic Global involvement 
ope~~tions borders 
Production Standardised mass-production Flexible, responsive , and high-
Ai quality production 
Product offering Low cost and standardised Customised products and 
products and services services 
Organisati0!lal functional Separated Cross functional 
departments 
Relationship"with customers Characterised by arm's-length Integrated transactions across 
lfand suppliers transactions value chain 
,,:{.". ·'tit-
'0;,' ,1&W ~ Organisational structure Hierarchy Lean structure 
,j~ - ;!';-
Target customers Mass-market Various segments 
Source: Kaplan and Norton, 1996: 2-18. 
Scrutiny of Kaplan and Norton's analysis as summarised in table 5.1 suggests that at the heart 
of the rationale behind the Balanced Scorecard resides the notion that information technology 
is the most important driving force of the information age. The authors argue that information 
teclmology enables companies through its enormous potential to compete successfully in the 
complex, integrated, and global operating environment of the information age (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996). 
Further scrutiny of table 5.1 seems to reveal a second point: an apparent contradiction 
between the principles of the information age and Porter's theories. This observation would 
briefly need to be commented on. The apparent contradiction can be illustrated by means of 
an example. Analysis of the determinants of long-term success (i.e. a rigorous exploitation of 
economies of scale for the industrial age and a continuous improvement in process and 
product capabilities for the information age) would suggest that these essentially reflect main 
courses of action characteristic of Porter's cost leadership and differentiation strategy. 
Exclusive focus on information age principles would a priori reject Porter's cost leadership 
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theory because Porter is commonly referred to as epitome for "the economist-driven 
'industrial organisation' line of thinking" (see, e.g. Roos and Roos, 1997: 414). Thus, it is 
interesting to note that rejecting part of Porter's theory seems a contradiction to the Balanced 
Scorecard's rationale, which would allegedly be "consistent with the industry and competitive 
analysis articulated in several of Porter's widely followed corporate strategy books" (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996: 37). 
In summary, the rationale, which seems to have motivated the construction of the Balanced 
Scorecard can be seen as demarcated by three major building blocks, viz. firstly, an expanded 
logic of corporate competitive success, involving both, financial, as well as non-financial 
perspectives; secondly, the strategic product market positioning using a Porterian approach; 
and, finally, the principles and driving forces that seem to impact competition in the 
information age, of which . the predominant impetus seems to come from information 
technology. With the rationale in mind, the purpose of the Balanced Scorecard can be 
illustrated. 
5.2.3 Purpose 
In view of the rationale, which motivated the Balanced Scorecard, the authors suggest a 
twofold purpose, viz. firstly measuring business strategy, and secondly, managing business 
strategy. With regard to the former, Kaplan and Norton, emphasise that the Balanced 
Scorecard is designed to translate an organisation's vision and strategy into a coherent set of 
performance measures comprising both, financial and non-financial measures. In essence, the 
first objective of the Balanced Scorecard seems to be the provision of an expanded 
organisational performance measurement system for, and this is important, internal usage. 
With regard to the latter, and this is equally important for the purpose of this study, the 
authors transcend their earlier interpretation (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) of the tool as a 
measurement system and now provide a "strategic framework for action" (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996a: 11). The strategic framework would go beyond the perception of the Balanced 
Scorecard as an expanded organisational performance measurement system in that it suggests 
its value as a strategic management system, which is designed to link a company's long-term 
strategy with its short-term actions, using appropriate indicators. These indicators are 
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organised into four different perspectives, viz. financial, customer, internal business process, 
and learning and growth. Kaplan and Norton accentuate that 
"the scorecard provides a framework, a language, to communicate mission and strategy; it 
uses measurement to inform employees about the drivers of current and future success. By 
articulating the outcomes the organisation desires and the drivers of those outcomes, senior 
executives hope to channel the energies, the abilities, and the specific knowledge of people 
throughout the organisation toward achieving the long-term goals. The Balanced Scorecard 
should be used as a communication, informing, and learning system,nol a controlling system" 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 24-25; emphasis in original). 
The scorecard then allns at linking seemingly disparate elements of a firm's competitive 
agenda and attempts to synthesise these into a single management report (Kaplan and Norton, 
1992). Kaplan and Norton's management report, in contrast to Sveiby' s, is explicitly designed 
for internal usage, only. The authors emphasise that that the purpose of the Balanced 
Scorecard is "to gain clarification, consensus, and focus on their strategy, and then to 
communicate that strategy throughout the organisation" (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 19). 
In combining seemingly disparate elements, the scorecard approach is designed to compel 
managers to scrutinise critical performance measures in conjunction. In this way, and through 
combining expanded performance measurement and strategic management the Balanced 
Scorecard appears to enable companies to find out whether improvement in one of the four 
perspectives has been achieved at the expense of another, and hence is designed to guard 
against suboptimisation (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 1996a, 1996b). In view of these 
assignments, it must be appreciated that in essence, the Balanced Scorecard can be seen as 
both, an expanded performance measurement system, as well as a strategic management 
system (Kaplan and Norton, 1996b). With the background of the Balanced Scorecard 
involving the origins, rationale and purpose of the Balanced Scorecard understood, attention 
can shift to the operationalisation approach and tool itself. 
5.3 Approach and tool 
The present section aims at elucidating the approach and tool used by Kaplan and Norton in 
their interpretation of the Balanced Scorecard as an expanded performance measurement tool. 
To this end, a systematic analysis of the Balanced Scorecard and its four constituent 
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perspectives is made. For expository purposes this analysis is divided into the following parts: 
firstly, the approach of the Balanced Scorecard, which comprises three generic principles 
according to which a company' s strategy can be translated into a set of concrete measures is 
discussed. Subsequently, the four scorecard perspectives (viz. financial , customer, internal 
business process, learning and growth) are introduced and concisely analysed. The four 
perspectives, in combined manner, form the Balanced Scorecard, which is illustrated in figure 
5.1. Based on the insights developed throughout the chapter, the final section critically 
discusses the potential of the Balanced Scorecard as an ICM tool. At various instances 
throughout this chapter, Kaplan and Norton' s approach to performance measurement is 
illustrated by means of practical cases. Where considered appropriate, comparisons are made 
with Sveiby' s Intangible Asset Monitor, as presented in the foregoing chapter. 
figure 5.1 : The Dalanced Scorecard as intellectual capital measurement tool 
Customer 
Perspective 
Goals Measures 
Financial Perspective 
Goals Measures 
Vision and Strategy 
Innovation and 
Learning Perspective 
Goals Measures 
Source: adapted from Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 9. 
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5.3.1 Three generic principles for linking measures to strategy 
Kaplan and Norton delineate three generic principles for linking measures to strategy, viz. 
firstly, cause-and-effect relationships; secondly, outcome measures and performance drivers; 
and finally the linkage to corporate financial objectives (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a). These 
principles form the basis for the construction of the Balanced Scorecard and are thus integral 
to an understanding of the tool. Each is outlined below and a brief case illustrating their 
interplay is provided. 
5.3. 1. 1 Cause-and-effect relationships 
According to Kaplan and Norton (l996a), a strategy is a set of relationships about cause and 
effect, which can be formulated in a sequence of "if-then" statements. The bottom line is that 
"every measure selected for a Balanced Scorecard should be an element of a chain of cause-
and-effect relationships that communicates the meaning of the business unit's strategy to the 
organisation" (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 149). 
The authors suggest that an appropriate measurement system should identify cause-and-effect 
relationships and make explicit the sequence of underlying hypotheses in order to translate 
strategy into concrete measures. The cause-and-effect relationships culminating in linkages 
and relationships to financial results can be interpreted as the crux of the Balanced Scorecard 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Bontis, Dragonetti, Edvinsson, and Roos, 1999). Such cause-and-
effect relationships would represent a rather sophisticated principle for the linkage of the 
individual scorecard perspectives. To recall from the foregoing chapter, it must clearly be 
emphasised that such linkage would be a very powerful tool in that it could conceputalise how 
a change in one perspective affects the other perspectives, i.e. it could conceptualise the 
"flows" between the individual perspectives. For example, the Balanced Scorecard could 
describe how an improvement in the learning and growth perspective would translate into an 
enhancement of the customer perspective, and would ultimately materialise in an increase in 
revenues as monitored in the financial perspective in figure 5.1. Thus, the principle of cause-
and-effect relationships in the Balanced Scorecard would transcend Sveiby's approach, which 
would be ill-versed on conceptual ising Ie flows between the three forms ofIe. 
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5.3. 1.2 Outcomes measures and performance drivers 
In order to link performance measures to strategy, the Balanced Scorecard employs two 
generic categories of measures, viz. firstly, mutually reinforcing performance measures (these 
are also referred to as "leading indicators"), and secondly, outcome measures (i.e. "lagging 
indicators"). Corporate strategy, in the Balanced Scorecard, needs to be translated into leading 
or lagging indicators. The relation between these generic measures forms an integral concept 
of the Balanced Scorecard. The authors emphasise that, 
"a good Balanced Scorecard should have an appropriate mix of outcomes (lagging indicators) 
and performance drivers (leading indicators) of the business unit's strategy" (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996a: 32). 
The reason for the adoption two generic categories of measures seems to be the balance 
needed between the two in order to guard against suboptimisation. It is argued that outcome 
measures alone might not reveal how corporate results are operationally achieved, whereas a 
single focus on performance drivers could preclude a company from finding out whether 
operational improvements eventually have influenced corporate results. The Balanced 
Scorecard approach, incorporating both, performance as well as outcome-related measures 
seems generally more promising than Sveiby's explicit concentration on performance related 
measures, which Sveiby refers to as "indicators of efficiency." 
5.3. 1.3 Linkage to corporate financial objectives and indicators 
The explicit link of non-financial to financial objectives and indicators in an integrated and 
mutually reinforcing system that translates strategy into a coherent set of measures appears to 
be the crux of the Balanced Scorecard. It seems a reasonable conjecture that the correlation 
between non-financial and financial measures would have the potential to yield considerable 
benefits for organisations. In fact, as has been emphasised at various occasions in this text, 
this link can be seen as significant contribution to traditional performance measurement. For 
the purpose of the present study, the importance of the expanded logic behind the Balanced 
Scorecard, which in contrast to Sveiby, embraces both, financial as well as non-financial 
perspectives on corporate competitive dominance, should again be emphasised. 
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5.3. 1.4 The interplay of the three generic principles - the case of the Metro Bank 
The interplay of the three generic principles can best be appreciated by examining a concrete 
case. Figure 5.2 offers an illustrative overview of the three forgoing principles, which are 
designed to enable a company to translate its strategy or vision into a specific leading and 
lagging indicator. It draws from a case study of Metro Bank and shows the relationships of 
the scorecard measures to strategic initiatives. From the strategic objective "develop the 
competencies needed to support the sales process" the strategic initiative "redesign the staff 
development process" has been deducted and six managerial directives have been formulated. 
The performance driver for the competency development process was determined as 
"strategic job coverage ratio" which in turn was linked to the strategic outcome measures 
"revenue per employee" or "sales per salesperson", both of a financial nature (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996a). 
Figure 5.2: Increasing employee productivity 
Strategic Objective: 
"Develop the competencies needed to support the sales process" 
Strategic 
Outcome Measure 
(Lag indicator) 
• 
• 
Revenue per 
Employee 
or 
Sales per 
Salesperson 
Performance 
Driver 
(Lead indicator) 
• Strategic Job 
Coverage Ratio 
Source: Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 154 
Strategic 
Initiative 
• RedeSign the Staff 
Development Process 
..... 1. Identify strategic jobs 
"... 2. Build competency 
profiles 
3. Assess current staff 
4. Forecast requirement 
5. Identify gap 
6. Build staff development 
plan 
In the case of Metro Bank, the logic of defining the strategic priorities and the measures that 
best describe them apparently led to the redefinition of a basic management program for 
strategic planning and execution. It appears not hypothetical to assume that without the strong 
logical systems thinking encouraged by constructing its Balanced Scorecard Metro Bank 
would not have addressed the redesign of staff development processes in such a systematic 
way. It thus appears that the Balanced Scorecard represents a valuable management tool for 
rethinking strategy and detecting relationships between strategic objectives and initiatives. In 
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this sense, it should agam be appreciated that the Balanced Scorecard can usefully be 
interpreted as a management tool that addresses questions pertaining to the generation of 
strategic alternatives (see, e.g. Lyles, 1994), and their implementation (see, e.g. Eisenstat and 
Beer, 1994; Hart, 1994). With the logic behind the three generic principles to translate 
strategy into a coherent set of measures appreciated, analysis can proceed with the 
investigation of the four perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard. 
5.3.2 Financial perspective 
The first perspective of the Balanced Scorecard involves financial measures. Notwithstanding 
the fact that financial measurement forms per definitionem not directly part of IC 
measurement (Stewart, 1998; Sveiby, 1997; Brooking, 1996), for the purpose of this study, it 
is considered essential to link IC measurement results to financial indicators and objectives, 
quite simply because the ultimate aim of every business organisation would be profit making. 
It would appear that a possible error of omission, which a singular focus on IC would be 
making could be the exact obverse it accuses the traditional, financial, measurement and 
management systems of making, viz. it ascribes predominance to the "intellectual." In' view of 
the objective to shed more light on ICM, it is considered useful to elucidate an approach in 
which ICM is conducted in conjunction with financial measurement. It must therefore be 
appreciated that the financial side of performance measurement is included in this thesis and 
should not be viewed as a contradiction to the intended focus on ICM but rather as a valuable 
supplement. The complementation of financial and IC perspectives would be inspired by the 
same mindset, which gave rise to the concept ICM in the first place, viz. holistic thinking. 
This suggests that, in order to provide'an enhanced understanding of the concept of ICM, it 
would be interesting to analyse how the Balanced Scorecard combines the financial with the 
three non-financial perspectives. Kaplan and Norton's approach to the financial perspective 
entails three basic steps. The identification of the company's business life cycle stage is 
defined as a first step, followed by the classification of financial objectives in three themes. In 
a third step, the two foregoing ones are combined in a three-by-three matrix, which aggregates 
the measures of the financial perspective. The three steps shall now be concisely discussed. 
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5.3.2. 1 Identification of the business life cycle stages 
The identification of the business life cycle stage constitutes a first step in linking the 
financial with the non-financial perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard. Kaplan and Norton 
argue that the business life cycle stage has fundamental implications for the strategy that a 
business unit may follow. Obviously, a business unit may follow a great number of alternative 
strategies, that would be impacted by the life cycle stage the business in question finds itself 
in (see e.g. Hasperslagh, 1982; MacMillan, 1982; Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Lyles, 1994). 
Within this line of thought, Kaplan and Norton suggest that three general stages of the 
business life cycle, viz. growth, sustain, and harvest, radically impact strategy formulation 
because the overall financial objectives for each are likely to differ. 
Businesses that are in the "growth" stage of their life cycle are likely to be interested in 
percentage growth rates in revenues and sales growth rates in targeted markets, customer 
groups and regions. Businesses competing in the "sustain" stage of their life cycle are 
believed to rely on financial objectives related to profitability, e.g. gross margin or accounting 
income. Businesses having reached a mature phase of their life cycle seem to strive at 
"harvesting" investments, hence overall objectives include cash flow and reductions 111 
working capital (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a). 
5.3.2.2 Classification of financial objectives 
In a step following the extrapolation of the three possible strategies that are related to each of 
the three business life cycle stages, Kaplan and Norton approach the measurement of the 
financial perspective by suggesting a threefold classification scheme that is believed to drive 
strategy, irrespective of the business life cycle. The three major themes of this classification 
are, firstly, revenue growth and mix; secondly, productivity improvement; and thirdly, cost 
reduction and asset utilisation. In brief, revenue growth and mix is designated to expand, 
change, and re-price the product or service offering, acquire new customers, and penetrate 
new markets. Cost reduction and productivity improvement essentially involves efforts to 
reduce direct and indirect costs for products and processes, and to share resources. The last 
theme, i.e. asset utilisation, is concerned with attempts to reduce the working capital levels, 
which are required to support a given volume and mix of business (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996a). 
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5.3.2.3 Aggregation of measures 
In a final step, the first two steps, identification of the business life cycle stage and the 
classification of financial objectives are aggregated in a three-by-three matrix (table 5.2). This 
matrix contains the indicators that are postulated for measuring whether a business enterprise 
would be able to increase the returns earned on its financial and physical assets. 
Table 5.2: Measuring strategic financial themes 
STRA TEGIC THEMES 
Revenue Growth and Cost Reductioni Asset Utilisation 
Mix Productivity 
Improvement 
Growth 
• Sales growth rate by • Revenue/Employee • Investment 
segment (percentage of sales) 
Percentage revenue • R&D (percentage of • 
"',, .. ,., .... ,', .. ,'" from new product, sales) 
services. and 
customers 
Sustain 
• Share of targeted • Cost versus • Working capital ratios 
customers and competitors' (cash-to-cash cycle) 
accounts • Cost reduction rates • ROCE by key asset 
STRATEGY • Cross-sellings • Indirect expenses categories 
• Percentage revenues (percentage of sales) • Asset utilisation rates 
form new applications 
• Customer and product 
line profitability 
Harvest 
• Customer and product • Unit costs (per unit of • Payback 
line profitability output, per • Throughput 
• Percentage transaction) 
unprofitable customers 
Source: adapted from Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 52. 
At this point, it should briefly be emphasised that measures indicating whether a business 
enterprise is able to increase the returns earned on its financial and physical assets might not 
be of paramount relevance to all organisations. As has been pointed out on various occasions 
in this text, it is commonly acknowledged that the Ie component of corporate market value is 
increasingly becoming bigger in many organisations. At the same time, the total value of 
physical assets tends to shrink (see, e.g. Sveiby, 1997; Harvey and Lusch, 1999; Stewart, 
1998; Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). To this extent, companies should be cautioned against 
an overemphasis on returns earned by physical asset and redirected towards finding critical 
indicators of revenues earned by Ie in order to be able to calculate the return on Ie. 
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To summarise, the Balanced Scorecard should be welcomed for its explicit linkage of non-
financial and financial measures. This linkage would be a major contribution in that it 
complements a singular focus on financial measures, which seems characteristic of traditional 
performance measurement systems. The Balanced Scorecard should furthermore be 
welcomed to the extent that it can be seen as an integrated ICM system that complements the 
systematic measurement and management of IC with a strong financial perspective. In 
important ways, the Balanced Scorecard would transcend other ICM systems (e.g. Sveiby's) 
that focus on IC, only. 
5.3.3 Customer Perspective 
The second perspective of the Balanced Scorecard involves the customers of the corporation. 
Kaplan and Norton, in line with a common wisdom in the marketing research realm (see, e.g. 
Kotler, 1988) hold that existing and potential customers are likely to have heterogeneous 
preferences. The customer perspective in the Balanced Scorecard involves two steps. In view 
of the heterogeneous preferences characterising customer segments, a first step for companies 
would be the identification of the customer and market segments in terms of these 
preferences. In a subsequent step, measures are selected for each of the targeted segments 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996a, 1996b). 
5.3.3. 1 Market segmentation 
Predicated on the belief that existing and potential customers are likely to be heterogeneous 
with regard to their preferences, Kaplan and Norton suggest, in line with Sveiby, to segment 
customers and markets. According to Kaplan and Norton, a useful strategy formulation 
process would be based on extensive market research indicating pertinent customer and 
market segments and the respective preferences along dimensions like price quality, 
functionality, image, reputation, relationship and service. This should enable a company to 
identify relevant customer and market segments and, as a reflection of its strategy, would also 
enable it to select and formulate objectives and measures for each of the targeted segments 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a). 
The illustrative cases given by Kaplan and Norton reveal that traditional bases to market 
segmentation in the spirit of Kotler (1988) are promoted. Pioneer Petroleum, for instance, a 
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big US refiner and retail marketer of gasoline and automobile lubricants, applied a 
segmentation approach on the basis of demographic variables such as age and family life 
cycle, gender, family size, income, and occupation. Kaplan and Norton's approach seems to 
be in contrast with Sveiby's (Sveiby, 1997: 118-119), where customers would not be 
segmented using such traditional bases, but according to the intangible revenues, which they 
provide. Generally, Kaplan and Norton's segmentation approach appears to be a worthwhile 
starting point in view of selecting target customers, its merits for the Ie context, however, 
would need to be scrutinised. It can be speculated that the Balanced Scorecard approach could 
inadequately obscure many of the intangible revenues, Sveiby's model seeks to capture. To 
alleviate this inadequacy, the possible merits of Sveiby's logic in segmenting customers seem 
to suggest interesting avenues for further investigations. 
5.3.3.2 Selecting measures for the identified segments 
The selection of measures for the customer perspective follows the principles delineated 
earlier in this chapter, i.e. a company should identify two sets of measures, viz. firstly, 
outcome measures, and secondly, performance drivers. 
5.3.3.2.1 Determining outcome measures 
After having identified the targeted segments, so Kaplan and Norton, an organisation can 
select and establish appropriate measures. The authors advise to concentrate first and foremost 
on the generation of a set of outcome measures. Kaplan and Norton have found out that 
generic measures such as market share, customer acquisition, customer retention, customer 
satisfaction, and customer profitability are prevalent in most Balanced Scorecards across 
industries and are thus referred to as the "core .measurement group" (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996a: 67). The customer core measurement group can, in line with the three basic principles 
according to which a company can translate its strategy into concrete measures, be interpreted 
as a causal chain ··of relationships. The core measurement group as a causal chain of 
relationships is illustrated in figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: Core measurement group of the customer perspective 
Market Share 
Customer 
Acquisition 
Customer 
Retention 
Customer 
Satisfaction 
Customer 
Profitability 
Customer 
Acquisition 
Market 
Share 
Customer 
Profitability 
Customer 
Satisfaction 
Customer 
Retention 
Reflects the proportion of business in a given market (in terms of numbers of customers, 
dollars spent, or unit volume sold) that a business unit sells. 
Measures, in absolute or relative terms, the rate at which a business unit attracts or wins 
new customers or businesses. 
Tracks, in absolute or relative terms, the rate at which a business unit retains or maintains 
ongoing relationships with its customers. 
Assesses the satisfaction level of customer along specific performance criteria within the 
value proposition. 
Measures the net profit of a customer, or a segment after allowing for the unique expenses 
required to support that customer. 
Source: Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 68. 
5.3.3.2.2 Determining performance drivers 
Kaplan and Norton complement outcome measures (i.e. lagging indicators) with performance 
measures (i.e. leading indicators). It is argued that ideally, the complementary leading 
indicators should reflect customer value propositions, which can be interpreted as drivers for 
the core measurement group. To accommodate value propositions from different industries 
and customer segments, a common, standardised, denominator has been established by the 
authors, which comprises three generic categories of value propositions. It is argued that in 
most cases, customer value consists of, firstly, product and service attributes such as 
functionality, quality, price, and time; and secondly, the image and reputation a firm has, and 
thirdly, the relationship a company has to its customers. These three value proposition, each 
on its own account and all in combined manner, are believed to determine the customer value 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a). 
In this context it should be appreciated that Kaplan and Norton's suggestions as to what 
customers perceive as valuable in products seems to cover and synthesise well a wide 
spectrum of possible value propositions from different industries and customer segments. It 
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must however be emphasised that an important area of neglect in the suggested approach 
appears to be the lack of attention devoted to "the dangers of being customer led" (Hamel and 
Prahalad, 1994). This negligence could be related to the fact that Kaplan and Norton commit 
themselves to "retrospective aspects of value propositions" (i.e. those that become evident 
once the product has been sold), rather than value propositions that are inspired by what 
Hamel and Prahalad have termed "industry foresight." The retrospective nature of the 
Balanced Scorecard would make it difficult to anticipate what range of benefits customers 
might value in tomorrow's products, and how the firm might through innovation pre-empt 
competitors in delivering these to the marketplace. In fact, the retrospective orientation is 
likely to engender misleading results against the background of fast moving and complex 
competitive environments, which are characterised by increasingly shorter innovation cycles 
(Burgelmann, Maidique, and Wheelwright, 1996; Lissack and Roos, 1999; Tidd, Bessant and 
Pavitt, 1997). The generation of such future-oriented measures for the customer dimension 
seem to suggest worthwhile areas for future research, in order to guard the Balanced 
Scorecard in particular, and IeM tools in general against the "dangers of being customer led." 
To summarise the customer perspective in the Balanced Scorecard, it must be remembered 
that this perspective, similarly to Sveiby, represents the only focus on the external 
environment of the firm. Notwithstanding the fact that the Balanced Scorecard's rationale 
draws strongly on the industry and competitive analysis articulated by Porter (Porter, 1980, 
1985), it would appear that the external environment in which competition occurs is only 
partly reflected by the customer perspective. Recalling Porter's five forces framework 
obviates that the customer dimension of the Balanced Scorecard would only comprise one of 
the five forces, viz. buyer power. A related criticism can also be found in the literature. For 
example, Bontis, Dragonetti, Jacobsen, and Roos proclaim that Kaplan and Norton's 
considerations are limited to customers only although companies interact with other actors, 
such as suppliers alliance partners, local community, unions, and final customers (Bontis, 
Dragonetti, Jacobsen, and Roos, 1999). 
5.3.4 Internal-business-process perspective 
Kaplan and Norton propose to identify the internal business process perspective after having 
established leading and lagging indicators for the financial and customer perspectives. It is 
maintained that this sequence allows firms to align measures derived from internal processes 
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with expectation of shareholders and targeted customers (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a). In their 
approach to develop measures for the internal-business-perspective, Kaplan and Norton 
recommend the determination of an "internal-process value chain" (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996a: 92) consisting of three generic processes, viz. innovation, operations, and postsale 
service. The suggested approach, reminiscent of Porter's value chain concept (Porter, 1980, 
1985), is depicted in figure 5.4. The constituent processes shall briefly be discussed in turn. 
Figure 5.4: The generic value-chain model of the internal-business-process perspective 
J~u~tOlper .• 
need· . 
·identified 
Innovation 
Source: Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 96. 
5.3.4.1 Innovation process 
Postsale 
As evident from figure 5.4, the innovation process consists of two components, V1Z. the 
identification of the market and the creation of a suitable product and service offering. 
Identifying the market primarily involves market research to find out the market size, nature 
of customers' preferences, and price points for the targeted product or service. For example, 
in the case of Rockwater, an undersea construction company whose clients are major oil, gas, 
and offshore construction companies, the objective for the innovation process was to 
encourage its employees to spend more time in detecting customer needs and provide 
innovative solution to these needs. Scrutiny of Kaplan and Norton's innovation process leads 
to draw the inference that Hamel and Prahald' s "industry foresight" (1994) that apparently 
was neglected in the customer perspective seems to be largely covered in the internal business 
process perspective. Measures suggested by Kaplan and Norton include "number of entirely 
new products," "success in developing specific products," and the "preparation of the market 
research" (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 100-101). 
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The creation of suitable products as the second step of the innovation process comprises three 
tasks, viz. firstly basic research to develop new products; secondly applied research to exploit 
existing products, and thirdly focused marketing of new products. For example, measures for 
the first two steps would include "percentage of sales from new products or from proprietary 
products," and for the third step "break even time," a metric developed by Hewlett-Packard 
measuring the effectiveness of its product development cycle (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 
100-104). Interestingly, the second step seems to reflect the essence of the resource-based 
paradigm according to which existing products or services solutions should be leveraged and 
systematically be deployed (Coombs, 1996; Hamel and Prahalad, 1993). This would suggest 
that while the Balanced Scorecard is, according to Kaplan and Norton, conceived within the 
Porterian paradigm of strategy, it reveals strong elements characteristic of the resource based 
paradigm. This aspect will receive further exploration in the critique of the tool towards the 
end of this chapter. 
5.3.4.2 Operation process 
The operation process starts with the receipt of a customer order and ends with the delivery of 
the finished product, thereby spanning in conjunction with the postsale service process the 
concept of the value chain in the sense of Porter (1985). According to Kaplan and Norton, 
"this process stresses efficient, consistent, and timely delivery of existing products and 
services to existing customers" (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 104). Possible measures draw 
from a scope of three major categories, viz. time (e.g. manufacturing cycle effectiveness), 
quality (e.g. waste, rework, process parts per million), and cost metrics (e.g. ABC anlysis). 
5.3.4.3 Postsale service process 
The last compound of the generic value chain of the Balanced Scorecard framework, the 
postsale service processes, is similarly to the previous compound, rather straightforward. It 
refers t6 -warranty and repair activities, treatment of defects and returns, and the processing of 
payments. It is reasoned that this process enables a firm to discern when appropriate, 
important aspects of service that are not part of the actual purchase have been delivered to the 
customer. Concerning indicator selection, Kaplan and Norton suggest to measure the 
performance of the postsale service process drawing from the same categories as described 
above. 
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To summarise the internal-business-process perspective of the Balanced Scorecard, it must be 
emphasised that this building block seems to draw heavily on the Porterian value chain 
framework. It therefore seems much more encompassing than Sveiby's singular focus on 
support staff in the internal structure of the Intangible Asset Monitor. It must be appreciated, 
however, that while the Porterian framework seems to be invoked by Kaplan and Norton, 
strong elements of the resource based paradigm to strategy can be observed. 
5.3.5 Learning and growth perspective 
Kaplan and Norton seem to have designed the three foregoing perspectives of the Balanced 
Scorecard in order to find out what the organisation must excel at to accomplish breakthrough 
performance. The fourth, learning and growth, perspective in turn is designed to provide the 
infrastructure required for achieving the goals of the other three perspectives. It has been 
emphasised by a variety of authors that excellent customer value, efficient processes, and 
exceptional shareholder value can only be delivered if a company constantly improves, 
innovates, and grows (see, e.g. Burgelmann, Maidique, and Wheelwright, 1996; Johanson and 
Swigart, 1991; Buys, 1999). To this end, it is seen indispensable for business enterprises to 
invest in their "infrastructure" (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 127). The authors identify three 
principal categories of this infrastructure, viz. firstly employee capabilities, secondly 
motivation, empowerment, and alignment, and thirdly information systems capabilities 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a). 
Parallel to the three foregoing perspectives, Kaplan and Norton approach the measurement of 
the learning and growth perspective by establishing lagging (i.e. core measures) and leading 
indicators (i.e. performance drivers). Figure 5.5 depicts the suggested indicators and shows 
the inherent dynamics of the measurement process. It is unclear why the authors derive 
performance drivers from the three principal categories of the learning and growth 
perspective, when core measures are apparently related to only one, viz. employee 
capabilities. Due to this, the learning and growth perspective seems less logically structured 
and straightforward than in the three previously discussed scorecard perspectives. With this 
fact in mind, a brief delineation of firstly, performance drivers, and secondly, core measures 
as suggested by Kaplan and Norton (1996a) can be analysed. 
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Figure 5.5: The learning and growth measurement framework 
Core Measures ~I I, Results 
Employee Employee 
Retention Productivity , ~ 
Employee 
Satisfaction 
Drivers 
Staff Technology Climate for 
Competence Infrastructure Action 
Source: adapted from Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 129. 
5.3.5. 1 Performance drivers 
The performance drivers of the learning and growth perspective are, although 
terminologically not identical, congruent with the principal categories of the learning and 
growth perspective and thus also threefold. Kaplan and Norton posit that staff competencies, 
technology infrastructure, and climate for action would best reflect the situation-specific 
dimensions, which organisations typically draw their performance drivers from. In measuring 
staff competence with drivers such as strategic skills, training levels, and skill leverage, the 
key strategic theme would be to reskill or upgrade the abilities of the work force in order to 
achieve the corporate vision. Further, it is held that even highly skilled employees are unlikely 
to contribute to organisational success if they are not well motivated to act. Hence, the climate 
for action dimension to be measured by means of key decision cycles, strategic focus, staff 
empowerment, personal alignment, morale and teaming. Underlying the two above mentioned 
dimensions resides the assumption of information technology systems constituting an enabler. 
Technology infrastructure performance drivers are according to the authors derived from 
technology, i.e. strategic technologies, strategic databases, and experience capture. 
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5.3.5.2 Core measures 
As evident from figure 5.5, core measures are exclusively related to one of the above 
discussed performance drivers, viz. employee capabilities. In line, only one of the three 
principal categories of the learning and growth perspective, is accounted for with the core 
measures "employee satisfaction," "employee retention," and "employee productivity" 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 129-132). Figure 5.5 suggests that the employee satisfaction 
objective can be read as a prerequisite for employee retention and productivity, which in turn 
would influence corporate results. An insight in employee satisfaction could be gained 
through conducting an annual survey that is arranged around issues such as involvement with 
decisions, recognition for doing a good job, or overall satisfaction with the company, propose 
the authors. The aim of measuring employee retention would be to avoid the departure of 
employees the organisation has made long-term investments in, i.e. a depletion of IC. A 
classical measure for employee retention seems to be the "percentage of key staff turnover." 
Employee productivity would be calculated involving the aggregate impact of multiple 
sources (e.g. "intervention with customers" or "efficiency of internal processes"). Kaplan and 
Norton suggest revenue per employee as an indicator for employee productivity, mainly for 
the reasons that it is relatively easy to calculate (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a). 
In summary, the learning and growth perspective of the Balanced Scorecard is composed of 
three major building blocks, viz. employee capabilities, information system capabilities, as 
well as motivation, empowerment and alignment. To this extent, the Balanced Scorecard 
would go beyond Sveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor, in that Sveiby's "employee 
competence" becomes only one component of a wider infrastructure comprising three 
building blocks. Recalling the anatomy of IC, which accords explicit attention to human 
capital (see chapter 2) seems to suggest however that the more encompassing view on 
corporate learning and growth in the Balanced Scorecard framework could also contribute to a 
neglect of the important constituent human capital. This aspect will receive further attention 
in the next section. 
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5.4 A critique of the Balanced Scorecard as intellectual capital management 
tool 
The four perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard, which can for the purpose of this thesis 
usefully be interpreted as the three forms oflC plus a financial dimension, have been analysed 
in the previous sections. In the remaining part of this chapter, the suitability of the Balanced 
Scorecard as an ICM tool shall be critically discussed. To this end, emphasis shall be placed 
on the following aspects: firstly, the potential of the learning and growth perspective for ICM 
purposes should be scrutinised; secondly, the intellectual indebtedness to Porterian theories 
and its implications would be interesting to examine; thirdly, the explicit linkage to financials 
in the Balanced Scorecard and its ramifications for ICM theory would need to be analysed; 
fourthly, the restriction of the purpose of the tool for internal usage should be contemplated; 
finally, an analysis of the potential ofthe Balanced Scorecard as an ICM tool can be made. 
5.4.1 The learning and growth perspective - a proxy for human capital 
As the foregoing analysis has revealed, the learning and growth perspective of the Balanced 
Scorecard seems to be less logically structured and intuitively plausible as the foregoing ones. 
Close scrutiny of this perspective has suggested that this inadequacy can mainly be ascribed 
to three areas, viz. firstly, terminological inconsistencies; secondly, structural discrepancies; 
and thirdly, inadequate treatment of human capital. Terminologically, Kaplan and Norton 
establish three principal categories for the learning and growth perspective, i.e. employee 
capabilities, information systems capabilities, as well as motivation, empowerment, and 
alignment (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 127). However, in the course of their argumentation 
(see the learning and growth measurement framework as depicted in figure 5.5), the 
terminology changes to staff competencies, technological infrastructure, and climate for 
action. Interestingly, and to the confusion of the reader, Kaplan and Norton later switch back 
to the first designations, except for the term employee capability, which is now referred to as 
-- - ---, 
"reskilling the workforce" (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 132). 
With regard to structural discrepancies, it should be noted that although Kaplan and Norton 
identify three principle categories pertaining to the learning and growth perspective, outcome 
measures are exclusively identified for employee related objectives (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996a: 129). To complicate matters even further, performance drivers for the outcome 
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measures are suddenly derived from all three categories. This incommensurate treatment of 
leading indicators (i.e. performance drivers) and lagging indicators (i.e. outcome measures) 
could be critisised, not only because it detrimentally affects an understanding of the 
framework as such, but also because it would compromise its usefulness in practice. It would 
appear that a more practical and cogent way to structure the learning and growth perspective 
would have been to firstly identify relevant categories and secondly derive lagging and 
leading indicators for each of these categories individually. 
Finally, in addition to the above revealed inconsistencies, a substantial weakness to be 
attributed to the learning and growth perspective seems to reside in Kaplan and Norton's 
inadequate treatment of corporate human capital. This has also been acknowledged by Bontis, 
Dragonetti, Jacobsen, and Roos, who proclaim that a 
"problem the sse has is its consideration of employees almost as an afterthought. Personnel 
is lumped together with IT systems into the learning and growth perspective ... As a 
consequence, the specific challenge of managing people and their knowledge is 
underestimated by the SSe. More than that, knowledge is reified, i.e. it is treated like a 
physical thing: this misconception might reinforce the mistake many companies make, to 
believe that the creation of an IT system is enough to automatically manage knowledge" 
(Sontis, Dragonetti, Jacobsen, Roos, 1999: 397, emphasis added). 
Clearly, information technology is an important factor in the management of corporate 
knowledge, yet its importance should not be overemphasised. There is increasing empirical 
evidence that an overestimation of information technology introduces serious hazards (see, 
e.g. Zuboff, 1988). A reasonable approach to the use of a company's technological 
infrastructure seems to view it as support system enabling effective communication between 
the corporate staff (see, e.g. Davenport, 1994; Davenport and Marchand, 1999; Hallowell, 
1999). 
5.4.2 The intellectual provenance of the Balanced Scorecard and its implications 
A discussion of the intellectual provenance of the Balanced Scorecard and its implications 
would form an integral component of a critique of this measurement and management tool. 
The line of reasoning of the present section would revolve around two arguments. Firstly, an 
apparent inconsistency in the logic underlying the Balanced Scorecard would need to be 
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demonstrated: while the Balanced Scorecard is, according to Kaplan and Norton, conceived 
within the Porterian paradigm of strategy, it reveals strong elements characteristic of the 
resource based paradigm. Secondly, it shall be demonstrated that this apparent inconsistency 
needs not necessarily be viewed as undesirable. 
As was outlined before, Kaplan and Norton have emphasised their intellectual indebtedness to 
Porter's theories. It would appear that in organisations competing according to Porter's rules 
strategic product market positioning represents a crucial task for managers: the managerial 
focus in the Porterian paradigm seems to be concerned with finding the optimum solution for 
combining products and markets given the bargaining power of the suppliers and customers, 
entry barriers, and potential substitute products (Porter, 1980). In terms of sustaining 
corporate strength Porter offers a well known scenario of three generic strategies, involving 
firstly, "overall cost leadership strategy," in which strength is derived from a rigorous 
exploitation of economies of scale, secondly, "differentiation strategy," largely based on 
continuous improvement and innovation concerning processes as well as product features; and 
thirdly, "focus strategy," which revolves around serving specific segments more effectively 
(Porter, 1985; Belohlav, 1996). These constitute, according to Kaplan and Norton (1996a), the 
main strategic principles the Balanced Scorecard relies on. 
It should however be appreciated that strong adherence in the Balanced Scorecard to Porter's 
principles could be inadequately biased to the extent that it overemphasises a product-market 
orientation at the expense of ignoring the strategic relevance of corporate resources, as a 
number of scholars hold (Barney, 1986; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1990; Hall, 1992; Nanda, 
1996). The general management field has been deeply involved with detecting sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage other than those proposed by Porter. It has been found that 
corporate resources are most highly associated with strategic success (Penrose, 1959; 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Rumelt, 1984; Hall, 1994). As a result, considerable work has been 
undertaken to establish an inward, "resource-based view of the firm" (Dierickx and Cool, 
1989; Hamel and Prahalad, 1990; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993) in reaction to the perceived 
outward bias epitomised by the Porterian paradigm. This resource based view essentially 
involves looking inside, rather than outside the firm. 
The potential inadequacies associated with an orthodox Porterian approach to strategy would 
suggest the merits of an alternative, resource based view on the Balanced Scorecard. In fact, 
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the analysis of the Balanced Scorecard and its four perspectives in the course of this chapter 
revealed that this performance measurement tool seems to obviate strong elements of the 
resource based approach to strategy. An indicator, which would reveal an application of the 
resource based paradigm has been pointed out by Itami. This author argues that strategies in 
the resource based paradigm would involve not only a scrutiny of the external environment 
but would predominantly be concerned with an inward orientation, i.e. a scrutiny of the 
optimal usage of a firm's resources (Itami, 1987). Itami' s interpretation seems to be captured 
to a large extent by the four perspectives, which embrace predominantly inward perspectives 
on corporate resources (i.e. the financial, the internal business, and learning and growth), and 
only one external perspective (i.e. the customer). From this angle, it seems that three 
perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard are essentially inward, i.e. on critical firm resources, 
rather than outward, i.e. on appropriate product market positioning. In fact, it has been 
emphasised before, that the customer building block as the only perspective with an outward 
orientation, seems to be an incomplete reflection of the five forces that characterise Porter's 
strategy framework. These observations would clearly suggest an intellectual indebtedness of 
the Balanced Scorecard to the resource based paradigm, rather than to the Porterian, as 
suggested by the authors. 
The above analysis would be indicative of an inconsistency in the logic of the authors. Such 
inconsistency, however, need not necessarily be viewed as undesirable. The foregoing 
sections revealed that the four perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard in general, and the 
three non-financial perspectives in particular are, in line with Sveiby's Intangible Asset 
Monitor, designed to respond to internal as well as well as external foci. This approach should 
clearly be welcomed to the extent that it accommodates a duality of internal and external 
aspects of corporate strategy design. The importance of accommodating this duality has been 
outlined by various authors of the management realm (see, e.g. Hamel and Prahalad, 1993, 
1994; Leonard Barton, 1995; Nanda, 1996) and would certainly enhance the potential of the 
Balanced Scorecard. 
5.4.3 The explicit linkage to financials in the Balanced Scorecard 
In analysing the Balanced Scorecard, it should be recalled that its rationale does not originally 
stem from IC theory and practice. As has been indicated above, Kaplan and Norton's intent 
does not seem to have been the design of an ICM tool but rather the construction of an 
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organisational performance measurement tool, which embraces financial and non-financial 
perspectives (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 1996a). The important point is that for the purpose of 
this study, the non-financial perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard can usefully be 
interpreted as building blocks one. To the extent that the Balanced Scorecard as an expanded 
performance measurement tool complements financial with non-financial indicators, thereby 
introducing a more encompassing framework than Sveiby's singular focus on IC, Kaplan and 
Norton's rationale should clearly be welcomed and can be interpreted as a contribution to 
ICM theory. 
The interpretation of the three non-financial perspectives of Balanced Scorecard as three 
building blocks of IC would need some elaboration. In order to complement financial 
measures with non-financial measures, three perspectives (or building blocks of IC) are 
adopted in Kaplan and Norton's analysis, viz. the "customer," "internal business process," 
and "learning and growth" perspectives. Recalling the findings of chapter 2 where most 
eminent IC models have been comparatively analysed and synthesised, Kaplan and Norton's 
suggested categories appear to be largely congruent with the synthesised sub-forms ofIC as 
depicted in figure 2.6, i.e. "external capital", "internal capital", and "human capital." Thus, it 
seems plausible to view the Balanced Scorecard as an ICM approach and tool. 
In this context, it should be appreciated that Kaplan and Norton themselves emphasise that 
"companies will succeed by investigating in and managing their intellectual assets" (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996: 18, emphasis added). There is also evidence for the fact that leading 
experts in the IC realm mutually acknowledge the Balanced Scorecard as an ICM approach 
and tool (see e.g. Sveiby, 1997, 1998a; Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). Conversely, Kaplan 
and Norton devote some attention to the achievements of Skandia. It is argued that the 
Skandia Navigator can also be seen as an expanded Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996a: 210-212). It can hence be argued that the above facts, individually and in conjunction, 
justify the conjecture that the Balanced Scorecard can, for the purpose of the present study, be 
read as an ICM approach and tool combining traditional financially oriented performance 
measurement with the measurement of corporate intangible assets. It is thus believed that the 
presentation of the Balanced Scorecard contributes to and enhances the understanding of 
ICM. 
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To the extent that the Balanced Scorecard is interpreted as an ICM tool, the explicit linkage of 
non-financial measures to financials would go beyond ICM models, which are primarily 
concerned with IC (i.e. those assets that are by definition non-financial), such as Sveiby's 
Intangible Asset Monitor, with its characteristic focus on IC, only. This view is authenticated 
by Bontis, Dragonetti, Jacobsen, and Roos, who accentuate that one of the chief 
accomplishments of Kaplan and Norton's approach is the explicit correlation between IC 
indicators and financial measures and objectives (Bontis, Dragonetti, Edvinsson, and Roos, 
1999). Thus, the Balanced Scorecard would clearly transcend Sveiby's Intangible Asset 
Monitor, which pursues ICM isolated from traditional, i.e. financial performance 
measurement. In Sveiby's approach, an IC report only submitted as a supplement to the 
annual report rather than as integral part. 
5.4.4 Restriction of the Balanced Scorecard to internal usage 
Revisiting the purpose of the Balanced Scorecard reveals that this tool is designed specifically 
as an internal document. In contrast, Sveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor seems to be 
characterised by a dual purpose, viz. it may serve as an internal document and it may also be 
used for external reporting. For the purpose of this study, the merits of the Balanced 
Scorecard's the explicit concentration on internal usage should be contemplated. 
It is noteworthy that restricting the purpose of the Balanced Scorecard to internal usage would 
limit its potential as an ICM tool. More precisely, a single concentration on internal usage 
could preclude a company from external reporting of both, its IC and financial status to 
external share- and stakeholders. As the analysis in this chapter has attempted to show, the 
Balanced Scorecard would have great potential as an ICM system for external reporting, 
because this management system would combine the two building blocks of corporate market 
value (i.e. IC and the book value) in one integrated report. In this respect, it should be again 
be emphasised that, if used for purposes of external reporting, the Balanced Scorecard would 
transcend Sveiby's ICM approach with its singular focus on Ie. Revising and/or adapting the 
format of the Balanced Scorecard in order to make it more suitable for external reporting 
purposes would suggest fruitful avenues for further research. 
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5.4.5 An interpretation of the Balanced Scorecard as a system for managing 
intellectual capital 
On a concluding note, it should be emphasised that the Balanced Scorecard seems to have 
potential for further exploitation as a tool explicitly for the purpose of managing Ie. In fact, 
Kaplan and Norton have already transcended their early vision of the Balanced Scorecard 
merely constituting a performance measurement tool (Kaplan an Norton, 1992) and 
established an approach to use it as a strategic management system. The authors emphasise 
that "the real power of the Balanced Scorecard occurs when it is transformed from a 
measurement system to a management system" (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 19). Similarly, in 
a recent publication, the authors clearly make the point that the Balanced Scorecard 
constitutes a valuable tool for managing corporate performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1998). 
To this end, four recursive processes are organised around the traditional scorecard, i.e. 
translating the vision, communicating and linking, business planning, and feedback and 
learning (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a, 1996b). 
In this respect, an interesting route warranting further investigations appears to be the 
suitability of these processes to IeM. To recall Sveiby, the Intangible Asset Monitor is 
explicitly designed as a measurement tool for Ie (Sveiby, 1997). To the extent that the 
Balanced Scorecard offers a platform for further expansion as a management tool for linking 
long-term strategic objectives with short-term actions (Kaplan and Norton, 1996b), Kaplan 
and Norton's approach would, by analogy, suggest similar ventures for IeM approaches and 
tools, e.g. Sveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor. As has been suggested at various occasions 
throughout the text, the three non-financial perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard can be 
seen as representative of the three generic building blocks of Ie. This would be indicative of 
the potential of Kaplan and Norton's framework as an IeM approach and tool, thereby going 
beyond the context for which it originally was conceived. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, an approach and tool to the measurement and management of intangible assets 
that does not emanate from the IeM research realm was critically analysed, viz. the Balanced 
Scorecard. This framework represents an expanded organisational performance measurement 
tool, which complements a financial perspective with three non-financial perspectives. These 
non financial perspectives can, for the purpose of the present thesis, be interpreted as building 
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blocks of re, hence suggesting the value of the Balanced Scorecard as an reM approach and 
tool. 
While the Balanced Scorecard does not represent an reM approach in a strict sense, the 
present chapter was, inter alia, concerned with demonstrating its suitability for IeM purposes. 
It was illustrated that the basic structure and approach of the Balanced Scorecard suggests a 
strong intellectual kinship with reM models. On the basis of its relatedness, three important 
insights could be gained for IeM theory. 
• It could firstly be demonstrated that the combination of financial and non-financial 
perspectives in an integrated framework would represent a useful contribution to 
conventional IeM models, such as the Intangible Asset Monitor by Sveiby, which 
seems to be characterised by a singular focus on Ie only. To the extent that the 
Balanced Scorecard links financial with non-financial measurement and management 
it can be interpreted as holistic management tool, which accords explicit attention to 
the two constituent parts of corporate market value in conjunction. 
• Analysis further indicated that while the Balanced Scorecard is typically interpreted as 
a measurement tool, it seems to have the potential for further exploration as a 
management tool that links long-term strategic objectives with short-term goals. To 
the extent that this framework can be used as a management approach, it would 
transcend IeM approaches, such as Sveiby's that are predominantly concerned with 
measuring intangible assets. 
• A third aspect that should not be overlooked is the fact that the Balanced Scorecard 
was explicitly developed for a wide spectrum of industries, e.g. service industries, 
consumer, and physical asset intensive industries. It should be appreciated that this 
would be in contrast to Sveiby's singular focus on know-how and service companies, 
which seemed to limit the potential applicability of the Intangible Asset Monitor. This 
would in turn suggest that the Balanced Scorecard can be interpreted as an reM 
approach and tool of wide applicability to a variety of industries. 
These three aspects, separately and in conjunction, seem to make the Balanced Scorecard a 
highly sophisticated IeM approach and tool of great potential for a wide variety of industries. 
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Its limitations, however, should not be overlooked~ The most important limitation is 
inherently linked to the purpose of the tool as an internal document. This interpretation of the 
Balanced Scorecard as an internal document would compromise its suitability for external 
reporting. Such external reporting to corporate share- and stakeholders, however, would be an 
important task for ICM models. 
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Chapter 6: The Skandia Ie Navigator 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the "Skandia IC Navigator" shall be explained and critically discussed as third 
approach and tool to ICM." The choice of this very model has been found appropriate for the 
purpose of the present thesis because it draws from both previously analysed models, viz. the 
Intangible Asset Monitor and the Balanced Scorecard. It can hence be interpreted as 
sophisticated approach, which seems to reconcile European with North-American streams of 
thought. On the one hand, the Skandia IC Navigator, similarly to Sveiby's Intangible Asset 
Monitor, specifically emphasises IC. On the other hand, and in line with Kaplan and Norton's 
Balanced Scorecard, it considers intangible assets in conjunction with financial performance 
measurement. This combinatory approach seems to suggest that it would be particularly 
interesting to examine the Skandia IC Navigator. 
As was customary in the previous two chapters, the model to be analysed in the present 
chapter will firstly be portrayed against the background of its origin, rationale and purpose. 
With this understanding, the approach and tool itself can better be appreciated and 
understood. Specific emphasis throughout this discussion will be given to the scrutiny of the 
sophistication of the Skandia model relative to the other two approaches in dealing with IC. 
The last section of this chapter will do so in detail. 
6.2 Origin, rationale and purpose of the Skandia intellectual captital Navigator 
As with the two foregoing ICM tools, an analysis of the origins, rationale, and purpose of the 
Skandia IC Navigator is intended to portray the ICM tool under examination against the 
background of intellectual and practical developments that have shaped its present form. 
6.2.1 Origin 
Skandia, the Swedish insurance and financial service company appears to be in the vanguard 
of operationalising a theory of Ie. Along with Sveiby, this company seems to form the most 
important contributors of the "Swedish community of practice" (Sveiby, 1996). The idea to 
construct a new managerial tool has emerged in the 1980s when Skandia's management staff 
began to realise that traditional management theory did not reflect appropriately changes in 
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the competitive environment of the company. It was recognised that intangible assets, which 
were at that point in time perceived as ineffable, increasingly determined the environment 
Skandia was competing in. In addressing the problem of visualising the true value of Skandia, 
a new corporate function was founded, headed by Leif Edvinsson as first Director of 
Intellectual Capital, in order to grow and develop the company's IC as visible lasting and 
value complementing the traditional balance sheet. Thus, the Navigator was developed by 
trailblazing practitioners as a response to the increasingly paramount role IC seemed to 
assume in Skandia's performance (Edvinsson and Petrash, 1996; Edvinsson, 1998a; 
Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). 
The team of the new corporate function discerned four distinct areas of focus, viz. "financial," 
"customer," "process," as well as "renewal and development" and one area underlying these, 
viz. the "human focus." Performance measures have been developed for each area in tum. In 
conjunction, these five building blocks are intended to represent a holistic and dynamic model 
that may be used to "navigate" a company holistically, hence its name "Navigator" 
(Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). In 1993, the first report in IC was published as a one-page 
section in the Annual Report and promoted to a full supplement the subsequent year. This 
1994 Annual Report is generally seen as a landmark achievement in the field ofIe. Since then 
Skandia has been publishing an IC supplement with each year and half-year report (Roos, 
Roos, Edvinsson and Dragonetti, 1998; Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). 
6.2.2 Rationale 
In order to illuminate the rationale behind the Skandia IC Navigator, it would be useful firstly 
investigate the combinatory approach that seems to characterise the tool. In subsequent steps, 
it would further be enlightening to discuss the metaphorical approach to illustrative format 
utilised for portraying the Skandia approach. Finally, it would be instructive to analyse the 
contention that IC would constitute a dept item on corporate balance sheets. 
6.2.2. 1 A combinatory approach 
In order to meet marketplace and corporate needs, a combinatory approach has been chosen, 
which incorporates and systematically adapts elements of Sveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor 
(e.g. knowledge perspective) and Kaplan and Norton's Balanced Scorecard (e.g. format of 
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display, and an approach that considers both, Ie and financial capital) to Skandia's corporate 
environment in the Navigator (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Sveiby, 1997; Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996; Roos and Roos, 1997). The adaptation process involved an explicit emphasis 
on Ie within a broader managerial framework. Edvinsson and Malone have emphasised that 
Ie is likely to dominate the valuation of companies since Ie increasingly captures the 
dynamics of organisational sustainability and value creation. Hence their explicit focus on Ie 
within a broader framework of an expanded organisational management system. To better 
illustrate the assumption underlying the explicit focus on Ie it is worth quoting Edvinsson and 
Malone at some length: 
"[IC] alone recognises that a modern enterprise changes so fast that all it has left to depend on is 
the talents and dedication of its people and the quality of the tools they use. But most of all, 
Intellectual Capital is inevitable because it alone, of any model for measuring corporate 
performance pierces the surface and uncovers true value. In doing so, it restores both common 
sense and fairness to economics. Intellectual Capital is our future" (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 
22). 
The attention to a financial perspective in the Skandia Ie Navigator can be illustrated as 
follows: 
"The financial statement is actually a subset of the larger IC report, capturing, as it were, one 
component of a much larger analysis of a company's worth" (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 
75-76). 
Thus, it must be appreciated that similarly to the Balanced Scorecard, the Skandia Ie 
Navigator seems to be characterised by an approach that considers both, financial as well as 
non-financial assets. Both aspects are combined in a holistic managerial framework for action. 
6.2.2.2 A tree metaphor 
A constituent part of the rationale underlying the Skandia Navigator is a metaphor, in which a 
business organisation is compared to a living organism. This illustrative approach seems to 
become rather prominent in recent management literature, where metaphors are (re-) 
discovered as a methodological tool in management research and practice (e.g. Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995; Lissack and Roos, 1999). Often analogies to living organisms are used as a 
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conceptual lens for viewing modern organisations (see, e.g. von Krogh and Roos, 1995; von 
Krogh and Vicari, 1993; von Kroght, Roos, and Slocum, 1994). 
In the case of Skandia, in order to emphasise the importance of IeM and to illustrate the 
potential pitfalls of denying Ie's pertinence to corporate success, a tree has been chosen as an 
epitome for a living organism. Edvinsson and Malone compare the trunk, branches, and 
leaves (i.e. the parts that are visible to the observer), to a business enterprise as it appears in 
the marketplace. The "visible parts" are typically described by traditional accounting 
processes, viz. organisational charts, annual reports, quarterly statements, company brochures, 
and other corporate documents. The fruits produced by the tree are also visible and can be 
interpreted as corresponding to products bought by consumers and profits sought by 
shareholders. It is argued, that "the smart investor scrutinises this trees in search of ripe fruit 
to harvest" (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 10). 
The assumption that such visible parts would embody the entire tree IS considered 
inappropriate for Ie practice, argue Edvinsson and Malone. While a good flavour of the fruit 
and a healthy colour of the leaves might be indicators for the tree's current state of health, 
these symptoms would not have the potential to predict whether the tree will also be healthy 
in the future, explain the authors. As half of the mass or even more of the tree lies 
underground, an understanding of how the roots' influence affects the fruit would be essential 
(Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). The authors suggest that in an era of rapid technological 
change, characterised by short product life cycles, unexpected competitors, and new types of 
relationships, a company ought to constantly pre-empt, and adapt to, changes. Analogously to 
the tree metaphor, the ability to adapt seems to reside in the strength of its root system, i.e. its 
hidden values, which need to be nurtured appropriately in order to sustain competitive 
advantage. It is contended that this 
"is what makes Intellectual Capital - the study of the roots of a company's value, the 
measurement of the hidden dynamic factors that underlie the visible company of buildings and 
products - so valuable" (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 11). 
The tree metaphor seems to reflect well the gist of the rationale, which the Skandia Navigator 
is built on. The authors believe that an adroit understanding of the hidden roots of a company 
(i.e. the invisible parts), the potential gains in nurturing them appropriately, and the potential 
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managerial dangers arIsmg with ill-treating and neglecting them would constitute a valid 
starting point for constructing an Ie measurement system. 
6.2.2.3 Intellectual capital as debt item on the balance sheet 
It is important to observe that Ie, in Edvinsson's treatment, is regarded as a debt item on 
corporate balance sheets. Before analysis can illuminate the rationale behind this conjecture, 
the reasons behind the construction of a balance sheet, which accords a more explicit 
recognition to Ie need to be considered. According to Edvinsson and Malone, traditional 
balance sheets would, for several reasons be inadequate for capturing the increasingly large 
gap between corporate market and book value. Firstly, balance sheets are paraphrased as 
"snapshots" of the past that are often "skewed or aimed at the wrong subject" (Edvinsson and 
Malone, 1997: 9). Moreover, balance sheets do typically not account for "soft management 
issues" and the impact of such issues on corporate competitive dominance (for related 
arguments, see, e.g. von Krogh, Roos, and Hoerem, 1996; Romhardt, 1997, 1998; Sveiby, 
1997). It is emphasised that traditional balance sheets typically do not 
"tell how much [organisational traditions and memories] are worth or set off alarms when, 
through management decisions or employee layoffs, they are lost. The result is often a kind of 
corporate Alzheimer's, whereby a company busy watching the bottom line loses its 
institutional memory, and thus itself, without ever noticing the loss" (Edvinsson and Malone, 
1997: 9). 
Likewise, a paradox of modern business investments is believed to reside in the fact that 
investments aiming at enhancing Ie, i.e. those assets, which enable a company to stay 
competitive ultimately result in a depreciation of corporate book value. The chain of 
reasoning is that if a company invests for instance in human capital or information technology 
it is likely to be affected by a short-term deterioration of its profit and loss statement, which in 
turn reduces the value of the balance sheet (see, e.g. Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Roos and 
Roos, 1997; Romhardt, 1998). In order to alleviate these inadequacies, it is aimed at depicting 
Ie as a visible value in corporate balance sheets. The suggested balance sheet is illustrated in 
figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1: The expanded corporate balance sheet 
Financial 
capital 
Non-
financial 
capital 
Assets 
Goodwill 
Technology 
Competence 
Official f 
balance sheet .. 
Source: adapted from Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 43; Edvinsson, 1997: 368. 
Three fundamental insights into the rationale behind the Skandia Navigator as IC 
measurement tool can be gained from figure 6.1: firstly, IC is seen as a non-financial form of 
corporate capital; secondly, IC related information is supplementary rather than subordinate to 
traditional purely financial information; thirdly and most importantly, IC is regarded as debt 
and not as asset item (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Edvinsson, 1997). While the first two 
insights seem straightforward would follow naturally from IC theory as discussed in chapters 
2 and 3 (see e.g. Sveiby, 1997, 1998a; Sullivan, 1998; Allee, 1999) the third proposition 
would require further explanation. 
Edvinsson and Malone suggest that IC is best viewed as a debt item because it can be seen as 
an investment in the future. This is based on the principle that IC would typically be borrowed 
from stakeholders, for instance from customers or employees (Edvinsson, 1997: 367-368;' 
Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 43). It should be emphasised that this perception ofIC contrasts 
with Sveiby's interpretation of IC as an asset item. Concerning the question of 
counterbalancing IC as a debt item, traditional accounting rules would suggest to 
counterbalance it with goodwill. Edvinsson and Malone proclaim that through this traditional 
lens goodwill is seen as "a trash item to be deducted as quickly as possible," because it 
ultimately reduces the value of the corporate balance sheet (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 44). 
,Alternatively, Edvinsson 'suggests that "from a knowledge value viewpoint it could be 
considered to reflect the intellectual value, which grows over time" (Edvinsson, 1997: 368). 
Thus, an important aspect to remember is that IC in the Skandia framework represents a debt, 
rather than an asset on the corporate balance sheets. 
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To summarise the rationale underlying the Skandia IC Navigator, it should be appreciated that 
this ICM model seems to be characterised by a combinatory approach, which embraces 
insights from Sveiby's analysis, as well as Kaplan and Norton's. Similarly to Kaplan and 
Norton, financial as well as non-financial perspectives are accommodated. Within this broader 
framework, similarly to Sveiby, the component IC gets accorded explicit recognition. The 
authors use a tree metaphor to illustrate the rationale behind the Skandia IC Navigator. In this 
metaphor, an organisation is compared to the tree itself, whereas the roots are interpreted as 
Ie. Finally, it should be borne in mind that in Skandia's approach, IC is viewed as a dept item 
on corporate balance sheets, because it is seen as borrowed from corporate stakeholders. 
6.2.3 Purpose 
Similarly to Sveiby, the purpose behind the development of the Skandia Navigator seems to 
have been triggered by the fallacy of current financial accounting systems to capture the true 
value of the modern enterprise, which according to Edvinsson and Malone lies in its Ie. To 
alleviate this inadequacy, the goal was set 
"to identify those intangible factors off the balance sheet, measure them, and find a way to 
present them in a coherent way. The result was a model for visualising and reporting 
Intellectual Capital. It centred around a navigational tool that acted as an organiser for the 
different types of value-laden corporate investments, and that offered a more balanced and 
holistic perspective than traditional models" (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 209, emphases 
added). 
This quotation seems to reflect the gist of the purpose of the Skandia Navigator as an ICM 
tool that would, in line with the Balanced Scorecard, be predominantly concerned with 
measuring corporate performance holistically. Edvinsson and Malone elaborate on the above 
and point out that the model targets both, valuation and navigation. According to the authors, 
valuation entails the determination of the constituent building blocks of IC (the underlying 
reduction approach is outlined in chapter 2). Navigation in turn corresponds to the process of 
highlighting the continuing processes of adding to a finn's long-term sustainability, and 
nurturing the organisation's roots for sustainable cash-flow generation. This clearly shows 
that IC measurement, in the sense of Edvinsson and Malone should ultimately be linked to 
financial performance (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Edvinsson, 1998b). 
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Another important point to be appreciated is that the Skandia Navigator is designed primarily 
for external reporting purposes, rather internal use. It is .claimed that the Skandia "Ie 
yardstick" can be applied to any organisation including organisations in the non-profit sector, 
which ultimately suggests a comparability of Ie data not only across industries, but also 
across economic sectors (see Edvinsson, 1997: 368; Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 162, 172). 
In sum, at the heart of the purpose underlying the Skandia Navigator seems to reside the idea 
to construct a measurement tool that visualises and accounts for .Ie and financial capital to 
external corporate stakeholders. Thus, in line with Sveiby, the focus is put on measuring, 
rather than managing Ie. It must also be remembered from chapter 4 that IeM tools seem to 
have potential for internal as well as external purposes. To this extent, it is interesting to note 
that the Skandia Ie Navigator is explicitly restricted to external usage. With this 
understanding, the approach and tool can be investigated. 
6.3 Approach and tool 
The present section aims at re-enacting the approach of the Skandia Navigator as an IeM 
model. It should be kept in mind, that since this tool has specifically been developed by the 
Swedish insurance company Skandia, the present section can also be read as a case study of 
Skandia. In particular, it should be emphasised that the general applicability of this IeM tool 
to corporate environments other than the service industry in general and the insurance 
business in particular should not be accepted at face value. For expository purposes, the 
analysis of the Skandia Navigator shall be presented in the following steps: firstly, the general 
approach utilised in building the tool is analysed. This is ensued by a discussion of each of the 
four constituent parts and the indicators used to measure them. Thirdly, Skandia's approach to 
consolidate these measures into one generic Ie index is illustrated. The chapter concludes 
with a critical analysis of the most salient areas of investigation. 
6.3.1 The format of display utilised and the derivation of indicators 
The format of display that has been chosen for the Skandia Navigator architecturally 
resembles a house. Analogously to the tree metaphor, this format of display seems to have 
been adopted in order to provide a straightforward approach to communicate the meaning of 
its components, i.e. how financial data is balanced with non-financial information, the present 
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with the past and the future, how the different components work together, and what role they 
play in the organisation's activities (see figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.2: The Skandia intellectual capital Navigator 
HISTORY 
-----------/----------.--,..---:.--.---~-----:..------
Customer Process 
Focus Focus TODAY 
Ie 
" 
. . / 
Renewal & Development Focus TOMORROW 
OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
Sources: Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 68. 
Starting at the top, the triangle (the "attic"), represents the financial focus, which would 
essentially involve the traditional balance sheet and is intended to offer an overview of past 
information and precise measures of where the company was at a specific moment in the past. 
Hence the "history" tag (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 68). The walls of the house are meant 
to symbolise the present activities including foci on customers and processes. The foundation 
is supposed to gear the enterprise towards the future and thus revolves around renewal and 
development issues. Finally, the human focus is equated with the soul of the house, hence its 
central position in figure 6.2. 
It should be noted that, in Edvinsson and Malone's analysis, the constituent parts of the 
metaphorical house represent areas of focus rather than forms of capital. This can be rather 
confusing, since the areas of focus are terminologically congruent with the Skandia approach 
to the anatomy of IC as presented in chapter 2. The terminological incongruencies become 
even more confusing, if one considers figure 6.3, where the alleged "focus areas" are again 
referred to as "categories of IC." As the authors themselves do not comment further on the 
inherent incongruencies, the present analysis shall not be concerned with their clarification, 
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either. In the present chapter, therefore, and in line with the practice by the authors 
themselves, "focus area" and "forms of intellectual capital" shall be used interchangeably. 
More important for the purpose of the study would be to illuminate the process of developing 
indicators for the respective Ie categories. 
In order to create sustainable value, Ie indicators would need to reflect the corporate vision 
and strategy, explain the authors. To this end, Edvinsson and Malone, similarly to Kaplan and 
Norton (1992, 1996a), suggest an approach where corporate vision and strategy is translated 
into key success factors from which concrete indicators are derived. These indicators are then 
allocated to the five focus areas. Figure 6.3 illustrates the suggested process that translates 
corporate strategy into the Ie Navigator. 
Figure 6.3: The intellectual capital proccss model 
BUSINESS 
CONCEPT 
KEY 
SUCCESS 
FACTORS INDICATORS 
CATEGORIES 
OFIC 
D 
Source: adapted from Roos, Roos, Edvinsson, and Dragonetti, 1998: 63 . 
Edvinsson and Malone define three important tasks, which an effective Ie Navigator ought to 
fulfil , viz. firstly, to "look down into the measurement," secondly to "look upward toward 
more sweeping measures of value," and thirdly to look "outward toward the user" (Edvinsson 
and Malone, 1997: 70). With "looking down into the measurement" it is meant that an 
organisational tool should act as a guide, hence the name Navigator. The right body of 
measurement should be chosen, categorised according to the Ie building blocks, and linked to 
a coherent system into a cohesive whole. It is posited that a Navigator should indicate 
position, direction, and velul;ily, in other words, it should be connected to corporate strategy. 
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"Looking upward toward more sweeping measures of value" is meant to suggest that a good 
Navigator has to ultimately combine all of the categorical data into selected "metaindices" 
which communicate the crux of a company's strengths. It is important to remember that these 
are explicitly designed for external comparison. The third task, "looking outward toward the 
user" refers essentially to comprehensibility and inclusiveness as fundamental aspects to be 
met by a navigation tool. 
To summarise this far, an attempt has been made to illuminate the approach of Skandia's Ie 
Navigator as a tool designed specifically for a service company. To this end, the format of 
display has been analysed. In a subsequent step, the derivation process of indicators has been 
discussed. Attention shall now shift to a critical analysis of the metaphorical house to bottom. 
6.3.2 The financial focus area 
Similarly to the previous framework, the Balanced Scorecard, Skandia accords explicit 
recognition to the linkage of financial data to Ie. The linkage of financials to intangible assets 
revolves around two cornerstones. Firstly, it is contended that the value of Ie has to 
ultimately be converted into monetary value because financials usually offer the best feedback 
system for testing the Ie foci. For example, changes in the Ie indices customer satisfaction, or 
employee morale should ultimately be reflected in changes in monetary measures e.g. 
revenues, or overhead costs. If this is not the case, argue Edvinsson and Malone, the 
respective Ie indicator would be inappropriate and should be discarded. Thus, it is crucial to 
realise that in the Skandia framework, convertibility of a given intangible asset in monetary 
values is seen as a benchmark for the usefulness of the indicator of this particular asset. 
The second cornerstone for linking financials to intangible assets is, according to Edvinsson 
and Malone, that they should by means of trial and error change organically over time to 
better fit other foci. A "free circulation of continuous upwelling of new indices and sinking of 
archaic ones within the structure of financial capital" (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 77) is 
advocated. These conjectures apparently the authors to the development of a taxonomy of 
financials, comprising three components along a time-scale from near to distant past. 
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6.3.2.1 A taxonomy offinancials 
To illustrate the taxonomy of financials, the attic of the metaphorical house has been split into 
three constituent parts, viz. raw financial data, financial capitalisation, and financial 
documentation (figure 6.4). Each of these three parts is designed to contribute to linking 
financials to IC, through systematically translating IC into monetary value. 
Figure 6.4: Skandia' s financial focus triangle 
DISTANT 
PAST 
Financial Accounting Records 
---------------------------------------_. 
NEAR 
PAST 
PRESENT 
Financial Capitalisation 
Raw Financial Data 
Source: adapted from Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 78. 
The designation "raw financial data" for the bottom of the financial focus triangle describes a 
situation "close to chaos" (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 79). The term chaos is meant to refer 
to subjective, non-empirical, and undifferentiated data traditionally captured, if at all, In 
footnotes and annotations to corporate financial documents such as annual reports or 
performance evaluations. Examples would include, but may not be restricted to, rumours, 
reports from salespeople, and patent attorneys. Such raw financial data has typically not yet 
been refined to the point where it can be measured. It is argued that while some parts of this 
information might be useless, others might be very valuable. The transformation of such raw 
data into measurable indices starts with the selection of relevant components. 
"The only solution is to find those measures that will hack through this information 
undergrowth, find the promising sites, then filter out the worthless gravel and sand to leave the 
gold nuggets we are searching for" (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 79). 
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The suggested selective filtering solution aiming at finding the "gold nuggets" within the 
abundance of financial data would generally appear to be a logical process designed to arrive 
at potential sources of future value creation. It should furthermore be welcomed that, in this 
manner, very recent operational data can be given consideration, which is typically 
overlooked in traditional accounting systems (see, e.g. Klavans, 1994; Drucker, 1995; Eccles, 
1991; Johanson, 1996). 
The goal of the second process, i.e. financial capitalisation, is to translate the selected raw 
financial data ("the gold nuggets") gathered at the bottom of the financial focus triangle into 
concrete measures. These data ought to be contracted into an initial list of indices of sufficient 
precision and scope. This contracted list is meant to serve as baseline standard that can be 
capitalised on and amended with time and experience. For example, the Skandia team through 
scrutinising the financial activities of its divisions has generalised a list of eighteen measures 
from this report. This list is included in table 6.1, which is presented later in this chapter. (For 
expository purposes, and in order to avoid redundancies, this table is only presented once in 
this chapter, although frequent reference will be made to it in the course of the analysis in the 
remainder of this chapter.) It should be emphasised that the measures in table 6.1 are 
suggested as guidelines for constructing an IC report, and it should be appreciated that the 
measures are not prescriptive. 
The third process is exemplified by the apex of the financial focus triangle. This apex stands 
for financial documentation of the measures delineated in the previous process by means of 
traditional financial tables. It represents the final transformation and manifestation of IC 
assets into cash value. In this context, Edvinsson and Malone ponder the question of whether 
selected indicators generated in the two previous processes are likely to be considered so 
critical that they might become "a permanent addition to the traditional accounting 
documents" (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 86). 
To summanse, it should be stressed that, similarly to Kaplan and Norton's approach, the 
Skandia model seems to be characterised by an explicit linkage of financial to non-financial 
data. The Skandia model, however, would transcend the Balanced Scorecard approach in that 
the financial dimension is further systematised and a taxonomy of financials is developed. 
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6.3.3 The customer focus area 
Moving down the metaphorical house from "the stuffy attic to the living part" (Edvinsson and 
Malone, 1997: 88) leads to the two walls, i.e. the customer and process foci. The present 
section is concerned with the customer focus area and the subsequent one with the process 
focus area. The analysis of the customer focus area is divided into two steps. The first is 
concerned with an important factor for this area, viz. customer satisfaction and the second 
section aims at illustrating the approach to measure the customer focus area. 
6.3.3. 1 Customer satisfaction 
Customer satisfaction forms an integral part of the Skandia framework. With regard to the 
customer focus area, Edvinsson and Malone, in line with a large number of observes (Vavra, 
1992; Christopher, Payne, and Ballantyne, 1991; Buttle, 1996; Gordon, 1998) subscribe to 
management theories such as the establishment of enduring relationships with their 
customers, total customer service, and the collaboration with customers on joint value 
creation (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 89). The ultimate aim of these management theories 
tends to be the delineation of ways to ensure the satisfaction of corporate customers. Analysis 
of the customer focus area has obviated that at Skandia "customer satisfaction" is the primary 
objective within this focus (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). Edvinsson and Malone give 
several reasons why it is paramount for a company to keep its customers satisfied, of which 
the two most important are outlined below. 
Firstly, a company ought to realise that customer expectations have changed over time. Unlike 
in the 1960s, modem customers expect individualism in products and want to personally 
define the purchased product or service to match their needs. As a result corporate capabilities 
such as empathy or the anticipation of future customer demands would constitute an essential 
task. While the authors do not recommend specific frameworks for the anticipation of 
customer needs, it should be noted that the application of Hamel and Prahalad's (1994) 
concept of industry foresight seems to lend itself particularly well for this purpose. 
Secondly and more importantly, Edvinsson and Malone argue that new types of relationships 
with corporate stakeholders force new organisational forms into being. The "virtual 
corporation" in the sense of Davidow and Malone (1994) is seen as epitome of a modern 
company, which would typically be characterised by a combination of high technology and 
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well-trained, adaptive workers to modify its form according to need. Enduring relationships 
with customers, based on mutual benefit for both parties involved, would appear essential for 
virtual corporations to build and sustain competitive advantage (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; 
Davidow and Malone, 1994). Relationship marketing with corporate customers has in the 
recent years become an area of scholarly interest (see e.g. Blois, 1996; Chirstopher, Payne, 
and Balantyne, 1991) and the issue of its applicability to a variety of business sectors 
including the service sector has been addressed in a proliferate number of publications (see, 
e.g. Lovell, 1997; McCourt, 1997; Buttle, 1996), and even to the non-profit environment (see, 
e.g. Olson and Slater, 1997; Lovelock and Weinberg, 1984; Kotler and Andreasen, 1996). In 
this view, the Skandia approach to build customer relationships in order to enhance customer 
satisfaction appears to be well founded in related empirical and conceptual contributions. 
From the above would follow that customer satisfaction is considered a critical factor for the 
customer focus area. This should be kept in mind during the next step of the analysis, which is 
concerned with the selection of measures for this focus. 
6.3.3.2 Measures for the customer focus area 
In order to account for the customer focus area, Skandia relies on a list of twenty indicators. A 
proposed standardised list of customer related indicators is incorporated in table 6.1. In the 
future, however, Skandia aims at introducing the "Customer Attraction Index" composed of 
five basic measurements, viz. customer type, customer duration, customer role, customer 
support, and customer success (figure 6.5). 
Figure 6.5: Measures for the customer attraction index 
Customer Type 
Customer Duration 
Customer Success 
Customer Role 
Customer Support 
Source: adapted from Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 96. 
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These five measurements, according to Edvinsson and Malone (1997), cumulatively capture 
the flow of relationships with current and potential customers. The single "Customer 
Attraction Index" is attained by multiplication of the five basic measurements. It is unclear 
why none of the five basic measurements accounts for customer satisfaction, when' the 
importance of this aspect has been explicitly emphasised Edvinsson and Malone (1997: 89). 
To summarise the customer focus area, the primary emphasis is put on the satisfaction of 
customers. Interestingly, however, analysis revealed that in delineating measures for the 
customer focus area, no explicit attention was accorded to the development of indicators for 
this important area. It should also be noted that unlike Sveiby, no attention seems to be given 
to the measurement of intangible revenues provided by corporate customers. Thus, a focus 
would be given to the delineation of how well customers are served, apparently at the expense 
of a consideration of critical inputs from the side of these customers. It should be 
remembered, however, that such customer inputs can constitute an important source of 
organisational value creation (Sveiby, 1997: 118). It should also be realised that to the extent 
that the customer focus area, in line with the Balanced Scorecard, can be seen as the only 
concern for the IC building block external capital, important additional constituents as they 
emerged from chapter 2 could be neglected. 
6.3.4 The process focus area 
The process focus area assumes the same position in the IC house as the customer focus, i.e. 
that of a supporting wall. The purpose of this focus is to find measures that reveal how well 
technology as supporting tool improves overall corporate efficiency and value creation. On 
the evidence of fast moving industry structures (Rheingold, 1993; Savage, 1995) and 
emergmg forms of organisations commonly referred to as hypertextual (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995), learning (Senge, 1991), or virtual (Davidow and Malone, 1992), Skandia's 
conclusion that investments in technology constitute a sound basis for building and sustaining 
corporate competitive dominance seems to reside on a sound fundament. The authors believe 
that an enhanced IC value surfacing in benefits such as organisational flexibility, the 
capability to quickly adapt to the constantly changing marketplace, and the swift development 
of new products are largely attributable to a rigorous exploitation of technology (Edvinson 
and Malone, 1997). 
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Notwithstanding the recognition that a sound strategy to invest in and reasonable way to 
exploit technology might enhance a company's Ie value, companies should be guarded 
against myopic technology investment and application (see, e.g. Zuboff, 1988 for a critical 
view on the introduction of information technology in corporate environments). Edvinsson 
and Malone alert their readers to four situations in which the costs of technology usage exceed 
its benefits, viz., firstly, the application of wrong technology; secondly, the purchase from the 
wrong vendor; thirdly, the wrong application of technology; and finally, the wrong 
philosophy in implementing technology. Since such situations potentially result in a 
depreciation of Ie, it is considered beneficial for the purpose of the study to glance at them 
briefly. 
6.3.4. 1 Situations where technology can lead to a depreciation of intellectual capital 
Firstly, the application of wrong technology could lead to a depreciation of Ie, because of an 
inherent trade-off relationship. One the one hand, the early adoption of a new invention can 
quickly lead to a decisive competitive advantage. On the other hand, the newly applied 
technology might become a commodity and companies pioneering in its application could 
soon been overtaken by competitors which have been more reluctant in adopting new 
technology (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). 
A second situation where information technology costs could exceed Ie benefits would be a 
purchase from the wrong vendor. The "wrong" vendor, in the sense of the authors, would be 
one that is likely to be swiftly outperformed and disappear from the marketplace. Purchasing 
companies, it is reasoned, could get "stuck with processing equipment that is expenslve, 
incompatible, and needless to say, obsolete" (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 104). 
The third situation is characterised by the wrong application of technology. Technology, 
would be wrongly applied if it has been acquired for the wrong reason. For example, 
computers might be bought that nobody uses, or high-tech equipment is installed without 
prior identification of a need to serve (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). It is interesting to note 
that companies typically classify such investments as assets rather than liabilities in their 
(traditional) balance sheets without recognising their detrimental effects on corporate 
performance through lowered Ie value and, as a result a shrinking market value. 
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Finally, the wrong philosophy in implementing technology could lead to a depreciation of Ie, 
e.g. a situation in which organisations radically introduce automation technologies, not readily 
fitting to the given corporate structure (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). This general rejection 
of "radical" in favour of more incremental approaches to implement technology would need 
to be qualified slightly, because it need not necessarily be viewed as beneficial to corporate 
Ie. A company might for instance, in occasions where strategic intent (Hamel and Prahalad, 
1989, 1993) clashes with current business operations be required to "radically" transform 
itself (Johnson, 1994, 1988; Miller, 1990; Burgelmann, Maidique, and Wheelwright, 1996) 
wherefore a radical way of implementing technology could be beneficial. 
6.3.4.2 Measures for the process focus area 
In view of the predominant emphasis within the process focus area on information 
technology, measures should predominantly reflect how well an enterprise uses its technology 
tools to create value. A standardised list of indicators for the process focus, the second 
supporting wall of the Ie Navigator, is included in table 6.1. It should be emphasised that at 
Skandia, the development of such measures is seen as an inherently company-specific 
process, and no prescriptions are made as to their generation. Thus, the list in table 6.1 is 
intended as a general guideline, and companies can set their individual foci, or adapt and 
expand the list as considered appropriate. 
In summary, the process focus area in the Skandia Ie Navigator seems to revolve around the 
appropriate usage of information technology. It is unclear, why Edvinnson and Malone, while 
drawing on the Balanced Scorecard, do not incorporate the relatively sophisticated insights 
concerning the process focus area as developed by Kaplan and Norton (see the generic value-
chain model of the internal-business-process perspective in figure 5.4). The view on the 
process focus area as presented by Kaplan and Norton would be more encompassing than the 
singular focus on the appropriate utilisation of technology ~as in the Skandia framework. 
6.3.5 The renewal and development focus area 
The fundament of the Ie house as indicated in figure 6.1 is designed to capture the 
opportunities that define a company's future. Hence, its indicators lie exactly at the opposite 
end of a spectrum ranging from past to future and where financials attempt to document the 
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immediate past performance of the organisation (i.e. the "attic"). The renewal and 
development focus aims at anticipating the immediate future by establishing what the 
company is doing currently, in order to best prepare itself to grasp future opportunities 
(Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). 
This focus area appears to have received relatively little attention in the Skandia Framework, 
which seems unfortunate, bearing in mind that the model, with its Ie focus, should be devote 
adequate attention to the development of "dynamic capabilities" (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 
1997), the management of the "opportunity gap" (Prahalad, Fahey, and Randall, 1994) for 
instance through the creation of new competitive space (Hamel and Prahalad, 1993), the 
renewal of "core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), and in particular through 
guarding core competenices from becoming "core rigidities" (Leonard-Barton, 1992, 1995). 
The approach at Skandia to actively promote renewal and development has been the 
identification of six perspectives according to which indicators can be grouped, viz. 
customers, attractiveness on the market, products and services, strategic partners, 
infrastructure, and employees. A list of indicators is, analogously to the foregoing parts of the 
Ie house, included in table 6.1. This list would reflect Skandia's approach to derive measures 
in a responsive way to perceived trends and discontinuities inherent in the strategic 
perspectives (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 182). As with the foregoing areas, the indicators 
of the renewal and development focus area are by no means prescriptive, and should be seen 
as mere suggestions. 
6.3.6 The human focus area 
It should be emphasised that in Edvinsson and Malone's treatment, only the human focus area 
interacts with the other foci. It is believed at Skandia that the power of the human dimension 
to connect the different Ie foci is crucial for the enhancement of the overall corporate Ie 
value. In other words, the success of other value creating activities depends to a large extent 
on the corporate workforce with its inherent culture, norms, values, and standard of training. 
Edvinsson and Malone infer that "an enterprise without values has no value" and that it is thus 
essential to "capture humanity" (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 123). The starting point for 
Skandia in measuring human capital would be to categorise the corporate workforce. 
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6.3.6. 1 Employee categories 
Unlike the traditional employment population centralised in corporate buildings and sharing a 
common philosophy, lifestyle, and community the workforce of today's virtual organisations 
(Davidow and Malone, 1992) tends to be characterised by a coexistence of numerous 
sUbpopulations. According to Edvinsson and Malone the number of these sub-populations, 
which often differ in behaviour and rules increases constantly. A current list developed for 
Skandia includes "office goers" regularly driving to work and thus bound to live near the 
office contrasted by "telecommuters" who typically conduct their job isolated from the office. 
Salespeople are referred to as "road warriors" because of their tendency to pursue work 
independently from any location and keep the contact to the office mainly via electronic aid. 
Finally, the term "corporate gypsies" is applied for workers who are not exclusively 
associated with a single company and work for instance as contractors or consultants 
(Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). As these categories imply, the Skandia approach considers 
white collar workers, only. This focus seems understandable, bearing in'inind that Skandia is 
a service company where the corporate workforce is often exclusively composed of white 
collar workers. At the same time, however, and this is noteworthy, such explicit focus could 
limit the applicability of the Ie Navigator to service companies. 
6.3.6.2 Measures for the human focus area 
After the categorisation of the corporate workforce, measures for the human focus area would 
have to be developed. The Skandia practitioners contend that indices derived from the 
identified categories ought to comply with three criteria. Firstly, they should be "well-
reasoned," i.e. relevant to Ie value creation, secondly, "well-designed," i.e. objectively 
chosen, and thirdly, "teleological," i.e. selected as to reflecting a company's present as well as 
its future (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 124). Edvinsson and Malone foresee an increasing 
interest in the measurement of corporate human capital and substantiate their opinion with the 
example that research on how to best measure human capital has already been conducted by 
OEeD researches (Miller and Wurzburg, 1995). Table 6.1 summarises some of the suggested 
measures. 
In summary, it is noteworthy that the final area of focus, vii. the human focus would be the 
only dimension of the Skandia Navigator, which interacts with all other foci. It should be born 
in mind that within this area of focus, attention is exclusively devoted to white collar workers. 
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It should be welcomed however that the Skandia IC Navigator, in line with the Intangible 
Asset Monitor, but unlike the Balanced Scorecard, does not "lump together" (Bontis, 
Dragonetti, Jacobsen, Roos, 1999: 397) human capital with IT systems, but accords specific 
attention to this important dimension of corporate IC. After the five dimensions of the 
Skandia Navigator have been discussed, analysis can now shift to the Skandia approach in 
calculating an IC index that embraces all five focus areas. 
6.3.7 Calculating the intellectual capital index 
So far, the Skandia Navigator seems structurally similar to the two previously discussed 
approaches, viz. Sveiby's Intangible Asset Monitor, and Kaplan and Norton's Balanced 
Scorecard. In essence, all three approaches, whether explicitly or implicitly, split corporate I C 
into several components, which are then translated into a set of indicators. Sveiby as well as 
Kaplan and Norton seem to stop at this stage. The Skandia practitioners, however, go one step 
further arguing that what was discussed in the forgoing pages of this chapter only constitutes 
the basis for the final, and most important step, viz. the determination of the IC index. 
The importance of such a single IC index becomes obvious, if one considers the debate 
concerning its inception. The Skandia approach to contract the variety of measures into a 
single index is derived from the registered trademark "IC-Index" of the London based 
consultancy organisation "Intellectual Capital Services", allegedly the pioneer in the 
development and application of consolidated measures for IC. It is, predicted upon the 
author's understanding the most detailed approach publicly available. The analysis shall now 
investigate this last and fundamental step that draws together all five areas of focus of the 
metaphorical house into a single IC index that consists partly of IC valued in dollars, and 
partly ofIC expressed as coefficient. More formally, 
Organisational Intellectual Capital = iC 
"C" is referred to as value ofIC in dollars, whereas "i" denotes an organisation's "coefficient 
of efficiency" in using that Ie (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 179). The re-enactment of how 
these measures are suggested to compute shall be conducted in three steps. A standard IC 
report of a hypothetical firm constitutes the starting point of the analysis, from which in a 
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second and third step "Ie absolute measure indicators (e)," and "Ie coefficient of efficiency 
indices (i)" are generated (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 184-186). 
6.3.7. 1 The standard intellectual capital report 
It has been customary in tIns chapter to refer to a standard list of Ie indices at each focus area 
of the Ie Navigator. In order to avoid redundancies, this list is only presented once in this 
chapter. Table 6.1 illustrates this list, which has been generated at Skandia in an attempt to 
structure a universal Ie report. It should be mentioned again that this list of indicators is by no 
means prescriptive, but solely designed as an impetus to stimulate further thinking. 
Table 6.1: The standard iulelleclual capilal report 
FINANCIAL FOCUS CUSTOMER FOCUS 
1. Total assets ($) 1. Market share (%) 
2. Total assets/employee($) 2. Number of customers (#) 
3. Revenues/total assets (%) 3. Annual sales/customers 
4. Profits/total assets ($) 4. Customer lost (#) 
5. Revenues resulting from new business operations ($) 5. Average duration of customer relationship (#) 
6. Profits resulting from new business operations ($) 6. Average customer size ($) 
7. Revenue/employee ($) 7. Customer rating (%) 
8. Customer time/employee attendance (%) 8. Customer visits to the company (#) 
9. Profits/employee ($) 9. Days spent visiting customers (#) 
10. Lost business revenues compared to market average (%) 10. Customers/employees ($) 
11 . Revenues from new customers/total revenues (%) 11 . Field salespeople (#) 
12. Market value ($) 12. Field sales management (#) 
13. Return on net asset value (%) 13. Average time form customer contact to salespeople (#) 
14. Return on net assets resulting form new business 14. Ration of sales contacts to sales closed (%) 
operations ($) 15. Satisfied Customer Index (%) 
15. Value added/employee ($) 16. IT investmenUsalesperson ($) 
16. Value added/iT employee ($) 17. IT investmenUservice and support employee ($) 
17. Investments in IT ($) 18. Service expense/customer ($) 
18. Value added/customers ($) 19. Service expense/customer/year ($) 
20. Service expense/customer/contact ($) 
RENEWAL AND DEVELOPMENT FOCUS 
1. Competence development expense/employee ($) 17. Average customer duration with company in months (#) 
2. Satisfied Employee Index (#) 18. Educational investmenUcustomer ($) 
3. Marketing expense/customer ($) 19. Direct communications to customer/year (#) 
4. Share of training hours (%) 20. Non-product-related expense/customer/year (#) 
5. Share of development hours (%) 21. New markets development investment ($) 
6. Opportunity share (%) 22. Structural capital development investment ($) 
7. R&D expense/administrative expense (%) 23. Value of EDI system ($) 
B. Training expense/employee ($) 24. Upgrades to EDI system ($) 
9. Training expense/administrative personnel (%) 25. Capacity of EDI system (#) 
10. Business development expense/administrative expense 26. Ratio of new products (less than tow years) to full (%) company product family (%) 
11 . Share of employees below age 40 (%) 27. R&D investment in basic research (%) 
12. IT development expense/iT expense (%) 28. R&D investment in product design (%) 
13. IT expense on training/iT expense (%) 29. R&D investment in applications (%) 
14. R&D resources/total resources (%) 30. Investment in new product support and training ($) 
15. Customer opportunity base captured (#) 31 . Average age of company patents (#) 
16. Average customer age (#) education (#) income (#) 32. Patents pending (#) 
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Table 6.1: The standard I C report (continued) 
HUMAN FOCUS 
1. Leadership Index (%) 
2. Motivation Index (%) 
3. Empowerment Index (#) 
4. Number of employees (#) 
5. Employee turnover (%) 
6. Average years of service with company (#) 
7. Number of managers (#) 
8. Number of woman managers (#) 
9. Average age of employees (#) 
10. Time in training (days/year) (#) 
11. IT-literacy of staff (#) 
12. Number of full-time Ipermanent employees (#) 
13. Average age of full-time/permanent employees (#) 
14. Average years with company of full-time penmanent 
employees (#) 
15. Annual turnover of full-time permanent employees (#) 
16. Per capita annual cost of training, communication, and 
support programmes ($) 
17. Full-time/permanent employees who spend less than 50 
percent of work hours at corporate facility (#) 
18. Number of full-time temporary employees (#) 
19. Per capital annual cost of training and support 
programmes for full-time temporary employees ($) 
20. Part-time employees/non-fuli-time contractors (#) 
21. Average duration of contract (#) 
22. Company manager with advanced degrees (%) 
PROCESS FOCUS 
1. Administrative expense/total revenues (#) 
2. Cost for administrative error/management revenues (%) 
3. Processing time, outpayments (#) 
4. Contracts filed without error (#) 
5. Function points/employee-month (#) 
6. PCs/employee (#) 
7. Laptops/employee (#) 
8. Administrative expense/employee ($) 
9. IT expense/employee ($) 
10. IT expense/administrative expense (%) 
11. Administrative expense/gross premium (%) 
12. IT capacity (#) 
13. Change in IT inventory ($) 
14. Corporate quality goal (#) 
15. Corporate performance/quality goal (%) 
16. Discontinued IT inventoryliT inventory (%) 
17. Orphan IT inventoryliT inventory (%0 
18. IT capacity/employee (#) 
19. IT performance/employee (#) 
Source: adapted from Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 179-183. 
For the purpose of calculating the IC index the comprehensive list above containing three 
different types of measurements, viz. direct counts (#), dollar amounts ($), and percentages 
(%), would have to be streamlined. The starting point for calculating the IC index with its two 
constituents, "i," and "C," are the direct counts. Direct counts constitute raw data, which 
should by means of comparison be further processed into percentages or directly translated 
into monetary values. Thus, two types of measurements remain to be streamlined, viz. dollar 
amounts and percentages. According to Edvinsson and Malone, all indicators expressed in 
monetary value are used to calculate the IC value "c." In a similar vein, the percentages ought 
to be contracted into "i," the coefficient of IC, indicating an organisation's velocity, position, 
and direction (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). 
6.3.7.2 Measuring the intellectual capital value (C) 
In determining "C," a decisive question to be considered would be which, and how indicators 
should be selected in order to achieve a realistic and comparable figure. In pursuing this 
approach, the indicators expressed as ratios (e.g. educational investment/customer) are 
suggested to be further processed by multiplying out the denominators. Subsequently, 
redundancies ought to be removed. This leads to the contracted list depicted in table 6.2. The 
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authors emphasise the importance of adequate consideration of the five focus areas in 
contracting the list of indicators. It is unclear, however, why the authors then choose a 
template that uses headings in the contracted list in table 6.2 that are different from those in 
table 6.1 . 
Table 6.2: Intellectual capital absolute measure (e) indicators 
New business development 
1. Revenues resulting from new business 
operations/program/services 
2. New markets/customer/clienUcurriculum 
development investment 
3. Industry development investment 
4. New channel development investment 
IT investment 
5. IT investment in sales, service and support 
6. T investment in administration 
7. Change in IT inventory 
Customer development 
8. Customer (client) support investment 
9. Customer (client) serviced investment 
10. Customer (client) training investment 
11 . Non-product-related customer expense 
Employee development 
12. Employee competence development investment 
13. Employee new product support and training 
investment 
14. Education unique to non-company-based 
employees 
15. Training and support programs unique to full-time 
permanent employees 
16. Training and support programs unique to full-time 
temporary employees 
17. Training and support programs to part-time 
temporary employees 
Partnerships 
18. Partnerships/joint venture development investment 
19. Upgrades to EDI or electronic networking system 
Branding and intellectual property 
20. Brand (logo/name) identification investment 
21 . New patent, copyright investment 
Source: adapted from Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 184-185. 
In line with the purpose of the Skandia Ie Navigator, Edvinsson and Malone explain that in 
measuring "e ," an approach was chosen, which primarily emphasises future earning 
capabilities, in order to best meet investor interests. This also seems to be in line with the 
general rationale of Ie that past performance (as captured in traditional corporate balance 
sheets) should be balanced with anticipated future earnings (Roos, Roos, Edvinsson, and 
Dragonetti, 1998; Stewart, 1998; Brooking, 1996; Kaplan and Norton, 1996a). 
6.3. 7.3 Measuring intellectual capital efficiency (i) 
The current Ie value is captured by the coefficient of efficiency "i," which tests the future 
investments (which are captured by "e") against corporate productivity, value creation, and 
user evaluation. In this manner, a company' s commitment to the future would be balanced 
with operating measures of the present (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). After the monetary 
indicators (indicators, which are expressed using $ signs) oftable 6.1 have been contracted to 
table 6.2, a list of indicators expressed in percentages and ratios remains. Parallel to the 
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streamlining process of the Ie value "e," in calculating the coefficient of efficiency from this 
list, all five areas of focus of the Ie Navigator should be adequately considered. According to 
Edvinsson and Malone, it is important that, in order to accurately reflect how effectively the 
organisation is currently using its Ie, each indicator increases in value the better the company 
performs (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). The suggested indicators obtained from the standard 
list as presented in table 6.1 are summarised in Table 6.3. At the risk of repetition, attention 
should again be drawn to the fact that Edvinsson and Malone stress that the suggested lists in 
table 6.2 and table 6.3 are by no means exhaustive nor prescriptive, but rather designed to 
incite debates as to what constitutes future Ie value and current Ie performance. 
Table 6.3: Intellectual capital coefficient of efficiency (i) indices 
1. Market share 
2. Satisfied Customer Index 
3. Leadership Index 
4. Motivation Index 
5. Index of R&D resources/total resources 
6. Index of training hours 
7. Performance/quality goal 
8. Employee retention 
9. Administrative efficiency/revenues 
(reciprocal of administrative 
errorlrevenues) 
Source: adapted from Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 186-187. 
For the purpose of this study, it would be beneficial to briefly pause here in order to consider 
an interesting point. Scrutiny of tables 6.1, and 6.3 reveals an inconsistency in the authors' 
flow of argumentation concerning the customer dimension. First, to recall from the customer 
focus area in this chapter, the authors emphasise strongly the importance of satisfying 
customers (see Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 89), then, however, a customer attraction index 
is introduced (see Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 95). This could be confusing because the 
reader would expect a customer satisfaction index in recognition of the alleged importance of 
customer satisfaction. Thirdly, and even more confusingly, in table 6.3, the authors eventually 
use a customer satisfaction index. Notwithstanding this terminological vagueness, the 
calculation of the coefficient of efficiency ("i") is rather straightforward. In order to calculate 
"i," the proposition is made to combine all nine measures of table 6.3 into a single index 
reflecting how a company is currently using its Ie. 
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This single index has been expressed by means of an equation: 
i = (n/x) 
The sum of the decimal values for the nine efficiency indices is equalled by (n), whereas (x) 
refers to the absolute number of these indices and thus determines their average. Only if a 
company operates exceptionally well, a coefficient greater than 1 can be achieved. 
To summarise, the Skandia approach goes one step further than the Intangible Asset Monitor 
and Balanced Scorecard approach in that a single IC index is calculated. This index is 
calculated by multiplication of its two constituent parts, viz. the intellectual capital value (e) 
and the coefficient of efficiency (i). The Ie index is meant to represent the overall value of a 
company's Ie for external reporting purposes and encompasses all five areas of focus of the 
metaphorical house. It should be remembered, however, that the indicators, which serve to 
calculate this index do not seem to be sufficiently standardised yet. This would be an 
important observation in view of the purpose of the Skandia Navigator to serve as a tool for 
external reporting. 
6.4 A critique of the Skandia intellectual capital Navigator 
A critique of the Skandia Navigator would need to investigate at least six areas. Firstly, and 
maybe most importantly, a lack of attention in the Skandia framework to the flows between 
individual Ie categories deserves attention. This could be investigated against the background 
of a general lack of attention to the interaction among individual perspectives in the model. 
Thirdly, it should be evaluated whether IC can be seen as a debt or an asset item on corporate 
balance sheets. Fourthly, the inadequate treatment of the external focus area should be 
critisised. Another area that deserves consideration is the human focus. Last but not least, the 
~ ~ - -
usefulness of the Ie index should be examined. 
6.4.1 Negligence of intellectual capital flows 
_ An important aspect, which is not incorporated in the Skandia approach to ICM seems to be 
an appropriate consideration of the flows between different categories of Ie. Accounting for 
these flows, however, would be an important requirement for ICM models (Roos and Roos, 
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1997: 419). For example, IeM models would need to capture how, in the process of 
translating human capital into structural capital, the latter would increase in value, whereas 
the former would decrease. This would suggest that the Skandia Navigator, similarly to 
Sveiby's model, could be "static" in that it would focus exclusively on capturing stocks ofle. 
An exclusive focus on stocks seems to neglect flows of Ie between such stocks. Here, it 
should be emphasised again that at this early development stage of Ie research, the 
sophistication of the three models discussed should be accredited and criticism should rather 
be formulated as suggestion for future research. In fact, Edvinsson and Malone themselves 
seem to recognise that a lack of attention to Ie flows could constrain the potential of the Ie 
Navigator: 
"Best of all, we need to show those indicators being continuously modified by other, related, 
indicators or indices. The result would be the Navigator moving through time, always up-to-
the-minute, but also leaving a trail of all of the past minutes to show improvement or decline. 
This would be a truly dynamic reporting of Intellectual Capital" (Edvinsson and Malone, 
1997: 72). 
Initial propositions concerning such more "dynamic" approaches to Ie measurement, which 
assigns a central role to flows between different Ie categories have been made by Roos and 
Roos (1997), Roos, Roos, Edvinsson, and Dragonetti (1998), and in particular by Bontis 
(1999). An in-depth analysis of these propositions would be beyond the immediate scope of 
this thesis. However, these propositions seem to illustrate and support Edvinsson's notion that 
"out of human capital grows some kind of structural capital" (Edvinsson, 1997: 368) and 
should therefore be further investigated and aligned to the IeM theory in general and the 
Navigator in particular. 
6.4.2 A lack of attention to the interaction among the focus areas 
The reason for the above could possibly reside in a lack of attention to the interaction among 
focus areas. It has been emphasised by Edvinsson and Malone, that in contrast to the four 
dimensions financial, process, customer, as well as renewal/development, which only interact 
to a certain degree with one another, exclusively the human focus interpenetrates all Ie foci. 
Hence the metaphorical description "soul of the house" for the human focus. The fact that 
only the human focus connects the different foci of the metaphorical house could be criticised 
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on the ground that potential sources of Ie value enhancement might be obscured or neglected. 
Particularly at the interface of two or more areas of focus companies might overlook potential 
sources of IC value enhancement. To illustrate, in the IC Navigator framework, no measure 
would explicitly account for the interface of customer focus and renewal and development 
focus. Thus valuable suggestions for the development of products from the side of the 
customer, which seem to be well conceptualised in Sveiby's framework, could not be 
conceptualised and might be overlooked in Skandia's. 
Recalling Kaplan and Norton's principle of cause-and-effect relationships as discussed in the 
foregoing chapter, it would appear that this principle lends itself well to capture the interfaces 
between individual focus areas. In linking the IC Navigator indicators by means of cause-and-
effect relationships the potential inadequacies in the example above could be avoided. In the 
example, both areas of focus (i.e. customer focus/renewal and development focus) would be 
connected since the "cause" (i.e. customer suggestion) would now be linked to the "effect" 
(i.e. product development). This would suggest that the Balanced Scorecard principle of cause 
and effect relationships, which explicitly considers the interface between two or more 
scorecard perspectives would appear more appealing than the Skandia Navigator approach, 
where only the human focus area interacts with the other areas of focus. Taking the fact into 
consideration that the IC Navigator draws partially from Balanced Scorecard insights, it 
seems unclear why the evidently powerful principle of cause-and-effect relationships, which 
links the different foci has not been adopted by the Skandia practitioners. Thus, the 
observable lack of attention to the interaction of the individual areas of focus should clearly 
be criticised. 
6.4.3 Intellectual capital as a debt item 
As the analysis has attempted to demonstrate, Edvinsson and Malone suggest that Ie is best 
viewed as a debt item because it can be seen as an investment in the future and would 
typically be borrowed from stakeholders (Edvinsson, 1997: 367-368; Edvinsson and Malone, 
1997: 43). This contention seems to be shared by various authors in the field. For example, 
Harvey and Lusch have recently suggested that many integral parts of Ie, i.e. innovation, 
brands, patents, knowledge processes and a host of other intangible assets constitute 
intangible liabilities. These liabilities are typically unrecorded and unrecognised on traditional 
balance sheets (Harvey and Lusch, 1999). 
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A fact that seems worth elaborating in this context is Edvinsson and Malone's and Sveiby's 
conflicting rationale concerning what IC constitutes in corporate balance sheets. As has been 
delineated in chapter 4, Sveiby suggests an additional invisible balance sheet under the 
surface of the established and visible balance sheet and recommends to view IC as an asset 
item that has its own form of counterbalance, i.e. shareholders' invisible equity and 
obligation. Edvinsson and Malone, in contrast, seem to stick to the traditional balance sheet 
elaborating on the goodwill of organisations that might be seen as counterbalancing item to 
Ie. 
Discernment of which of both approaches might be more applicable to IC theory seems 
premature at this point in time. It appears that Edvinsson and Malone's as well as Sveiby's 
rationale would in similar manner have to be refined and grounded in theory in order to be 
able to judge which of both would be more valid and appropriate. Notwithstanding the danger 
of premature comments, a fact rendering Sveiby's approach more appealing would be his 
terminological consistency, i.e. intellectual assets are allocated to the asset side of the 
invisible balance sheet. At this point of the argumentation, critics might ponder the question 
whether the active or passive side of the balance sheet is really that important an issue for IC 
measurement since in any case, a corresponding value is located precisely on the other side as 
counterbalance. 
6.4.4 Inadequate treatment of external environment 
It has been emphasised above that the metaphorical house represents, predicated on the 
author's understanding, an excellent model for illustrating the complexity oflCM. Despite its 
excellent illustrative format, it could still be criticised on the grounds of minor 
inconsistencies, primarily on its seemingly inadequate treatment of the external corporate 
environment. 
From an observation of figure 6.1, it would appear that Edvinsson and Malone are aware of 
the pertinence of the operating environment to corporate success. Closer examination of their 
analysis, however, reveals that the operating environment is not linked to any of the 
components of the Navigator. The only constituent of an organisation's external environment 
to be measured and catered for appears to be the customer focus. Such treatment, which also 
seems to be characteristic of Kaplan and Norton, as well as Sveiby's approach, arguably 
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involves a misplaced view on external forces pertaining to corporate performance. This 
inadequacy could lead to a negligence of other important aspects of the external environment, 
such as supplier power, competitors (see, e.g. Porter, 1980, 1985, 1998), and societal peer 
groups holding a stake in corporate activities, both nationally (see, e.g. Moss-Kanter, 1999; 
Kotler and Andreasen, 1996) as well as internationally (see, e.g. Wartick and Wood, 1998, 
Roddick, 1991). To this end one might question whether an adoption of the triad 
categorisation of Ie as proposed in chapter 2 would not offer a more appropriate alternative, 
because the external dimension in this model would accommodate a broader spectrum of 
external corporate stakeholders. 
6.4.5 A critique of the human focus area 
The second-last focus of the Ie Navigator to be critically discussed is the human dimension. 
Apparently inspired by Sveiby's theories of know-how companies and the knowledge 
perspective, Edvinsson and Malone exclusively refer to white collar workers, e.g. salespeople 
or office goers and do not explicitly incorporate blue collar worker into their categorisation of 
employees. An exclusive focus on such white collar, or "knowledge workers" seems to 
characterise contemporary discourse in the Ie research realm (see, e.g. Drucker, 1999a, 
1999b). The exclusive focus on white collar workers in the categorisation of a firm's 
employees in the Skandia approach, however, suggests that the immediate relevance of the 
Navigator could be limited to service companies. To offset this potentially limited 
applicability and in order to gain wider pertinence, an alternative categorisation approach 
could be adopted. Particularly useful in this respect seems to be Stewart's approach (Stewart, 
1998: 90-91), which has been introduced in chapter 4. 
For the purpose of this thesis, it can briefly be elucidated how Stewart's approach could 
co~pl~l1lent the Skandia Ie Navigator. Edvinsson and Malone, similarly to Sveiby, propound 
that all employees of the company would contribute to the overall Ie value (Edvinsson and 
Malone, 1997: 130). This could be motivated by the strong entrenchment of the two 
frameworks in the service industry, where seemingly all employees contribute to Ie value 
creation. For the purpose of widening the potential of the Skandia Ie Navigator beyond the 
service industry realm, Stewart's generic categorisation approach could be adopted. Recalling 
Stewart's two-by-two matrices illustrated in figure 4.4 (Stewart's approach to categorise- a 
company's workforce) and figure 4.5 (Managerial directives for addressing the established 
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categories) suggests that a complementation of Skandia's approach with Stewart's 
suggestions might constitute a fertile ground for further exploration. The potential benefit 
thereof might be a clearer view on human capital's direct contribution to IC value creation, 
across industries. 
6.4.6 The usefulness of the intellectual capital index 
Last, but not least, the usefulness of the intellectual capital index would need to be 
scrutinised. As the analysis in this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, the Skandia 
approach seems to go beyond the Intangible Asset Monitor and the Balanced Scorecard 
because it ultimately contracts all IC information into one concrete measure, the IC index. 
Such an IC index should clearly be welcomed to the extent that it would appropriately 
contract all relevant I C information in one single measure that can be used for external 
reporting, and benchmarking purposes. 
A critique of the sophistication of the Skandia Navigator would need to examine how well 
this approach fulfils such a purpose. To this end, it must be kept in mind that the Skandia 
Navigator, in line with the Balanced Scorecard and the Intangible Asset Monitor, would 
accommodate a great variety of indicators. As was explained in chapter 4, this could be an 
asset to the extent that such a non-prescriptive approach would leave room to accommodate 
industry-specific foci and emphases in selecting measures. Attention was also drawn to the 
speculation that such "laissez faire" practice, while apparently useful for internal purposes, 
could be less than optimal if IC data is to be used for external reporting. The reason for this 
conjecture has been ascribed to the importance of comparability in external reporting. To the 
extent that heterogeneous indicators are used, comparability of IC data could be severely 
compromised. It has been concluded that while a non-standardised approach to the 
identification of indicators would certainly represent an asset for internal purposes, it could be 
a liability for external reporting. 
Since the Skandia Navigator seems characterised by the same "laissez faire" approach to the 
delineation of indicators, its IC index, which would merely be a contracted version of these 
indicators, would be useful internally, but could be less beneficial externally. This point 
would need some elaboration. If a company's initial choice of indicators is strongly 
determined by individual company specific dynamics and foci, it could a priori be precluded 
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from external comparison. This would be an important observation if one recalls that the 
purpose of the Skandia Navigator is. primarily external reporting, and that it is claimed that 
their "Ie yardstick" can be used not only across industries, but even across sectors of the 
economy. In fact, an observed company specificity would strongly contradict Edvinsson and 
Malone's aspirations. According to them, 
"Ie vaults the traditional chasm between for-profit and non-profit institutions, for the first 
time in history we can compare the value of all institutions in society. Suddenly you can 
compare apples and oranges - not by looking at the fruit, but at the trees - especially the roots 
- from which they come" (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997: 174-175, emphases in original). 
Bontis, Dragonetti, Jacobsen, and Roos add a new dimension to, and expand, the above by 
stressing the fact that if an Ie approach is extremely flexible, all companies relying on this 
approach are likely to suggest different variations of the same idea. which prohibits any 
possible comparison (Bontis, Dragonetti, Jacobsen, and Roos, 1999). It would thus appear 
that a general guideline for constructing an Ie report in the form of a standardised framework 
applicable across industries bears enormous potential for inter-company and even inter-sector 
comparison. To this end, the construction of such a standardised framework of Ie 
measurement for the purpose of external reporting would constitute an excellent, if not the 
most important, avenue for the research path ahead. 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter illustrated and critically discussed the Skandia Navigator, an IeM tool that has 
been designed by, and specifically for, the Swedish insurance company Skandia. Therefore, 
chapter 6 could, in many ways be read as a case study of Skandia. It was argued that this 
would be important, because the emphasis on localised conditions in the Skandia framework 
could limit its relevance-- to other companies, particularly those which are not in the service 
industry in general or the insurance business in particular. 
The Skandia Navigator intellectually draws on the two models, which were discussed in the 
previous two chapters (the Intangible Asset Monitor has been analysed in chapter 4, and the 
Balanced Scorecard has been examined in chapter 5). Analysis in this chapter revealed that, 
methodologically, Skandia's Navigator would be a combinatory approach that combines 
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elements from the models discussed in the previous two chapters. In this sense, the Skandia 
approach could be seen as an ICM model that accords explicit and detailed attention to the 
measurement of IC (similarly to the Intangible Asset Monitor) within a wider framework of 
corporate performance measurement that also considers financial performance (in line with 
the Balanced Scorecard). An important fact not to be overlooked is that the Skandia Ie 
Navigator goes one step further than these two models in that the most salient indicators are 
contracted to a single measure, the "IC index." The usefulness of this index, however, could 
be severely compromised for external reporting purposes, because of the non-standardised 
approach in delineating individual measures that coalesce in this index. Such wide latitude in 
selecting measures, while potentially useful for internal purposes due to the flexibility it 
would offer, could radically impact comparability of Ie data across companies. 
A last, but important point to be appreciated is the lack of attention to Ie flows between the 
individual building blocks. It should be emphasised that this deficiency is not characteristic of 
the Skandia approach alone, and would suggest that extant discourse in IC research could be 
"static" in that it treats IC essentially as a "stock" of assets. 
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Part III: Summary, concluding observations, and 
recommendations 
Chapter 7: Summary, conclusions, and recommendations 
7.1 Introduction 
The objective of the study was outlined in chapter 1. The present thesis was designed to 
contribute to an improved understanding of the concept of ICM by way of conceptually 
clarifying IC, and a critical analysis of extant approaches of, and tools to, ICM. In view of this 
purpose, a comprehensive conceptual study was conducted, involving international literature 
on the subject oflC and its management. 
This final chapter is divided into four main sections. Firstly, a summary of the overall 
conceptual analysis is provided. This is in line with the practice throughout to provide 
summative evaluation statements at strategic points in the spirit of McNiff, Lomax, and 
Whitehead (1996). This serves to demonstrate the relevance of the individual parts and 
chapters to the improvement of an understanding of the concept of ICM. Secondly, the major 
conclusions, which could be made on the basis of the conceptual study, are outlined. Thirdly, 
a number of the most salient recommendations are forwarded. Finally, recommendations for 
further research are presented in ascending order of priority. 
7.2 Summary 
7.2.1 Part I: Conceptual frame 
Part I provided a general introduction to, and conceptual frame of reference for, the concept of 
ICM by contributing to an improved understanding of the resource ICM seeks to manage, viz. 
IC. Part I comprised the first three chapters of the present study. 
7.2.1.1 Introduction (chapter 1) 
The first, introductory chapter briefly sketched relevant trends and discontinuities that seem to 
characterise corporate competitive environments. The most remarkable result that can be 
observed from these discontinuities seems to be the increasing importance of IC for corporate 
success. In view of its importance, it seems natural to accord explicit attention to the 
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management of this organisational resource. The above insights form the background against 
which the present study can be viewed and from which the statement of the problem followed. 
The problem, which motivated the thesis, can be summarised by reference to a conceptual 
vagueness and obscurity surrounding the concept ICM and the resource it seeks to manage. 
The indicated divergence in views can be interpreted as a major factor impeding an 
understanding ofICM. A misplaced view on ICM, however, is likely to have a severe impact 
on corporate competitive success. Thus, the objective of the study was to contribute to an 
improved understanding. After the statement of the objective, attention was given to the 
delineation of the scope. In a subsequent step, the methodology employed for the analysis was 
introduced, its epistemological implications were outlined, and its adoption justified. 
Ultimately the approach to structure discussion that followed was presented, in order to 
provide a framework to guide the reader through the thesis. 
7.2. 1.2 A preliminary definition and an anatomy of intellectual capital (chapter 2) 
A fundamental task for the purpose of this thesis was to establish clarity concerning the 
definition and anatomy of the resource the phenomenon under investigation seeks to manage, 
viz. I C. This was considered a worthwhile effort in view of the conceptual vagueness 
concerning IC, which seems to be prevalent in current analyses in the ICM realm. Apparently 
no clear consensus has as yet emerged concerning the definition and anatomy of this 
resource. The divergence in views impairs a proper understanding of ICM. Appropriate 
conceptualisation of IC can be seen as a fundamental platform from which further 
investigations concerning its management can be pursued. It would appear that the question of 
how to manage is compounded by the question of what to manage. 
The objective of this chapter was to review and synthesise extant perceptions of IC, with the 
ultimate aim of contributing to an enhanced understanding of the concept of ICM. Upon 
analysis, a preliminary definition was given and extant categorisation approaches were 
synthesised in a threefold classification scheme. The three identified categories of IC were 
described in terms of their relative emphases and foci. The theoretical investigation in chapter 
2 further provided a critical analysis of the benefits and limitations of the proposed 
classification scheme. 
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7.2.1.3 The need to manage Ie (chapter 3) 
Before analysis can tum to a critical discussion of extant ICM approaches, it was considered 
useful to first demonstrate the need for the management of IC through illustration of the 
generic importance IC assumes in a wide spectrum of industries. This was provided by way of 
reference to a business case involving the advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi, as well as by 
reference to the importance oflC in branches of industry besides the service variety in general 
and the advertising business in particular. 
Analysis of the Saatchi & Saatchi case revealed potential managerial dangers, which can be 
associated with a focus on corporate financial data at the expense of managing Ie. The 
interpretation of the case study using an IC perspective obviated the importance of the three 
components of IC, as they emerged from chapter 2, in building and sustaining 
competitiveness at Saatchi & Saatchi. After highlighting the pertinence of IC and its 
management for Saatchi & Saatchi, the analysis proceeded to examine the relevance of IC to a 
variety of industrial settings. Comparison of the market value and book value of selected 
companies in the manufacturing industry, as well as the knowledge and service industries was 
made. A replacement value approach was used to show that the gap (i.e. IC) between the 
market value and the book value of the investigated companies was substantial. Thus, it was 
acknowledged that to the extent that the book value represents an increasingly diminishing 
component of the overall market value of many companies, purely financial foci, which 
typically concentrate on this book value, are inappropriate for many corporate environments. 
This is indicative of the potential of ICM approaches and tools, whose critical analysis is the 
content of part II. 
7.2.2 Part II: A critical analysis of extant intellectual capital management 
approaches and tools 
Part II consists of chapters 4-6, each focusing on the analysis of one extant ICM approach and 
tool. The objective of part II was to critically analyse extant ICM approaches and tools, 
building on the insights as developed in part I. Throughout the three constituent chapters 
implicit assumptions and individual premises of the individual ICM tools were uncovered. 
Particular emphasis was given to the inherent limitations of the discussed ICM approaches 
and the operational environments where each is designed to be deployed. This was done by 
way of critical examination of their sophistication in attending the anatomy of IC in a wider 
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context of corporate management. In order to facilitate compansons and cross-references 
between the individual approaches and tools, the analyses in the three chapters were 
structured analogously. An analogous analytical approach seems to suggest that, for the 
purpose of providing an overall encompassing picture of the discussions, they are best 
summarised by means of a table. Table 7.1 draws together the most salient insights made 
throughout the analyses, thereby providing an abridged version of part II. 
Table 7.1: A summary of extant intellectual capital management approaches and tools 
Chapter 4: Chapter 5: Chapter 6: 
The Intangible Asset The Balanced The Skandia IC 
Monitor Scorecard Navigator 
Origin • Designed to meet the • Research at the Nolan • Developed to reflect 
specific requirements Norton institute changes in competitive 
of a publishing (KPMG) involving a environment of 
company variety of companies insurance company 
(Affarsvalden) from different (Skandia) 
industries 
Rationale • Based on knowledge • Guarding the company • Tree metaphor: IC 
perspective against described as root of 
• Emphasis exclusively suboptimisation corporate value 
on IC • Based on Porterian creation 
• Construction of an and information age • IC as debt item on 
"Invisible balance principles corporate balance 
sheet" with IC as sheets 
asset item 
Purpose • Measuring intangible • Expanded • Measuring IC in an 
assets organisational integrated framework 
• Involving IC performance • Combines financial 
.. , 
exclusively measurement tool capital with IC 
• Internal as well as • Holistic management • External reporting 
« ' external purposes tool 
• Financial and non-
financial perspectives 
included 
• Internal document 
Approach and • Very strong focus on • Balanced approach • Measuring IC in 
tool corporate workforce comprising financial conjunction with 
in two building blocks and non-financial financial capital 
of IC (internal capital perspectives • Presents sophisticated 
and human capital) • Cause-and-effect methodology to 
• Three bases of relationships link calculate overalilC 
measurement: individual perspectives index 
growth and renewal, • Identification of 
efficiency, stability outcome measures 
and performance 
drivers 
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Table 7.1:A summary of extant reM approaches and tools (continued) 
Advantages • Very sophisticated • Ca u se-a n d-effect • IC index could allow for 
categorisation of relationships link the external comparison 
corporate customers four scorecard between companies 
in terms of intangible perspective and across industries 
revenues they • Explicit focus on • Useful illustrative 
provide financial aspects in a format, viz . 
• Very relevant to holistic performance metaphorical house 
service and know- measurement 
how companies framework 
• Can be deployed into a 
system for managing 
IC 
• Specifically developed 
for a wide spectrum of 
industries 
Disadvantages • Strong focus on • Downplays value of • Inadequate treatment 
employees might human capital of external 
lead to neglect of • Inadequate treatment environment, i.e. focus 
important areas of of external exclusively on 
internal capital environment, i.e. focus customers 
• Inadequate treatment exclusively on • Static, IC flows not 
of external customers incorporated 
environment, i.e. • Restricted to internal • Usefulness of Ie index 
focus exclusively on \ could be limited use 
customers because of 
• Explicit focus on unstandardised 
service and know- approach that 
how companies underlies the index 
• Perhaps less relevant • Designed specifically 
to other (e.g. for a service company 
manufacturing) 
industries 
• Static, IC flows not 
incorporated 
• No overall IC index 
calculated for 
external reporting 
• Not linked to financial 
capital 
rn summary, chapters 4-6 which constitute part II of the thesis, contributed to an improved 
understanding of the concept of reM through systematic analysis and critique of the three 
most prominent reM approaches and tools. 
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7.2.3 Part III: Concluding observations and recommendations 
7.2.3.1 Summary, conclusions and recommendations (chapter 7) 
The final chapter 7 presents the most salient aspects and insights, which were constructed 
throughout the study, for an enhanced understanding of the concept of IeM. To this end, 
firstly, each part was briefly summarised in terms of its constituent chapters. In this summary, 
for expository purposes, it was considered appropriate to draw together the principal thoughts 
of chapters 4-6 in a table format, thereby providing an abridged version of part II. In a 
subsequent step, the major conclusions of the analysis were forwarded. Thirdly, based on the 
findings of the study a number of recommendations were made, both in terms of 
recommendations for a better understanding of the concept ofIeM, as well as suggestions for 
the advancement of business applications and theory. 
7.3 Conclusions 
The major trends and challenges to modern corporate management, which could be discerned 
from an analysis of the literature, were elaborated in chapter 1. The challenges, each 
individually and in conjunction, seem to heighten the importance of an appropriate 
understanding of the concept of IeM. The challenges provided the inspiration to undertake a 
study to contribute to an improved understanding of the concept by way of conceptually 
clarifying Ie, and providing a critical analysis of extant IeM approaches and tools. 
The most salient conclusions made throughout the study, can be itemised in the following 
manner: 
(a) Upon analysis of the prevailing definitions and categorisations of Ie, the following 
preliminary definition of Ie was suggested: 
Intellectual capital 
(i) is an important source of value creation, and thus 
(ii) contributes to sustainable competitive advantage; 
(iii) constitutes the value gap between book value and market value, which typically 
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(iv) is invisible in the corporate balance sheet; 
(v) has the potential to enhance a company's future earning capability; 
(vi) is the sum of tangible and intangible intellectual assets; 
(vii) consists of three main building blocks, viz. human capital, internal capital, and 
external capital; 
(viii) is a corporate key success factor and thus an important managerial responsibility 
is to manage it adroitly. 
(b) While divergences concerning the anatomy of IC seem to prevail, current interpretations 
of the concept can be synthesised. Upon synthesis, IC can be thought of in terms of a triad 
model, which is composed of three generic constituent parts, viz. 
(i) human capital, l.e. the skills, capabilities and competencies of the corporate 
workforce, 
(ii) internal capital, i.e. "what is left in the company when the employees go home," and 
(iii) external capital, i.e. customer-, social-, supplier-, competitor-, and other stakeholder 
relationships, the reputation of a company, as well as the brand equity. 
(c) Upon analysis, extant ICM approaches and tools generally seem to be developed for 
service industries. It was found that this emphasis could limit their relevance to other 
branches of industry. To the extent that IC appertains to a wider spectrum of industries, 
and that individual industries would be characterised by considerably different dynamics, 
such emphasis could be inadequate. 
(d) An important question to be contemplated when thinking about ICM, would be a possible 
explicit linkage of ICM approaches and tools to traditional, i.e. financial measurement 
systems. It was concluded that a possible error of omission, which a singular focus on Ie 
could make, would be the exact obverse it accuses the traditional, financial, measurement 
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and management systems of making. To the extent that IeM would ascribe predominance 
to Ie, corporate financial capital could be neglected. 
(e) It was found that extant IeM approaches and tools seem to lend themselves for two 
generic purposes, viz. firstly, internal measurement purposes, and secondly, external 
reporting purposes. The inherent requirements of each, however, seem to be in conflict: 
(i) When used for internal measurement purposes, IeM approaches and tools would need 
to allow for sufficient latitude in order to accommodate industry, and/or company-
specific characteristics and foci. 
(ii) When used for external reporting purposes, IeM approaches and tools would need to 
be fairly standardised, in order to enable comparisons between companies and across 
industries. 
(iii) The above implies that, when both purposes have to be accommodated 
simultaneously, the requirements inherent in each would need to be balanced. 
(f) Extant IeM approaches and tools appear to be "static" in that they account primarily for 
stocks ofIe, rather than for flows ofle between individual categories. 
(g) Although the "M" of IeM is commonly interpreted as an abbreviation for management in 
the current literature, extant approaches and tools to IeM seem to be principally 
concerned with the measurement, rather than the management, of Ie and can thus be 
referred to as measurement tools and not management tools in the broader sense of the 
word. 
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7.4 Recommendations 
7.4.1 Recommendations for an improved understanding of the concept of 
intellectual capital management 
Recommendations for an improved understanding of the concept of ICM, based on the 
analysis in the present thesis could include, but may not be limited to, the following: 
(a) The anatomy oflC can best be understood in terms of a triad model, comprising the three 
generic building blocks, viz. human capital, internal capital and external capital. The three 
main categories can be further subdivided into several subcategories. A subdivision 
appears useful, because it would allow individual companies to set specific emphases to 
suit their particular circumstances and industry characteristics. 
(b) In VIew of possible inadequacies associated with a singular focus on Ie in IeM 
approaches and tools, an appropriate understanding of ICM would view IeM within a 
broader framework that integrates both IC as well as financial capital. Such appropriate 
understanding would attribute adequate managerial attention to both constituents of 
corporate market value in conjunction, rather than focusing on each individually. In this 
manner, Ie as well as the book value could be accommodated. 
(c) IeM, as a measurement tool, can be understood as having a dual purpose, in that it could 
be used for internal measurement as well as external reporting. Inherent in such a dual 
purpose, however, a trade-off relationship could reside. On the one hand, sufficient 
sensitivity to industry and/or company-specific requirements would be needed for internal 
measurement purposes. On the other hand standardisation would be required in order to 
ensure comparability across companies and/or industries in the case of external reporting. 
(d) When referring to current ICM approaches and tools, the "M" ofICM should, contrary to 
common practice in the literature, be understood as measurement, rather than 
management. This would be important in order not to overestimate the potential of extant 
IeM models. 
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7.4.2 Recommendations for further research 
Recommendations for further research would constitute an integral part of a theoretical study 
to clarify the structure and general approach of emerging concepts. This thesis concludes with 
the provision of such recommendations in two generic areas, viz. firstly, the advancement of 
business applications, and secondly, the advancement of theory. 
7.4.2.1 Recommendations for the advancement of business applications 
The following recommendations for the advancement of business applications can be 
forwarded: 
(a) The relevance ofIe in its present form to various industries should be examined. It seems 
that general agreement exists concerning the fact that Ie assumes great pertinence across 
industries. The individual degrees of pertinence, however, seems to vary. The relative 
pertinence to diverse industries should therefore be considered, in order to establish the 
need for an active engagement with the management of the resource Ie. 
(b) In the present investigation, a further examination of how the three generIc building 
blocks of Ie could best be split into subcategories in order to accommodate industry-
specific emphases could be made. The suggested approach would allow individual 
companies to set specific emphases to suit their individual circumstances and industry 
characteristics in devising reM initiatives. Such practice would be particularly relevant 
when IeM is used for internal purposes. It should be remembered, however, that when 
used for external reporting purposes, the latitude inherent in this approach could be 
inadequate. 
(c) The notion of a consolidation in views on IeM and its possible business applications 
should be examined. For example, such consolidation should be welcomed to the extent 
that it offers a universally accepted platform for measuring this resource. The envisaged 
merits of a universally accepted Ie measurement approach seem to include enhanced 
comparability of corporate success, and benchmarking opportunities across industries and 
countries, and could be investigated. 
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(d) For such benchmarking purposes, the development of an "IC index," i.e. strategic pointer 
that consolidates IC information into one figure representing a company's IC situation 
would be worthwhile investigating (see, e.g. Roos, Roos, Edvinnson, and Dragonetti). 
This IC index could be used to supplement and/or extend traditional balance sheets, 
thereby providing a more comprehensive picture of the two constituents of corporate 
market value. 
(e) In designing approaches and tools to manage IC, companies are advised to consider the 
inherent benefits and limitations of the three approaches analysed in this study. This 
would enable them to superimpose selected and useful aspects of individual models, while 
discarding others, thereby tailoring an individual ICM framework to their particular needs. 
7.4.2.2 Recommendations for the advancement of theory 
Several perceived shallow areas and inadequate conceptualisations, which could be discerned 
in the course of this study, would deserve further scholarly efforts. The following list, 
presented in ascending order of priority, is meant to provide preliminary recommendations for 
such advancement of theory: 
(a) A fundamental step for the advancement of theory would be the validation of the 
definition and anatomy of IC as it emerged from this study. Analysis revealed that extant 
perceptions of the resource to be managed through ICM can be synthesised in a threefold 
categorisation scheme. The synthesised anatomy of IC, as it was presented here, can 
clearly be criticised on various grounds. It was, inter alia, suggested that a synthesis 
concerning the constituent components of IC is premature at the present stage of research 
development in the field. In view of this possible drawback, three interlinked areas of 
further investigation can be identified: 
(i) Firstly, it appears expedient to conduct further analyses into alternative components 
of IC. It would be critical for further assessment of the synthesised model to 
scrutinise the appropriateness of the individual building blocks. This analysis should 
be conducted relative to practical environments where the model is implemented. 
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(ii) Secondly, the threefold categorisation, while appealing in its conceptual pragmatism, 
may obscure the merits of an alternative, more comprehensive approach. Put 
differently, the notion that the three main categories as extrapolated in the present 
study are exhaustive, should extensively be validated. 
(iii) In a subsequent step it may be useful to further establish clarity concerning the 
overlap of the three (or the appropriate number of) components of IC. This exercise 
seems beneficial in view of the potential insights it offers concerning an alternative, 
more discrete classification pattern. In short, it should be scrutinised whether the 
categories as presented here are mutually exclusive. 
(b) In view of possible inadequacies associated with a specific emphasis on companies in the 
service industry that could be observed in the ICM approaches analysed, it would be 
beneficial to scrutinise the potential of current approaches to a wider spectrum of 
companies in diverse industries. If in fact found inadequate for industrial settings other 
than service, extant approaches should be revised. In revising them, two aspects demand 
explicit consideration: 
(i) Firstly, in designing cross-industry ICM approaches and tools, particular attention 
should be given to the accommodation of industry and/or company-specific 
characteristics, using for example Porterian (1980, 1985, 1998) frameworks. 
Provision should also be made for dynamics inherent in industry structures. It should 
not be overlooked that such structures are likely to reconfigure over time, thereby 
possibly affecting the relevance of the frameworks to be designed. This would imply 
that to be useful for a wider spectrum of industries, such revised ICM approaches and 
tools would need to allow for sufficient sensitivity in order to accommodate such 
industry-specific characteristics and dynamics across industries. 
(ii) Secondly, in designing such cross-industry ICM approaches and tools, it must be 
remembered, however, that accommodating sensitivity to industry characteristics 
could compromise the sophistication of such tools when used for external reporting 
across industries. ICM tools for external reporting would need to be fairly 
standardised, in order to allow for comparability across industries and companies. 
This would imply that in designing approaches and tools for external reporting 
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purposes, a balance should be sought between sufficient sensitivity to industry-
specific characteristics, and standardisation of approach. 
(c) Concerning the lack of emphasis on IC flows, in extant ICM approaches and tools, a 
major contribution would be the design of a dynamic framework within which such flows 
can be accounted for. Research could take advantage of existing models, but would need 
to scrutinise their applicability to the ICM context. A particularly attractive approach, 
which could be adapted for the purpose of accounting for IC flows has been presented by 
Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1996a) in their well-known Balanced Scorecard. The core 
principle of "cause-and-effect" relationships within the Balanced Scorecard, which is 
explicitly designed to link the four scorecard perspectives, seems to offer a feasible 
starting point for research into I C flows. 
(d) The current preoccupation in ICM research with measuring IC, would suggest that an 
excellent contribution to current theory development could be the delineation of concrete 
management directives for ICM. Such directives could be based on the insights. already 
gained in extant discourse, and would need to expand the scope of IC measurement 
beyond its current confines and include the management of this important corporate 
resource. 
(i) Structurally, such management approaches could, as a starting point, consider the 
three generic building blocks of IC as they emerged from the analysis of the present 
study. 
(ii) In designing approaches for the management of IC, it must be kept in mind that the 
design of such ICM approaches is likely to differ radically not only with regard to 
e(l~h of the three building blocks oCIC, but also with regard to whether such ICM is 
to be used for internal or external purposes and the industry environment where the 
tool is to be used. 
(iii) Thus, an important starting point for the development of these management 
approaches would be a clear delineation of their purpose. 
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